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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation works to provide a virtue ethical analysis of oppression and
towards the establishment of an obligation which necessitates active engagement in
resistance to oppression. In this way, this project can be seen as proceeding in a twofold
manner; on one hand this project contains a descriptive element, where oppression and its
harmful influence is systematically exposed and laid bare for moral analysis, and, on the
other hand it contains a normative element, where this moral analysis is done and the
grounds of obligations for resistance are established.
The use of virtue ethics, as a framework for such a project, certainly affords many
benefits but at the same time poses many unique challenges. The unique and beneficial
aspects a virtue ethical approach provides to the complex social, political, and moral
quagmire that is oppression finds its roots in the general arguments advanced by virtue
ethicists in defense of virtue.
Michael Slote has noted that there are roughly five main concepts in ethics; (1)
general moral concepts, such as good and bad or right or wrong, (2) rational concepts,
which relate to actions, decisions making, and choice, (3) “admirability and the kindred
concepts,” which indicate the ways morality is conferred or admitted in social
relationships, (4) personal well-being or welfare, which is “the idea of things going well
for someone or in someone’s life, and, (5) “the class of notions that can be used to
evaluate states of affairs, histories of events, and the like.”1 For Slote, these five classes
of concepts represent the different “common sense” ways which ethical notions can be
understood. Slote not only defends virtue ethics in that it is uniquely able to capture
1

Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue (Oxford University Press, 1992), 198-199.
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these five categories of ethical notions, but sights this accomplishment as “add[ing]
impetus to the recent revival of virtue ethics.”2 While Slote does not defend or privilege,
in principle, so-called “common sense” approaches to ethics, he does defend virtue ethics
over consequentialist (and specifically act-utilitarian) theories as virtue is better equipped
to address and utilize these concepts. For Slote, “utilitarianism… allows for a reduction
of all its moral terminology to the idea of producing or resulting in good states of affairs,
and the latter idea and others of its category can in turn be reduced to the category of
personal good.”3 This sublimation of the complexity of ethical notions, and therein the
breadth of moral life in its expansive reality, which utilitarianism encourages is
“irrecusably reductive” and leaves utilitarianism ill-equipped to deal with the reality of
morality and moral understandings.
Arguments similar to Slote’s have been launched against deontological ethics.
Stan van Hooft chronicles, in detail, how virtue ethics “does a better job of performing
the four tasks of moral theory: to understand morality, to prescribe norms, to justify
[moral norms] and to describe how [moral norms] fit into our lives.”4 For van Hooft,
deontology cannot sensibly advance a conception of the social lives of humans as morally
important in its own right, and in holding the centrality of reason in both life and how life
is lived deontology must either ignore or devalue other moral aspects of life.
These claims, and the arguments which support them, coalesce into a general
picture of dissatisfaction about ways of moral theorizing which do not, in the words of
Rosalind Hursthouse, take seriously the role of “moral education, moral wisdom or
discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of
2

Slote, From Morality, 3.
Slote, From Morality, 199.
4
Stan van Hoff, Understanding Virtue Ethics (Acumen Publishing, 2006), 48.
3
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the emotions in our moral life, and the questions of what sort of person I sold be, and of
how we should live.”5 In this way, these arguments can be seen as the germination and
blooming of the critiques made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her seminal 1958 piece “Modern
Moral Philosophy.”6
Following in the vein of these defenses of virtue (and therein the critiques made
of other forms of moral theories), this project utilizes the comprehensive framework of
virtue ethics as a valuable tool for the evaluation of oppression, and the benefit of such an
approach is a natural extension of these general arguments. Oppression, as it will be
shown, is an extremely complex social phenomenon and exerts its harmful influence on
the oppressed in a vast array of ways, and virtue ethics’ moral holism is especially apt at
being able to not only descriptively account for the affected aspects of life but also
provide a normative assessment of these effects.
While virtue ethics is particularly well suited for the descriptive task of morally
assessing the damaging impact of oppression in the lives of the oppressed in a rich and
meaningful way, it poses a unique set of challenges when one moves from the descriptive
project to the generation of prescriptive requirements in the face of such moral harm.
Virtue ethics has not only been assailed, often unfairly, for being unable to adequately
generate schemas for action guidance in a general way, but the “recent revival of virtue
ethics” (to borrow a phrase from Slote) has been in large part motivated by Anscombe’s
plea for a return to ethics without obligation. While I will argue, in chapter three, that
this general critique is unfounded and that virtue ethics does, in fact, present a conception
of action-guidance, the second half of this project seeks to not only generate a specific

5
6

Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1999), 3.
G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy, 33, no. 124 (1958).
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schema for action-guidance in response to oppression but to root these actions in to a
conception of obligation. It is here that virtue ethics poses a unique challenge for this
project as such a framework has traditionally eschewed such concepts and many of
virtue’s most staunch proponents have argued against such attempts.
Before moving on to outline, in more detail, the work in the chapters to follow, it
is important to note while this project uses, continually, the broad label “virtue ethics”
and actively seeks a virtue ethical interpretation of oppression, it is within Aristotelian
and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that this work is being done. While virtue ethics have
been developed in conjunction with consequentialism7 and deontology,8 and the
possibility of virtue theories being found in the work of Hume9 and Nietzsche10 have
been explored, this project does not seek, nor utilize, a synthesis of these positions. With
this admission made clear, the subsequent chapters can be outlined such that the shape of
this project can be seen in greater detail.
Chapter one outlines the broad conception of oppression which is deployed
throughout the project, and is primarily drawn from the paradigmatic examples of racism,
sexism, classism, and heternormatity. At the outset it is argued that comprehensive
theories of oppression, which seek to exhaustively schematize oppression in all possible
variants such that oppression can be differentiated from other forms of political and
moral wrongs, can act as an obstacle for moral analyses of obvious cases of oppression.
Further it is argued that a comprehensive theory of oppression is unnecessary for such
7

See Julia Driver’s Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
See Nancy Sherman’s Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue (Cambridge University
Press, 1997), and, Onora O’Neill’s “Kant’s Virtues,” in How Should One Live: Essays on the Virtues, ed.
Roger Crisp (Oxford University Press, 1998).
9
See Christine Swanton’s “Hume and Virtue Ethics,” in Oxford Handbook of Hume, ed. Paul Russell
(Oxford University Press, 2014).
10
See Christine Swanton’s “Nietzsche and the Virtues of Mature Egoism,” in Nietzsche’s On The
Genealogy of Morals: A Critical Study Guide, ed. Simon May (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
8
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work to proceed. In lieu of advancing or endorsing a rigid theory of oppression, this
chapter works from an understanding of oppression as an emergent social phenomenon
which is deeply entangled with unjust social structures to identify five salient features of
oppression. The salient features identified here are: (1) oppression is a social
phenomenon and affects individuals qua their membership in social and economic
groups, (2) oppression is harmful for the oppressed, (3) oppression is not, in and of itself,
a chosen state of existence by the oppressed, (4) oppression exerts its harmful influence
over a protracted period of time, and, (5) oppression cannot be reduced to any single facet
and exists as a confluence of factors, harms, and social structures. The conception of
oppression which emerges here lays the groundwork for the morally assessment of
oppression which is to follow.
Chapter two takes the conception of oppression outlined in chapter one and, using
the framework of Aristotelian (and neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethics, works to substantiate
the prima facie claim that oppression is wrong as it inflicts moral damage on the
oppressed. In short, this chapter argues that oppression acts, in a multitude of ways, as an
obstacle for the achievement of flourishing. This chapter is broken down into three
sections. In section one, the ways oppression works as a limitation of virtue is explored.
Here, it is shown that specific virtues are made either impossible, overly onerous, or
burdened by the existence of oppression. In each of these ways specific virtues are
radically affected and, more often than not, made an impossibility for oppressed people
and thus oppression can be shown to be a force which curtails the possibility of
flourishing. In section two, the ways oppression systematically manipulates the external
goods necessary for the achievement of flourishing is explored. Here, it is argued that

6

Aristotelian virtue ethics advances the view that certain material goods are necessary, yet
not sufficient, for the achievement of flourishing and these necessary goods are
systematically manipulated under conditions of oppression. This systematic
manipulation means that the external goods necessary for flourishing are often
unavailable to the oppressed. In section three, oppression is connected to so-called “base
and shameful actions.” This section begins exegetically and works to uncover Aristotle’s
view of base actions, and it is argued that Aristotle’s account of such actions suffers from
important shortcomings. Yet, by building on Aristotle’s views, in light of these
shortcomings, a coherent view of base actions can be established and it will be
demonstrated that oppression often curtails flourishing by forcing the habituation of these
base actions. In total this chapter works to connect the harmful effects of oppression via
virtue ethics and uses this encompassing framework to trace the harmful effects of
oppression to our desires, our emotions, our choices, our habits, our interactions with
others, and our political existence as social beings. The resulting picture of oppression
and its harms not only demonstrates the extent and depth of oppression's devastating
effects on the oppressed, but works to ground the claim that the existence of oppression
mandates obligatory responses from virtuous agents.
Chapter three takes up the challenge of establishing, in the virtue ethical
framework, a strong moral obligation which requires agents to resist oppression and
obligates individuals to actively engage in liberatory struggles against oppressive forces.
Admittedly, there is an immediate and apparent tension between the project of virtue
ethics and the idea of strong obligations. Yet, it is argued that such an obligation can still
be found in virtue ethics. To defend this view, this chapter begins by outlining

7

Hursthouse’s virtue-based account of action guidance as found in the so-called ‘v-rules.’
For Hursthouse, the v-rules are derived from the existence of the virtues themselves and
create a schema of rules for the achievement of flourishing. While the v-rules themselves
do not generate obligations, this chapter works to show that the v-rules entail a vast set of
derivative rules (or ‘d-rules’) which do obligate agents in a variety of ways. Of
significance here is the way that the v-rules, and their entailed d-rules, obligate agents to
act in such a way as to resistance the damning influence of oppression as it is a barrier to
flourishing.
The fourth and final chapter works to give substance to the broad obligation,
established in chapter three, that agents are under to resist oppression. It is argued here
that the dischargement of this obligation cannot be fulfilled through the development of
certain intellectual or emotional capacities which might allow individuals to understand
and then judge (properly) their experience of oppression with moral outrage. If it is
oppression's inherent harms that make flourishing impossible for the oppressed (and
therefore creates the moral mandate for resistance), then it is these harms, along with the
practical mechanisms which level these harms, that resistance must be directed. While
some of the harms inflicted by oppression are emotional and psychological in nature,
these harms cannot be reduced to merely "internal" states which can be solved by
transforming an agent's dispositions. Thus, it is argued that virtue ethics, in its demands
that we meet oppression head-on, cannot be reduced to an obligation to cultivate a
disposition and must focus upon action determination. The resistance necessitated by
virtue ethics must function to directly and purposefully attack and dismantle the
apparatuses of oppression which make avenues to flourishing impossible for the

8

oppressed. To provide substance to this call for action determination in resistance
struggles, a model, drawn from the practical world of activist organizing, is imported and
explained such that one is able to see a clear path towards the fulfillment of the obligation
to resist. In the end, this chapter defends the robust account of revolutionary action put
forth and defends against the possible worry of demandingness.
Broadly speaking, this project was largely inspired by the works of Lisa Tessman
and Rosalind Hursthouse, who in many ways work at opposite ends of the virtue ethics
spectrum. I was extremely fortunate to be able to spend time in New Zealand working
closely with Hursthouse during the writing of this dissertation, and during our time
together she often claimed that we did not need to answer “those political problems” as
they were best left to “political philosophers.” While Hursthouse’s work often engages,
deeply, in ‘political’ questions, she sees a divide between political philosophy and moral
philosophy and her work focuses on what has traditionally been in the arena of moral
philosophy. Tessman, on the other hand, works expressly to engage virtue ethics in the
social and political arenas, and her work on the so-called ‘burdened virtues’ and their
connection to liberatory struggles is, to my mind, the best example of how virtue ethics
can, and must, be used to address these ‘political’ questions. Tessman, I would suspect,
sees no strict divide between these two spheres.
The work which follows here could be characterized as an attempt to synthesize
these two perspectives. I disagree with Hursthouse’s characterization of distinct spheres
and do not see a divide between ‘moral theory’ and ‘political philosophy.’ Yet, I agree
with her that virtue ethics begins with a moral framework and that it is through this
framework that virtue ethics works, even when addressing political and social questions.

9

Thus, this project works to keep moral assessment and obligation at the core of the
arguments, and avoids (for example) the political works of Aristotle. Following
Tessman, whose work on the burdened virtues encapsulates one relatively narrow
although extremely important aspect of oppression, this work continually returns to
questions of flourishing and the acquisition of virtue and can contrasted with other work
which might seek to keep justice, or injustice, at its theoretical nucleus. In the end, I
believe that Tessman is right and that the framework of virtue ethics necessitates active
engagement in political and social questions and, in these engagements, virtue ethics can
truly excel at addressing these problems and laying the groundwork for moving beyond
them.

10

CHAPTER ONE

OUTLINING A CONCEPTION OF OPPRESSION

It might be believed that the natural starting point for a protracted project on
oppression and moral resistance would be the establishment, or at least the outlining, of a
comprehensive theory of oppression. Such a theory, once detailed and defended, would
provide the foundation for the moral work of chronicling oppression’s damning effects on
the lives of the oppressed and the need for resistance struggles. Yet, no such
comprehensive theory of oppression will be found here, although this first chapter will
outline a broad understanding of oppression and will highlight some of oppression’s
salient features. This broad understanding of oppression will serve to launch subsequent
moral discussions of oppression, oppression’s harms, and the need for moral resistance
struggles.
Before outlining the understanding of oppression which is at work in this project
the seemingly bold move to omit a robust theory of oppression from this project needs to
be explained and defended. It will be argued here that not only is such a theory
unnecessary for moral philosophizing about oppression and resistance but that attempts at
comprehensive theories of oppression might actually act as roadblocks for further
important work on these topics.

11

Section 1 - The Failures of Comprehensive Theories of Oppression

Oppression is not a foreign concept to anyone working academically in political
and moral philosophy or to those who work in activist and revolutionary movements.
While the concept of oppression, or at least being oppressed, is understood by most
people, an understanding of exactly what oppression is, and how it is differentiated from
other forms of moral and political harm, remains oddly elusive. Racism, sexism,
heteronormativity, and classism are all paradigmatic examples of oppression and, often,
these examples serve as stand-ins for robust 'theories of oppression.' Identifying a theory
of oppression, where oppression is exhaustively schematized and where oppression in all
possible variants and nuances is differentiated from other forms of political and moral
wrongs, often takes a back-seat to other more substantial questions about how oppression
manifests in the lives of the oppressed or how the lived struggle against oppression ought
to take shape. Too many, and I would include myself in this group, the concept of
oppression and its strict ontology are less important than the question(s) about how
oppression is to be resisted. Thus, paradigmatic examples of oppression often act as a
placeholder for a complete theory of oppression and allows for us to agree on
oppression's obvious existence.
Considerable academic and activist work has been devoted to the topic of
oppression. Deeply theoretical accounts, descriptions, and treatments of oppression have
emerged from both academics and activists to chronicle, in detail, oppression’s
influences, existence, and root cause(s), yet, to my mind, a comprehensive and allinclusive theory of oppression remains peculiarly intangible. Attempts to chronicle

12

oppression, such that oppression in all its varied forms, be they real, historic, or even
potential, rely on the belief that oppression can be schematized into a singular theoretical
framework. To this end, what might be called ‘ontologies of oppression’ can be seen to
fall into two rough camps; one which seeks to encompass the idea of oppression into a
particular theoretical framework, and, the other which seeks to identify oppression via
necessary and sufficient conditions. It is my belief that both camps ultimately fail to
provide a compelling unified conception of oppression and here I would like to, briefly,
explain why.
This first camp, which seeks a theory of oppression within a particular
philosophical theory, takes forms of oppression and works towards a singular paradigm
such that all the different types or kinds of oppression can be shown to share a common
core within a distinct theoretical framework. The pre-existing theoretical framework is
imported into discussions of oppression and acts both as the intellectual scaffolding for
the construction of an account of oppression as well as works to move oppression into the
fold of the existent theoretical structure. No better example of this can be found then in
the work of Marxists.
Marxists have long tried to craft unified theories of oppression where the
historical causes of oppression can be identified and the common essence of various
forms of oppression can be unearthed and shown to be a part of 'Oppression.' For the
Marxist, this unified theory of oppression situates the oppression of workers at the
ideological center of their account and then seeks to subsume other forms of oppression
as variants of the oppression of the working class. Thus, the oppression of women and
people of color are explained as exploitative relationships of capital and private property
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and are treated as merely different, but no less pernicious, forms of class exploitation.
This attempt to consolidate various forms of oppression into a singular theory has led to
what Heidi Hartmann has called an "unhappy marriage" between feminism and
Marxism.11 For Hartmann, the early Marxist's conception of oppression essentially
analyzed patriarchal oppression in terms of women's relationship to capital and private
property12 and could not take seriously the relationship between men and women.13
Feminist critiques of such sublimation helped show how simple Marxist analyses could
not take the oppression of women seriously as an issue in its own right, and in many ways
such critiques did not fall universally on deaf ears. Hartmann cites the work of Eli
Zaretsky as an example of a Marxist theorist who took the feminist critique of traditional
Marxism seriously and attempted to avoid the sex-blind nature of classical Marxism and
who tried to synthesize feminism and Marxism together.14 For Hartmann (and others
such as Lydia Sargent15), this attempt, while not sex-blind, still replicated the Marxist
trope of sublimating patriarchal oppression into class divisions. According to Hartmann,
Zaretsky's analysis "ultimately rests on the notion of separation, on the concept of
division, as the crux of the problem" such that patriarchal oppression remains "a division
attributable to capitalism."16 Similar analyses have shown problems of the same kind in
sublimation of race and racism in the Marxist analysis, and such problems lead Leonardo
11
Heidi Hartmann, “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive
Union,” in Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism, ed.
Lydia Sargent (South End Press, 1981).
12
The most famous of such "early Marxist attempts" at analyzing the oppression of women can be found in
Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, which was written in the year
immediately following Marx's death.
13
Hartmann, “Unhappy Marriage,” 3.
14
Eli Zaretsky, Capitalism, the Family, and Personal Life, (Harpercollins, 1986), and also, “Socialist
Politics and the Family,” Socialist Revolution (now Socialist Review) 19 (January-March 1974), 83-98.
15
Lydia Sargent, “New Left Women and Men: The Honeymoon is Over,” in Women and Revolution: A
Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism, ed. Lydia Sargent (South End Press,
1981).
16
Hartmann, “Unhappy Marriage,” 6 (emphasis in original).
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Zeus to (borrowing the title from Hartmann) identify the "unhappy marriage between
Marxism and race critique."17
Ultimately, attempts to craft a singular vision of oppression, which can explain
both the historical causes and material conditions, for various forms of oppression fail in
both their descriptive content as well as their in their normative uptake as such endeavors
must take one of the paradigmatic forms of oppression as the common crux and then
engage in various forms of sublimation. It is in this intellectual act of sublimation that
one fails to take seriously the unique epistemological, historical, and contextual facts of
various forms of oppression and it seems that such attempts, regardless of noble intent,
are doomed to failure. It was the failure of unified theories of oppression which led Iris
Marion Young to note that "attempts by theorists and activists to discover a common
description or the essential causes of the oppression of all these groups have frequently
led to fruitless disputes about whose oppression is more fundamental or more grave."18
Whereas so-called unified theories of oppression seek to fold oppression into a
particular theoretical framework, such as Marxism, other theories of oppression seek to
unify oppression into a codified set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Attempts such
as these do not, at least overtly, try to fold oppression into larger theoretical discussions
but rather try and establish a set of criteria drawn from examples of oppression into a
rigid schema of essentially shared characteristics. Unfortunately, attempts of this nature,
to devise a unified conception of oppression from a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions, also fail to provide a compelling account of oppression.

17

Leonardo Zeus, “Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Race Critique: Political Economy and the
Production of Racialized Knowledge,” Policy Futures in Education, vol. 2, no. 3-4, 483-493 (2004).
18
Iris Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in Oppression, Privilege, & Resistance, eds. Lisa
Heldke and Peg O’Connor (McGraw Hill, 2004), 2.
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One problem with attempts to explain oppression by a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions is that most attempts of this nature devolve into protracted
discussions of warranted inclusion or exclusion. When oppression is rigidly defined
through the identification of a set of necessary (and sufficient) conditions odd sets of
counterfactuals emerge and demand that one engage in bullet-biting to either include or
expel groups from the category of the oppressed. Take for example Kenneth
Clatterbaugh's analysis of feminist theories of oppression.19 In part, Clatterbaugh
outlines what he calls "limitation theories" of oppression. For Clatterbaugh, "the basic
idea [of limitation theories of oppression] is that when options are denied to individuals
in virtue of membership in a group, that limitation constitutes oppression.”20
Clatterbaugh rejects such conceptions of oppression (which he attributes to Marilyn Frye
and the early work of Alison Jaggar) because there are "obvious cases of limitation that
are not oppression" and this leads us to the spurious belief “that everyone is oppressed.”21
As an example of these abundant and "obvious" cases he cites various examples
including the limitations imposed on "well-known Hollywood personalities" who “cannot
travel freely in the city or eat at a favorite restaurant without a crush of admirers."22
Clatterbaugh deploys this example as a form of reducto ad absurdum, and obviously does
not think that celebrities are oppressed qua their celebrité, and uses this odd
counterfactual to dismiss ‘limitation theories’ as being built on unclear and indefensible
conditions for defining oppression. For Clatterbaugh, such counterfactuals (and the

19

Kenneth Clatterbaugh, “Are Men Oppressed?,” in Rethinking Masculinity: Philosophical Explorations in
the Light of Feminism, 2nd Edition, eds. Larry May, Robert Strikwerda, and Patrick D. Hopkins (Rowman
and Littlefield, 1996).
20
Clatterbaugh, “Are Men Oppressed?,” 291.
21
Clatterbaugh, “Are Men Oppressed?,” 293.
22
Ibid.
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reductos they create) clear the path for the advancement of his view of oppression (which
he dubs “dehumanizing theory”). What is ultimately ironic about Clatterbaugh’s
argument is that such counterfactual banter, which he uses to dismiss one attempt at a
unified theory of oppression, actually works as a reducto to all forms of oppression
established on strict categories of necessary and sufficient conditions. The critical
response to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions is the testing of these conditions
against innumerable counter-examples, no matter how contrived. Discussions which
begin as attempts to understand the reality of lived oppression devolve into utterly
fantastical discussions of examples so-far removed from the experience and reality of
oppression that these theories must either accommodate counterfactuals into their criteria
(making their conception of oppression “purely theoretical”) or engage in bullet-biting
such that their conception of oppression omits cases of fantastical oppression.
Similar self-critiques can be found in the ever evolving work of Ann Cudd. Cudd
has written prolifically on oppression and often her work revisits her own ideas such that,
beyond the obvious ever necessary work to clarify and refine ideas which all theorists
face, she continually and subtly alters her conception of oppression such that it can
handle marginal cases. In 1994, Cudd posited four necessary and jointly sufficient
criteria of oppression.23 These four "criteria of oppression" were: (1a) "oppression must
involve some sort of physical or psychological harm," (2a) "Oppression applies in the first
instance to groups who are identifiable independently of their oppression," (3a) "Some
persons benefit, (or think they do), from the oppression," and, (4a) "Oppression must
involve some coercion or force." By 2005, Cudd had refined these four criteria to four

23

Ann Cudd, “Oppression by Choice,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 25: s1 (1994).
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"conditions" which are identifiable in oppression.24 These four conditions are: (1b) the
harm condition: "individuals are harmed by institutional practices (e.g., rules, laws,
expectations, stereotypes, rituals, behavioral norms)," (2b) the group condition:
individuals suffer harms in (1b) because of their membership (or perceived membership)
in a social group," (3b) the privilege condition: "there is another social group that benefits
from the institutional practice in (1b)," and, (4b) the coercion condition: "there is
unjustified coercion or force that brings about the harm." While each of these conditions
closely mirrors the four criteria she outlined over a decade before, these conditions are
subtly altered. For example, in her later work Cudd had moved to from a strict criterion
of benefit (3a) to a broader understanding of benefit as a result of privilege (3b).
Similarly, the fourth condition, while mirroring the fourth criteria, moved from defining
oppression via strict coercion (as a matter of available choices) to unjustified coercion.
Here, Cudd found that without overtly tying the coercion criteria to an established theory
of justice (which she imports from most directly from Rawls and less directly from
liberalism in general), the criteria of coercion allowed-in too many counterfactuals to
accurately capture oppression and therein distinguish oppression from other social forms
of preference and choice limitation.
My point in noting this evolution of ideas in Cudd's work is not to critique her
changes or justify why she saw the need alter her views in her later and more mature
work, but rather to show that rigorous work on a comprehensive theory of oppression
(which to my mind, no one has been more rigorous than Cudd) predicated on necessary
and sufficient conditions comes at a heavy cost; namely that counterfactuals, and how
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Ann Cudd, “How to Explain Oppression: Criteria of Adequacy for Normative Explanatory Theories,”
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 35:1 (2005).
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one deals with such marginal cases, must become the primary focus of such work.
Continually clarifying and therein either allowing-in or shutting-out X or Y from the
concept of oppression such that the concept of oppression can remain a defensibly rigid
designator has become the central focus of Cudd’s analysis.
Deeply related to this problem emerges a second problem within Cudd's work on
oppression. Cudd expressly ties her theory of oppression to a liberal (if not libertarian)
moral framework. While this move severely limits the ways individuals and states can
engage in resisting and dismantling the social and economic apparatuses of oppression, it
also means that Cudd (over)emphasizes aspects of oppression such that they are able to
coincide with a liberal worldview.25 For Cudd, the evolving conception of oppression her
work presents remains centrally focused on individuals, rights violations, and the
manipulation of what could otherwise be unfettered choices made by the oppressed.
While the liberal framework Cudd works within provides the necessary normative tools
for assessing these lost values, and determining that it is oppression which causes these
losses, as morally wrong, it also works descriptively. Cudd defines oppression with the
same moral tools she uses to normatively assess oppression. As a liberal, Cudd sees the
coercion of choice as a central transgression and descriptively mounts a definition of
oppression as a form of coercion. The result of this is that both the descriptive analysis
25
Cudd, in her book Analyzing Oppression (Oxford University Press, 2006), proposes five strategies for
combating oppression. These five avenues are (1) rhetorical and symbolic strategies (which includes both
the use of "purely cool rational uses of persuasive speech" and "passionate and creative uses of speech,
poetry, art, photography, film, and theater" (202)), (2) economic strategies (which includes union strikes,
consumer boycotts, and the expansion of micro-credit agencies), (3) armed struggle (which must be limited
to just war ethics), (4) legal strategies (which includes the passage of laws like ERA and Civil Rights Act),
and, (5) resistance to indirect economic and psychological force (which captures the ways that the
oppressed can (and must) actively work to counteract stereotypes and the obligation to openly disobey
oppressive social norms). Critics such as Helga Varden have claimed that this limited list, which remains
safely tied to liberal conceptions of rights, "hamper[s] [Cudd's] ability to provide the arguments necessary
for the conclusions she draws concerning how to fight oppression." Helga Varden, “Critical Commentary
on Ann Cudd’s Analyzing Oppression, Symposia on Gender, Race, and Philosophy 5, no. 1 (Spring 2009),
7.
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and the advancement of normative goals must remain situated within a singular
theoretical framework and thus unlikely to curry favor with those who reject this
framework.
In both the work of the Marxists and the analytic philosophers (such as Cudd) we
can see how comprehensive theories of oppression face serious, if not insurmountable,
hurdles. In both cases, serious critiques emerge to challenge the conceptions of
oppression they advance and, interestingly, the emergence of these ruinous critiques was
doomed to happen. To advance an ironclad, all-encompassing, and universal theory of
oppression is to demand rigid compliance from various forms of oppression into a unified
theory. The demand of compliance, as outlined above, results in either dogmatic
sublimation of alternative views (as in the case of the Marxist) or the endless devolution
into counterfactuals. In either case, any account of oppression which seeks to work
beyond mere descriptive analysis or analytical ontology becomes distracted or
handcuffed to these discussions. The ability to theorize about what is to be done, or how
oppression impacts moral understandings, is placed into a secondary position behind the
immediate task of first understanding, in total, what oppression truly is. In this way, a
strong theory of oppression hinders the ability to analyze oppression within a moral
framework.
Not only can a strict theory of oppression hinder moral work on the topic, it seems
that such a comprehensive view is unnecessary for proceeding into discussions about the
moral implications of oppression and the moral demand to respond to oppression. It is
not the case that all, or even a majority of, philosophical work on oppression suffers fatal
flaws derived from attempts at a crafting comprehensive theories of oppression. In fact,
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most of the work done on the topic of oppression has been done without a robust theory.
Seminal works on the topic of oppression, such as Frye’s work The Politics of Reality26
and Young’s “The Five Faces of Oppression,” make remarkable insights into the reality
of oppression and help position oppression as a paramount moral and political evil
without either first establishing a rigid and clear conception of oppression or relying on
such a strict model. Other protracted accounts of oppression and its harms, such as
Tessman’s work on oppression as it intersects with the virtues27 and Harvey’s work on
the way oppression is “civilized” into society through things such as humor and role
expectations,28 do not need a codified and foundational account of oppression. In each of
these works we can see that theorizing about oppression need not begin, nor rest on, a
rigid and strict conception of oppression. Thus, no such attempt at a unified theory of
oppression will be established or forwarded here in this work. It is not the goal of this
chapter, or this entire project for that matter, to conceptualize what oppression really is
but rather to trace oppression’s considerable moral influence and establish resistance to
oppression as morally necessary.
The move to omit a theory of oppression from a work expressly focused on
oppression and moral resistance does not free one to simply move forward to analyzing
oppression and its harms and then working to establish the need for moral resistance.
One cannot simply distance a work on oppression, such as this, from the otherwise
different project of working on an exhaustive description of oppression and then freely
and liberally use the term oppression without using it with reckless abandon. To this end
it is necessary to outline an operating conception of oppression which can serve to launch
26

Marilyn Frye, Politics Of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (The Crossing Press, 1983).
Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (Oxford University Press, 2005).
28
J. Harvey, Civilized Oppression (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).
27
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the moral work which is at this project’s core. It is to this task that the remainder of this
chapter will be focused.

Section 2 - A Broad Understanding of Oppression

The conception of oppression which will be deployed here, and then used
throughout this project, begins by identifying oppression as an emergent social
phenomenon which is deeply entangled with unjust social structures. These unjust social
structures allow and support the existence of oppression. In essence, unjust social
structures can be said to ‘aid and abet’ actions and instances of oppression, and it is this
intermeshing of oppression with unjust social structures which helps differentiate
instances of oppression’s manifestation from other seemingly similar cases of harm,
abuse, and disadvantages. The unjust social arrangements which I have in mind here
include (a) the patriarchal power relations between men and women, (b) heteronormative
assumptions which normalize heterosexuality and subsequently demonize other
expressions of sexuality, (c) racist or racialized views of people, and, (d) classist
divisions between economic groups. It is these unjust social arrangements which give
rise to the paradigmatic examples of oppression; namely sexism, heteronormativity,
racism, and classism.
The complex interplay between existent social arrangements and oppression is
evidenced by the considerable array of linguistic ambiguity in the terms surrounding
“oppression.” Often the term ‘oppression’ is used in a nounal form and done so to pickout the general existence of a coercive and destructive force. But ‘oppression’ also
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carries a verbal form (as in “to oppress”) which indicates the deployment (in action) of
such coercive and destructive forces, as well as an adjectival form (as in “oppressive”)
which describes something as pertaining to oppression (in its nounal form). These
linguistic variations, when deployed, might be seem to be working to advance a singular
definition of oppression. To describe something as ‘oppressive’ might seem to indicate
that it is predicative of an ontological category which can be understood ‘above and
beyond’ its instantiations. Similarly, to use oppression in its verbal form might seem to
indicate that oppression simply exists as a category or type of action (or even intention).
In either of these cases, the use of the varied linguistic forms of oppression might be
taken as evidence of a conception of oppression which omits (or at least downplays) a
myriad of others ways oppression exists.
This linguistic ambiguity leads to confusion as to what ‘oppression’ refers; is
oppression properly predicated of a unique system of disadvantages which is socially
distinct from other forms of systematic harm, or is it properly predicated only to those
actions which disadvantage and harm others, or rather does it indicate the experience of
oppression in the lives of the oppressed? In short, it would appear that each of these is
true yet each, individually, fails to encompass the reality of oppression. In some ways it
is proper to describe something as oppressive when it is an instance of a larger unjust
social arrangement and in other ways such a use of the term oppression fails to
distinguish instances of oppression from the structural mechanisms which create the
circumstances for such instances of harm.
The picture of oppression which this project deploys is that oppression is an
amalgamation of all these concepts. Oppression cannot be reduced to merely the discrete
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instances of oppressive actions and forces, but at the same time cannot be understood
without accounting for the vast plurality of actions and forces which together create a
social web of disadvantage, harm, and abuse. In this way, it is often helpful to talk about
“manifestations of oppression” when considering the concrete examples and instances of
social harm and abuse, and other times it is necessary to talk about oppression in a
general and encompassing way to capture the totality or milieu of such a social existence.
In a similar way, it is often necessary to talk about oppression as it affects classes of
people (such as in the claim that “women are oppressed”) but this does not deny that this
oppression exists only in the ways that individual women directly experience the
systematic effects of unjust social arrangements.
A conception of oppression such as this, which operates and exists at both the
superstructural level of general societal arrangements which negatively affect groups
while at the same time only manifest in the concrete experience of oppressed people,
helps us, at this initial stage, to differentiate between seemingly similar actions which
vary in their relation to oppression. Take, for example, the actions of a physically
abusive partner. When the victim of domestic violence coincides with larger unjust
social arrangements, the actions of the abuser can be described as oppressive. When the
victim of abuse fails to be a member of a socially disadvantaged group, the actions of the
abuser fail to be oppressive, although no less harmful and deplorable. While domestic
violence is perpetrated by both men and women, and the gender of the perpetrator may
not play a substantial role in the moment of abuse, it is surely the case that the gender of
the perpetrator, in relation to the gender of the victim, carries with it a wide range of
damning effects. Domestic violence perpetrated by men against women is aided and
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supported by patriarchal social arrangements which contribute to victim silencing, are
supported by beliefs of prerogative and provocation, and result in eschewed paths for
legal recourse (to name just a few). In this way, two seemingly similar instances of
domestic violence, differentiated by gender, must be assessed differently qua that which
qualifies as oppressive.
From this broad picture of oppression as deeply entangled with unjust social
arrangements it is possible to further identify five salient features of oppression. These
features are (1) oppression affects individuals qua their membership in social and
economic groups, (2) oppression is harmful to the oppressed, (3) oppression is not a state
chosen by the oppressed but rather a state imposed upon them, (4) oppression exerts its
harmful influence over a protracted period of time, and, (5) oppression cannot be reduced
to any single facet and exists as a confluence of factors, harms, and social structures. By
flushing out these salient features the broad picture of oppression being advanced here is
given further depth and clarity. So it is to these salient features that attention must be
turned.

1.

Oppression is a social phenomenon and affects individuals qua their membership in
social and economic groups

Because oppression emerges as intimately bound-up with unjust social arrangements,
the social nature of oppression, meaning that it affects individuals and does so qua their
membership in social and economic groups, is the most striking feature of oppression.
This social nature of oppression is evidenced in the literature on oppression as it is the
most common thread found throughout this literature. While one can talk about an
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'oppressed individual,' it is not the case that the oppression that they experience is leveled
against them in a singularly individualistic way, but rather that they exist as a member of
an oppressed group.29
These social (and economic) groups to which oppression manifests are not merely
collections of individuals. Individuals may be grouped in countless ways, either though
self-association or by another's categorization, yet each and every type of categorization
need not be understood as a group. Here it is helpful to distinguish a difference between
'groupings' and 'groups.' A grouping of individuals may be done through any number of
characteristics whereas individuals are identified as similar to others through some shared
characteristic or trait. Groupings need not be significant to either the individual grouped
or to the one categorizing individuals as part of a group. For instance, individuals may be
grouped by hair color or dominate handed-ness, and these groupings, to greater or lesser
degree, may be said to accurately categorize individuals.
While groupings may be more or less morally arbitrary, ‘groups’ are deeply
connected to the ways that an individual's identity is constructed. Groups are constituted
around shared norms, beliefs, ways of knowing, and collective history and thus play
important roles in how one experiences life, how one understands and comes to
knowledge, and how one views their collective past. Participation in a group, whether
self-chosen or not, has a constitutive impact on individuals, whereas groupings of
individuals merely identify common or shared traits.

29

To my mind there is no clearer explanation of the role of social groups in oppression than the account
given by Young in “Five Faces of Oppression,” and this discussion of the social nature of oppression, as
identified as a salient feature, mirrors her work.
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In some cases the social groups of which one is a member is a matter of choice
and self-identification. Individuals who adopt a particular religion may be said to choose
the norms, beliefs, and understandings of a religious tradition and thus voluntarily
transform themselves into a member of a specific group. In other cases, the placement of
individuals into social groups can be done through colonial gaze of others. Indigenous
persons, in the United States, may have seen themselves simply a collection of different
peoples, but the arrival of colonial forces created the single category of "Indian" or
"Native" whereas the norms, beliefs, and histories of indigenous people were transformed
into a social or cultural group through its identification as "the other." It is in this
identification of "the other" that the relational nature of group-to-group dynamics can be
seen. Social groups emerge in relation to other social groups.
While social groups not only classify but also constitute individuals, social groups
are fluid and dynamic and individuals can participate in a plurality of social groups.
Social groups change and shift, affecting inclusion and exclusion parameters, and do not
exist as unchanging fixed categories.
It is within the dynamics of social groups that oppression operates. When a social
group, and the norms and identities it constitutes, is placed into a subordinate position
within a dominant social framework of normalization the subordinate group is subject to
oppressive forces. These systematic forces which coerce, subjugate, and prejudice a
social group are hallmarks of oppression. While an individual in a subordinate social
group will directly experience the force of oppression, it is their participation in a social
group which makes them oppressed. It is not the case that the oppression that one
experiences is leveled against them as a unique individualized target of prejudice, but
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rather the individual is subject to oppression qua their inclusion within an oppressed
social group.
As mentioned earlier, this social nature of oppression is the most common and
shared thread found throughout the work of different theorists and in different theories
concerning oppression. While different theorists have emphasized different types of
social or economic groups, all stress that it is into the social dynamics of the
subordination of social (or economic) groups that oppression exists.

2) Oppression is harmful for the oppressed

The most obvious salient feature of oppression is that it is harmful for those
oppressed. It would seem that the identification of harm is often the first step in
identifying oneself as an oppressed person and is the most directly experienced effect of
oppression in the lives of the oppressed. Oppressed people experience the harmful
effects of oppression directly and often it is the naming of these harms which reveals the
individually-experienced harm as present in the lives of people of a particular social or
economic group. In this way, the harms of oppression are not only real, but the
experience of these harms can serve as an epistemic base for the oppressed to identify
their oppression.30

30
It is worth clarifying, here, that this claim that the epistemic experience of oppression’s harms might aid
the oppressed in seeing their harms as systematically affecting a group (and not just the unfortunate lot of
an individual) does not, in itself, constitutes a verification of oppression’s existence. While some, such as
Judith Tormey, take this experience as positive verification, I do not want to make such a move. See
“Exploitation, Oppression, and Self-Sacrifice,” in Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation,
eds. Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky (Putnam, 1976)./
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The most discernable of harms caused by oppression are the physical and
economic harms leveled against the oppressed. The living conditions of the global
working class and the systematic use of targeted violence are easily recognizable and
often the harm most chronicled through the media. The recent killing of Eric Garner, an
unarmed black man choked to death by a white NYPD officer, and the union busting
tactics of Coca-Cola which have left at least four union leaders dead in Colombia both
exemplify not only the reality of oppression’s use of physical harm, but also the way that
this harm is easily transmitted across the globe through images, eye-witness reports, and
accounts of first-hand experience. In a similar way, the economic reality of poverty and
wantingness is easily identifiable and demonstrable when looking at the lives of the
working class. In many ways it is easy to see poverty and see the ways that groups of
people are deprived economic opportunities and benefits, and therein harmed.
Less apparently obvious are the ways oppression inflicts harm on individuals in
non-physical and non-material ways. The oppressed, in addition to these physical and
material forms of harm, are also subject to a myriad of emotional and psychological
harms. Oppressed people can suffer from an eroded sense of value, be emotionally
manipulated into states of irascibility, and (through material manipulation) kept in states
of ignorance. These types of emotional and psychological harm experienced by the
oppressed, while less apparent, are no less damaging and detrimental than the obvious
cases of physical harm and must be counted for when considering oppression’s harms.31
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Theresa Tobin’s recent, as well as forthcoming, work on spiritual violence gives rise to what might be
called “spiritual harm.” This type of harm, as a distinct form of harm from the emotional and psychological
harms briefly touched upon here might also warrant inclusion. I do not, neither here nor in chapter two,
take-on the issue of spiritual harm (or spiritual violence), but Tobin’s work on this topic seems to suggest
strongly that spiritual harm is unique, real, and connected to oppression.
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It should be said that different individuals as well as different oppressed groups
will experience these harms in a variety of ways and to a variety of degrees. These harms
can be experienced acutely or chronically, and may vary between individuals or groups.
It seems impossible to identify a singular experience of oppression’s harm, or even
identify an exacting measurement of the damage these harms ‘ought’ to inflict on
different individuals or groups if they are to be victims of oppression. Yet, between
different oppressed groups there does exist a common tie of harm, and the various effects
of oppression must be seen, at least in part, as an overlapping tapestry of harm. While the
forms of harm caused by oppression are chronicled, in detail, in chapter two, it seems
sufficient to say here that oppression is harmful and that oppression harms the oppressed
in a plurality of ways.32

3) Oppression is not, in and of itself, a chosen state of existence by the oppressed

This third salient feature of oppression, which identifies oppression as an imposed
and unchosen state by the oppressed, is a natural outcropping of the ways that oppression
affects individuals qua their membership in social groups. Since many of the social
groups to which one may belong, which are subject to unjust arrangements, are not
necessarily voluntary associations, the oppression which affects the members of these
groups cannot be said to be chosen by oppressed. In this way, the ascendancy of
dominate social orders is imposed upon the subordinate group and not the object of
choice.
32

It should be noted that there may also be ways that oppression damages those individuals who are not
oppressed but benefit from oppression. While there might be some truth to such a claim, the potential
harms oppression may have on “the oppressors” will not be explored or documented in this project.
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To this claim there might be some who argue that there are cases where a group
chooses subordination and can be said to, as a social group, choose their role as
oppressed. Take for example a religious community of women in which the wider
religious community mandates the subordination of women to men in both the religious
and social aspects of life. Here, the dutiful women actively participate in their
subordination and oppression and choose to remain in such a position of subservience.
Such examples exist in many religious communities and it might be claimed that such
examples undercut the claim that oppression is always imposed upon the oppressed and
never a chosen state of affairs by the oppressed.
It is my belief that these communities do not represent people choosing to be
oppressed, although their choices do allow for their oppression. In such cases the
subordinated groups are surely choosing to exist within a set religious group defined by
norms, beliefs, and values. Such a group of religious women would be choosing to
accept the norms of a type of religious devotion, which in turn is oppressive, but they are
not choosing to be oppressed for the sake of being oppressed. Communities such as these
may come to accept their subordination as a necessary part of a religious doctrine, but it
is the religious doctrine which is the object of choice. A group or community may come
to accept its subordination or oppression within a larger community, but this acceptance
is not equivalent to having the group's subordination be the end that they seek through
their actions or choices. A similar case can be made in other such instances of seemingly
self-chosen oppression. Take for example a woman who decides to have a biological
child and further decides to work at home as a care worker for her offspring. This
woman may be reinforcing gender stereotypes of domesticity and motherhood by her
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actions but her choice is not motivated by the desire to reinforce these stereotypes. It
would seem that given the (albeit fictitious option) to have a biological child and raise the
child herself without this action feeding into sexist stereotypes of domesticity, this
individual would prefer this option. Here, in this contrived yet real example, we can see
that the sexist norms which mandate women to be mothers to remain authentic in their
femininity is not the object of her choice, but rather the accidental byproduct of her
choice. The same seems true for other forms of oppression. Oppressed individuals may
be reluctant to abandon oppressive structures the oppressive structures themselves are not
the objects of choice. Thus many African Americans chose to remain in debt-bondage to
their former slave owners long after their legal emancipation, yet it was not their debtbondage that was the object of their choice but rather the relative security of existent
conditions weighed against the unknown which meant choosing such arrangements. The
racism was imposed, and all things being equal, was not the object of choice of the
oppressed.
It needs to be clear that I do not want to dismiss or deny the important ways in
which oppressed individuals may become participants (either actively or passively) in
their own oppression. I simply want to claim that oppression, or being in an oppressed
state, is not the object of choice by the oppressed as an end that they actively seek. In
this way, oppression is imposed upon subordinate groups as part of a paradigm of
hegemony.
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4) Oppression exerts its harmful influence over a protracted period of time

Time, and temporal continuance, also plays an important role in understanding
oppression and must be seen as one of its salient features. On one hand, this feature of
time can be understood as the duration of an oppressive structure, and on the other we
can see how oppression affects individuals over protracted periods of time. To this first
feature, oppression, as a systematic confluence of forces, persists over a relatively long
period of time. Because oppression works, in part, by manipulating social and economic
mores, and by establishing and using moral attitudes, oppression is an enduring force.
Oppressive systems do not arise overnight, nor do they subside and die in a moment.
Forms of oppression are prolonged and exert their harmful influence sustained periods of
time. This durational life of oppression ties to the second way which the temporal nature
of oppression must be understood. In this second way, oppression is not something that
individuals pass in-and-out of, and being oppressed is not a transient state. Much like
how oppression persists over long periods of time, individuals perdure as oppressed
people.
Identifying oppression as enduring and temporally persistent helps distinguish it
from other forms of related political and social wrongs often conflated with oppression.
Oppression should be distinguished from other unjust arrangements such as exploitation,
servitude, being downtrodden, and being held in bondage (to name just a few). While
these social and economic arrangements are often the hallmark of oppression, they do
remain distinct. Evidence for this move to distinguish oppression from other forms of
injustice is exhibited in the ways one can be said to be removed from an unjust social
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arrangement yet not be liberated from oppression. Here, one can look to cases where
individuals or groups have (even temporarily) extracted themselves from unjust social
conditions yet, never the less, remained oppressed. Take for example the workers at
Chicago’s Republic Windows and Doors. In 2008, UE workers (United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America) were informed that the company was immediately
closing their production plant.33 Workers announced that they had no intention to see the
plant close, occupied the facilities, and continued assembly production. After garnering
much media attention, the plant remained open and in use until it was bought by Serious
Energy (a rival company). These workers, running the plant collectively and as a
collective, were successful at (temporarily) freeing themselves from the exploitation of
management yet were not free from being oppressed members of the working class. A
similar example can be seen by returning to the previously mentioned example of US
chattel slavery and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. While the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment effectively ended chattel slavery in the US, the newly “freed”
African Americans were not liberated from the oppression. In both of these cases we can
see how individuals or groups can be said to have escaped one unjust arrangement (be
that ‘exploitation’ in the case of Republic Windows and Doors and ‘legal bondage’ in the
case of newly freed American slaves) yet remained firmly under the thumb of oppression.
While it is true that individuals suffering under oppression are exploited and often in
some form of bondage, it remains the case that one can free themselves from these
arrangements without being liberated from oppression.
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For a detailed description of the initial work of the UE to keep Republic Windows and Doors open, as
well as its operation until dissolution, see Alejandra Cancino, “Former Republic Windows and Doors
Workers Learn to be Owners,” The Chicago Tribune (November 6, 2013),
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These examples illustrate the ways that oppression, and being oppressed, must be
distinguished and, partially, disentangled from other ways in which unjust social
arrangements manifest. The move to highlight the temporal longevity and ability to
perdure as salient feature of oppression helps us do just this. While it is not possible to
establish an ‘oppression-or-not’ clock or calendar, the paradigmatic examples of
oppression reveal a salient feature of lasting continuance. In addition, oppression’s
perdurance also helps explain why attempts to “root out” and eliminate oppressive
structures requires an attention to this longevity.

5) Oppression cannot be reduced to any single facet and exists as a confluence of factors,
harms, and social structures

The fifth and final salient feature of oppression that needs to be highlighted is the
nonreducable nature of oppression. By identifying oppression as ‘nonreducable’ is to
claim that oppression cannot be parsed down to any one salient feature or any individual
moral transgression, evil, or moral harm. As revealed by the paradigmatic examples,
oppression emerges as a systematic confluence of forces, and the reality of oppression is
that it resists being diminished to a singular moral wrong.
To reduce oppression to a single moral evil, or even a short-list of moral
transgressions, is to deny the systematic nature of oppression. The existence of
oppression is one of a wide range of social, political, and economic influences which
exerts its damning influence on oppressed peoples in a variety of political and moral
ways. So to pin oppression as simply, for example, a series of unjust structured political
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arrangements is to overlook the vast array of ways which oppression operates beyond the
confines of juridical injustice. Similarly, to reduce oppression to being merely the result
of the immoral and unjust actions of an oppressor is to overlook the important ways that
individuals will be privileged through the existence of oppression yet not be the evil and
maniacal overlord who intends the enslavement of others. Oppression, both in its causes
as well as in its effects, defies attempts at reduction and its systematic nature is one of
complicated factors. It is in the identification of this fifth salient feature which keeps
reductive accounts of oppression from being advanced and seeks to keep the reality of
oppression’s systematic nature in place.

Section 3 - Conclusion

The understanding of oppression being advanced here is that oppression is a
purduring, harmful, and unchosen state which affects individuals qua their membership
in social groups and which, in turn, is supported by, and entangled with, unjust social
arrangements. This picture of oppression is born out of the paradigmatic examples of
oppressive structures like racism, sexism, classism, and heteronormativity and works to
keep these paradigmatic examples at the center of its understanding. This admittedly
broad conception of oppression navigates the terrain between, on one hand, strict theories
of oppression (and the pitfalls they entail), and, on the other hand, an overly loose
conception of oppression which lacks critical engagement.
In the end, the picture of oppression being used here may not be equipped to
universally address potential counterfactuals, or systematically distinguish oppression
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from the social arrangements which work to support the existence of oppression. To this
charge, I will freely admit, although it is necessary to temper this charge by reiterating
two important points made earlier. First, an all-encompassing, ironclad, unwavering
theory of oppression is not the aim of this chapter, or this project. The focus of this
project is to analyze the harmful effects of oppression in the lives of the oppressed within
the framework of virtue ethics and then work toward the establishment of our responsive
obligations to oppression within this framework. Second, an ironclad and universal
theory of oppression is not necessary for such work to proceed. This general conception
of oppression, which mirrors other such descriptions that eschew and forsake allencompassing theoretical attempts, creates a broad yet thick understanding of oppression
which can be further analyzed through the theoretical framework of Aristotelian (and
neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethics. Through the lens of virtue ethics the harms of oppression
on the oppressed, which were briefly touched upon in this chapter, can be brought into
sharp focus and can be chronicled in detail. It is the result of the descriptive exploration
of analyzing oppression’s damning harms that works to motivate the need for individuals
and communities to engage in resistance struggles. But before looking at the morally
available resistance to which people are obligated, this descriptive analysis of
oppression’s influence on the oppressed, done from within the virtue theoretical
framework, must occur and it is to this task that the next chapter is focused.
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CHAPTER TWO

IDENTIFYING THE WRONGS OF OPPRESSION IN VIRTUE ETHICS

I take it as given that oppression is, prima facie, morally wrong and it inflicts
moral damage upon those who suffer under its influence. This chapter will move from
this prima facie claim to substantiate the ways that oppression harms individuals as
understood by virtue ethics. This harm is inflicted on a multitude of levels and, for the
virtue ethicist, can be divided into a three-part categorization; oppression's effect on the
acquisition of virtue, oppression's manipulation of external goods, and oppression's
necessitation of base and shameful actions. Corresponding to these three categories, this
chapter has been divided into three sections which relate to three nexuses of harm caused
by oppression.
Each of these sections utilizes etiological arguments which trace the influences of
oppression to the harm leveled against oppressed individuals. In short, oppression limits
the availability of flourishing and warps individuals characters into states of viciousness.
The labeling of these states as "vicious" may sound odd at points because, as it will be
shown, the damage leveled against individuals is often not chosen or volitional. Yet, the
etiological explanation of oppression's coercive force directly results in individuals being
pressed into harmful states of vice.
By showing how, in these three arenas, oppression curtails flourishing, we are
able to generate an Aristotelian obligation to resist oppression as oppression denies
flourishing to not only individuals but also entire communities of people.
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Section 1 – Oppression as a Limitation of Virtue

It is clear that external influences are capable of effecting changes in the
emotional and psychological states of moral agents. Oppression, as a force, affects the
moral character of individuals and thus the existence of oppression limits individuals in
their ability to be virtuous. This can be seen both in relation to the moral virtues as well
as the intellectual virtues. Here, I wish to show how this is the case. In general, we need
to see how virtues are affected by oppression and this effect manifests in three broad
ways. First, some virtues are made a practical impossibility for oppressed individuals
and the possibility for the achievement of these virtues is eliminated. Second, some
virtues are affected in that their acquisition is made extremely difficult for the oppressed
person. In a third way, some virtues become what Tessman has called “burdened,” in
that the proper and appropriate mean for the virtue is extreme.34 In this third case, the
agent does in fact inculcate a virtue as opposed to a vice but the virtue, due to the
existence of oppression, is damaging and dangerous to its possessor. To illustrate how
the virtues are (a) eliminated, (b) affected, or, (c) burdened, the specific moral virtues of
temperance, courage, and so-called "good-temperedness," along with the intellectual
virtues of wisdom and knowledge, will be outlined. These virtues illustrate, in specific
detail, how the virtues are unduly manipulated by oppression in these three ways. This
manipulation of virtue curtails agents in their habituation of these moral virtues and limits
the availability of virtue and therefore flourishing. In each of these instances (and in
reference to both types of virtue), it is essential that we see how oppression acts as a
34
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causal force which inhibits individuals from developing the virtues necessary for the
achievement of happiness (flourishing).

A. Temperance

Let us first turn to the virtue of temperance, as it is through temperance that we
can see how some virtues are made a complete impossibility by the existence of
oppression. To understand how oppression makes temperance impossible for the
oppressed it is necessary to first outline Aristotle's conception of temperance (and therein
his understanding of appetites).
Aristotle differentiates, at Nicomachean Ethics (NE) 1118b8, two different senses
of appetite; "common appetites" and "peculiar appetites."35 Common appetites are
described as "natural" and connected to our base physical existence while peculiar
appetites are described as preferences related to taste and individuated desires for
particular foods. The desire in common appetites is physiological in nature and rooted in
our need for food as a means for sustaining our physical existence. Peculiar appetites
appear, for Aristotle, to be not physiological in nature but rather preferential to taste.
Charles Young argues that "[Aristotle's] distinction between common and peculiar
appetites is better seen, not as a distinction between two different kinds of appetite, but
rather as a distinction between different grounds for our having the appetites we do."36 I
agree with Young and resist moves to distinguish two different types of appetites. Such a
move is not supported by the text. To claim that there are two different types of appetites
35
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would require the identification of two independent virtues to govern these two types of
appetites. Aristotle would have to distinguish different (but related) virtues of
temperance as he does with generosity and magnificence in chapters one and two of Book
IV. Since Aristotle does not do this it is disingenuous to the text to claim that his
descriptions of common and peculiar appetites are meant as a difference in kind.
If we accept Young's account, as I suggest that we do, we are given a picture of
temperance by Aristotle which responds to our layered and complex relationship to food.
At a basic level we desire food for survival, but our desire for food does not simply
reduce to physical need and can, after the physiological need is met, become preferential
for pleasure and enjoyment.
Interestingly, these two sources of desire regarding food require that we provide
two corresponding accounts of intemperance, particularly in relation to situations where
these desires are unsatisfied. When peculiar appetites go unfulfilled we are left with what
Aristotle calls a "craving" (1118b10). These cravings are a form of profligacy and
beyond the mean of temperance. The specific criteria of time, place, degree, manner, and
motive (1106a22, 1109a26) in relation to the doctrine of the mean yield an assessment of
such errant desires. For example, one may experience a peculiar appetite for a food
which is ethically repugnant (such as foie gras or veal), or have a peculiar complaint at an
inappropriate time (such as complaining that the food at a funeral is not to your liking).
In this way, we can be intemperate in regards to our peculiar appetites and this
intemperance is explained through the enumerated criteria of the doctrine of the mean
found repeated in Book II.
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On the other hand, when common appetites go unfulfilled we are left having to
provide a different moral analysis. While the conditions of time, place, manner, and
motive remain morally relevant, common desires are first weighed against the criteria of
satisfaction. That is, the primary moral question of our physiological desires for
sustenance relate to the ability to realize these desires through survival eating. When
common appetites are met our immediate desires for food are satiated. This satiation is
temporary and these desires will reemerge at a later time when our bodies again desire
nourishment. In this way, common desires can be called 'hunger.' While possibly
complicated by peculiar cravings for a particular food when we are hungry, the common
appetites are satisfied not through particularly desired foods but rather by eating some
food. To satisfy a common desire, food must be consumed. For common appetites, it is
only after the possibility of satiation is made manifest that we can raise further evaluative
concerns about the conditions of these desires.
Thus, Aristotle claims, "in the natural appetites [read: common desires] few go
wrong, and only in one direction, that of excess" (1118b15). Aristotle seems quite
correct in claiming that there is, but with one exception, only errors of excess in regards
to common appetites. The error of deficiency in regard to our common appetites would
only arise in individuals who, do to physiological37 or psychological38 disorders and
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diseases, would not possess the natural instinct for nourishment. Where Aristotle is
patently wrong is in his claim of rarity concerning this vice of excess. In fact, it would
appear that the countless people who suffer in poverty experience this excessive desire.
When the basic need for food goes unfulfilled, placing individuals in a state of starvation,
or is fulfilled without the requisite nutrients needed for proper functioning of the body, as
in malnutrition, the individual suffers from an excessive desire for food. As odd as this
sounds, underfed, starving, or malnourished people are physiologically forced into a state
of wanton intemperance, and this intemperance is one of excess. Considerable clinical
research in nutrition, psychology, and physiology can attest to this counter-intuitive
claim.
Ancel Keys, as lead researcher, headed the Minnesota Starvation Experiment
which sought to explore and explain the psychological and physiological effects of food
deprivation.39 During the experiment, which began in 1944, subjects were placed on
progressively restrictive diets and their psychological states were detailed. First subjects
were put on a 3,200 calorie per day diet to determine their "ideal weight." Following this
initial period (which was, for most subjects, a caloric restriction from their everyday
eating habits), subjects had their caloric and food intake severely restricted for 24 weeks
where they were allowed to return to "normal eating habits" only after they had achieved
a weight-loss goal of dropping 75% of their initial body weight. During the 24-week
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starvation period, subjects ate minimal diets of potatoes, bread, and pasta thus mimicking
the eating conditions faced by soldiers and civilians during World War II. Keys found
that when the subjects were placed into a state of starvation they "became increasingly
focused on food; they collected recipes, hung pinup pictures of food, and changed career
plans to food-related activities such as becoming a chef.”40 Keys found that extreme food
deprivation results in not only an increase in the desire for food, but also an increase in
intensity of desire. Once subjects achieved their weight-loss goal, they were placed upon
unrestricted diets for 12 weeks where they were permitted to eat unlimited amounts of
food of their own choice. Keys found that during this unrestricted eating period subjects
over-ate, gorged, and binged, and in some cases even stole food when food supplies were
readily available. Similar results were found by researchers questioning Canadian
prisoners of war who had been subject to food deprivation during their incarceration.41
Interviewees reported patterns of binge eating which continued from the time of their
initial release and well into their civilian life after the war.
Whether in cases of voluntary starvation (as exhibited during the Minnesota
Starvation Experiment) or involuntary starvation (as exhibited by Canadian POW's), the
effect of food deprivation seems to be the development (and maintenance) of excessive
common desires for food. While Aristotle notes, and criticizes, "belly-gods" (or "those
people... that fill their belly beyond what is right," 1118b19) as an example of
intemperance, what he does not see is that the same excessive desire for food is found in
those who are systematically denied access to food. The only difference, qua
temperance, between the belly-god and those experiencing starvation appears to be the
40
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ability to satisfy the excessive common desire. In both cases, there exists an errant desire
of excess relating to common desires and the existence of this excessive desire results in
intemperance.
This discussion of the virtue of temperance demonstrates the ways that oppression
can deny the availability of virtue and therefore limit flourishing but the significance of
this example extends beyond merely elucidating this point and holds further special
significance in this discussion. The special significance of temperance in relation to
oppression comes from the important ways in which this specific virtue intersects with
the practical maintenance of power and oppression. Rolf Künnemann and Sandra EpalRatjen, writing on behalf of the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
highlight what they call "food-related oppression" claiming the manipulation of food is
one of the most common ways that individuals and groups are held under manipulative
and oppressive control.42 Further, they claim, "control over the access to food and foodproducing resources of other people and peoples is one of the most fundamental sources
of power over them.”43 The immoral misuses of this power are forms of oppression, and
there are important definitive correlations between oppressive political structures and
their manipulation of food and food availability.
In the most bold and egregious forms, food is directly and intentionally targeted
as a weapon of political and social control and thus can be used as a vehicle for enforcing
and maintaining oppressive structures. Food, due to the bare necessity that it serves, is a
particularly effective tool for subjection and manipulation. One striking and
paradigmatic example of this can be seen in the distribution (or lack thereof) of food by
42
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syndicated warlords during the civil war in Somalia. In 1991, after losing the backing of
the Russian Soviets, the communist government of Somalia was overthrown and the
country erupted into a brutal civil war. The civil war was primarily fought between two
militias, one led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other Mohammed Farah Aidid. Both
men, commonly described as "warlords,” used the systematic withholding of food to
further their cause.44 One of the immediate results of the outbreak of the civil war was a
widespread famine which, according to the UN, caused over 240,000 deaths.45 The UN
created a special taskforce, named United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) to
respond to the pressing needs of civilians. In conjunction with US forces who carried out
their own "humanitarian" missions, the UN attempted to supply food to relieve the effects
of the famine but their attempts ultimately failed. The failure of this humanitarian aid
was due to the fact that food relief efforts were funneled primarily through the warring
factions. Aidid and Mohamed both accepted food from the UN and distributed the food
to civilians as a reward for support for their faction. Civilians were given a choice
between supporting one of the aligned militia groups and aiding the war efforts or
starvation. This direct withholding of food from the civilian population represents the
most severe form of oppression manifest through food manipulation.
Beyond cases of intentional and forced food manipulation, such as those
represented by the case of the Somali civil war, the existence of so-called "food deserts"
also works as a tool of oppressive food manipulation. The term "food desert," first used
in the 1990's in Scotland, does not currently have a uniform or agreed upon definition and
44
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the term encompasses a wide range of related topics.46 Some define food deserts based
upon availability and affordability of healthy food,47 while others define food deserts as
locations where food options are limited to types of businesses of limited employees.48
In short, a food desert is a geographical area in which healthy food availability is limited
and food options are predominately served by convenience stores and fast food services.
The term "food desert" is contrasted with "food oases" where a food oasis is a location
where a plurality of healthy food options exist at affordable prices. In food deserts there
may be an abundance of food and an abundance of food outlets, but by-and-large it is
only highly processed "empty calorie" food, rich in fat, sugars, sodium, and hydrogenated
oils, all of which have deleterious health effects. Fresh vegetables, fruits, and nutritious
alternatives are scarce, if available at all. Food deserts have become an important topic
of scholarship for urban planners, public health officials, civic engineers, dietitians, and
activists because almost all studies and surveys of food deserts show that food deserts
exist disproportionately in economically poor areas, be they rural or urban,49 and
disproportionately affect people of color.50
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While it is clear that victims of starvation do not have their food needs met, and
therefore are intemperate, it is, on the surface, less clear how food deserts relate to
common desires. It might appear that food deserts, and the coerced unhealthy choices
they impose upon residents, relate to peculiar desires, yet it can be shown that food
deserts create a similar intemperance of excess to starvation in relation to common
desires. Common desires are distinguished from peculiar desires in their root cause, and
the root cause of common desires for food is physiological in nature. Physiologically, the
body desires, for health and maintenance, certain nutritional qualities. Proteins, complex
carbohydrates, and nutrients are all desired by the body for healthy function and these
nutrients are exactly what is often missing in diets constructed within food deserts.
While a preference for romaine lettuce over green-leaf lettuce is a peculiar desire, the
need and desire for produce is common. In food deserts, these basic biological needs are
not being met, and the common desires not satisfied. If physiological desires are not met,
individuals are left wanting. It is this wanting for that which cannot be fulfilled that
marks the vice of intemperance.
Shown through the cases of both the Somali civil war and existence of food
deserts, individuals and communities suffering under oppressive systems of food
manipulation are left with their appetites unfulfilled. In Somalia, the unfulfilled common
appetites resulted in starvation, malnutrition, and, all too often, death. In American food
deserts, the unfulfilled common appetites result in malnutrition, public health crises, and,
in some cases, premature death. If the clinical research into starvation and malnutrition is
correct, and people who exist with their common appetites left unfulfilled experience an
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increase in unsatisfied desire, then both of these oppressive circumstances perpetuate
vice.
There are important differences between the starvation experienced in Somalia
and the needs left unfulfilled by food-deserts, and it needs to be made clear that the
parallels being drawn here between these cases are not done to equate, in total, the
experiences, the suffering, or the consequences of each case. It's plain to see that victims
of forced starvation suffer in their gluttony exponentially more than do individuals living
in food-deserts. And individuals in food-deserts may "quiet" their common desires
through eating undesirable food whereas the victims in Somalia lacked this possibility.
Additionally, those trapped in food-deserts possess, to some degree, an ability to (even
temporarily) leave the area which cannot fulfill their needs whereas Somali civilians
lacked this possibility.
While we must acknowledge these differences, the physiological (and moral)
evaluation remains. If an individual exists with their common and physiological needs
unmet, they are pressed into a state of vicious excess which is subject to evaluation by
virtue ethics. The oppressive structures which manipulate food availability create an
atmosphere where the virtue of temperance is made impossible and thus these oppressed
people are morally harmed. Further, it is the oppressive regimes and circumstances
which necessitate this harm.

B. Courage
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The effect that oppressive structures have on virtues is not limited to making them
impossible for oppressed people. While temperance may be made a practical
impossibility for those suffering under the conditions of oppressive regimes, other virtues
are affected by the existence of oppression, yet not to the point of complete
unavailability. Some virtues, due to the existence and effect of oppression, are onerous
and their development appears to verge on the supererogatory.
One particularly powerful and poignant instance of this limitation of virtue can be
seen in the manipulation of fear through systematic violence. Ann Cudd, in her thorough
exploration of oppression, claims that “violence is and has always been a critical
component in the origin and maintenance of oppression.”51 Cudd sketches and chronicles
the complex ways in which violence, both overtly and implicitly, is utilized as a tool for
maintaining oppression, concluding that we can see the power, influence, and
ramifications of violence in systematic oppression by looking at the "statistical evidence
that a group acts in a more constrained or less beneficial way" due to their exposure to
said violence.52 Here, I would like to provide some statistical evidence of just this sort
which connects oppression and violence and substantiates the effects of exposure to
violence on the availability of virtue. While Cudd's project is to chronicle the connection
between violence and oppression, her conclusion of groups being forced to act in "more
constrained or less beneficial way[s]" has broad implications for virtue ethicists and our
understanding about the availability of virtue.
When talking about violence it is essential that one distinguish between acute and
chronic violence. Acute violence occurs when individuals are faced with temporally

51
52

Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 85.
Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 91.

50

limited situations of violent interaction. This violent interaction arises, occurs, and
dissipates within a measurable time and the violence experienced by individuals is
limited to this temporal window. Chronic violence, on the other hand, is the persistent
exposure to violence where the violence experienced by the individual is not limited to
any specific moment but rather experienced as perduring and continual. Acute violence,
according to psychologists Jinan Usta and Jo Ann Farver, is typified by the 1992 Los
Angeles riots or sniper attacks in school yards.53 Chronic violence, on the other hand, is
“where shootings, stabbings, gang activities, and being robbed re-occur with
unpredictable frequency.”54 Joy Osofsky defines chronic community violence as the
“frequent and continual exposure to the use of guns, knives, drugs, and random
violence.”55 In both the case of acute and chronic violence the exposure to violence
affects the fear response of those exposed.
This move to distinguish between acute and chronic violence (or acute situations
of fear from chronic situations of fear) is vaguely present in Aristotle's description of
courage. In describing courage, Aristotle quickly rattles off an extensive list of times or
situations where courage is needed; moving quickly between the chronic (facing the
challenges and possibility of poverty [1115a11, 1115a17], facing disease [1115a29], and
experienced in the lives of sailors at sea [1115a29, 1115b1-3]) and the acute (in facing
situations of disgrace [1115a11], the possibility of quick and eminent death [1115b5],
times where one is flogged for a crime [1115a20], facing an insult to one's family
[1115a22] and situations of battle [1115a30]). While Aristotle expressly notes the need
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for courage in all of these situations, and in the face of both types of violence, what he
fails to address is the scope and depth of the effect that both acute and chronic violence
have on individuals in their development of the virtue of courage. While it is true that
each of these situations requires courage, and courage can properly respond to each of
these situations, what Aristotle does not address is how these situations transform
individuals in their moral development. Courage must be developed in response to
chronic and acute violence as it is in these circumstances that fear is, and should be,
experienced and therefore where courage is exercised. It is in violence's transformative
effect that the availability of courage is limited and warped.
The negative effects of acute violence are abundantly clear, and it does not seem
necessary here to outline, in depth, the severity and details of harm one can experience by
being the victim of a violent crime or situation. In fact, a full exploration of the
psychological and emotional damage that acute violence carries is a full project unto
itself. It seems sufficient here to merely point out that being party to acute violence
typically results in, during the short term, shock and denial, while longer term harms
include "unpredictable emotions, flashbacks, strained relationships, and even physical
symptoms like headaches and nausea."56 It has even been shown in multiple studies that
being a third-party to acute violence can, and often does, result in the same harmful
outcomes.57
On the other hand, the negative effects of chronic violence require a deeper
explanation and this is so for three reasons. One, there has been considerably less
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research done into the effects of chronic violence; two, this research is less well known;
three, chronic violence has the most effect on oppressed people.
To explain the harms of experiencing chronic violence, children are of particular
importance as it is through their psychological and moral development that we can see
the long-term harmful effects of exposure to violence. Usta and Farver claim that
"isolated events are thought to have less serious effects on children because they are short
in duration, after which things can ‘return to normal.’ However, children’s reactions may
be more adverse when the violent incidents are intense and recurring."58 Chronic
violence is more serious than acute in that the continual harmful effects create a situation
where things cannot “return to normal" and the harms experienced by the individual are
lasting and transformative.
Research studies done on Lebanese children in Beirut,59 children on Chicago's
South Side,60 children in Boston,61 children in Washington D.C.,62 and children in New
Orleans63 all show that preschool and school-age children exposed to chronic violence
exhibit symptoms of (or similar to) Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. These young
children experience sleep disturbances, have difficulty paying attention and
concentrating, and often “are less likely to explore.”64 These different studies chronicle a
uniformity of harms experienced by young children living in neighborhoods of chronic
58
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violence. Where the studies diverge is in their assessment of these harms as the children
enter adolescence. Some adolescents, who live with chronic violence, exhibit excessive
aggressiveness, irritability, anxiety, and disproportionate drives for revenge seeking.
Other adolescents, from the same or similar communities, grow emotionally numb,
become non-reactive to continued violence, and are anesthetized and desensitized. It
appears that a majority of children exposed to chronic violence develop behavioral traits
of either (a) numbness and indifference, or, (b) aggressiveness, irritability and
vengefulness. While varying positions have been outlined for the cause of this
divergence,65 researchers note that these divergent behavioral states are carried on into
adulthood.
While the source (or cause) of the divergence in behavior of adolescents (and
adults) exposed to chronic violence remains the subject of psychological investigation,
the two identified states of character (via the divergent behavior between numbness and
aggressiveness) are important for understanding of courage and confidence. If the result
of experiencing chronic violence is either numbness and indifference or aggressiveness,
irritability or vengefulness, either state is one of tremendous moral damage. In fact, these
two divergent states appear to align with a virtue assessment of courage in that it appears
that people come to have their fear warped into either rashness or insensitivity, and both
are states of vice which are expressly accounted for by Aristotle. Aristotle describes
courage as the moral virtue pertaining to fear and confidence (1107b1), and like all other
moral virtues operates as a mean (1107a20-25). While governing the feeling/capacity for
fear, an appropriate and moderated response to fear must be accompanied by confidence
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to be properly called courage. Courage is not simply standing steadfast in a fearful
situation, but doing so knowing that one can achieve a worthy end. It is controlled fear
that allows one to remain physically present in fearful situations (or at least not
immediately tuck-tail and run at the first sign of danger) and confidence that allows for
the courageous person to persist in these conditions. This combination of proper fear and
confidence is courage and to develop the virtue of courage one must, in the words of
Daniel Putnam, "[exercise] deliberative choice in the face of painful or fearful
circumstances for the sake of a worthy goal" and have "faith in oneself to act for the best
in threatening circumstances for the sake of a worthy goal."66 It is specifically this virtue
of courage, as the combination of the proper control of fear and proper use of confidence,
which is directly affected by violence. The exposure to chronic violence, punctuated by
acute violence, warps and transforms the individual's fear response and erodes
confidence. The divergent behavior presented in the current psychological literature of
adolescents who were, when children, exposed to chronic violence quantifies and
substantiates the moral erosion of confidence and the warping of fear. For the virtue
ethicist, the behavior exhibited by these exposed individuals is not merely indicative of
psychological states of trauma, but is of further importance in that it is tangible proof of
the harmful effects of oppression's use of violence on people's states of character and the
virtue made (un)available to them.
What differentiates this example of courage from the example of temperance is
that even with prolonged exposure to chronic violence, individuals may be able to
develop proper courage. Examples of individuals developing (and deploying) courage
while suffering under the material conditions of oppression and violence can be seen in a
66

Daniel Putnam, “The Emotions of Courage,” Journal of Social Philosophy 32, no. 4 (2001), 463-464.

55

vast array of arenas involving social, political, and economic justice movements. Union
organizers (such as Frank Little and César Chávez), civil rights activists (such as Rosa
Parks and Medgar Evers), anti-war activists (such as Sophie Scholl, Dr. Kurt Huber, and
other members of the 'Weiße Rose'), theological activists (such as Gustavo Gutiérrez and
Leonardo Boff), and even sports figures (such as Jackie Robinson and Megan Rapinoe)
faced conditions of overwhelming violence and oppression yet were, remarkably, able to
cultivate and deploy courage. Each of these individuals cultivated courage in
circumstances of violence and oppression enabling them take strong political and moral
stances in the face of overwhelming backlash. Individuals such as these are rightly held
up as heroes due to the extreme nature of the circumstances which they faced while both
developing and using their courage. These heroic individuals not only help inspire
others to struggle for justice, but also show that the cultivation of courage remains
possible, but extremely and onerously difficult, in the circumstances of chronic violence.
While it is important to see how courage remains possible while enmeshed in
oppressive structures, it is equally important to see that the ability to cultivate courage
while in these circumstances is excessively difficult, and success borders on the
supererogatory.

C. Proper Anger

To this point we have seen how oppression affects virtue in that in some cases it
makes their acquisition extremely difficult, if not supererogatory. Other virtues (or
would-be virtues), such as temperance, may be affected to such an extreme degree that
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their acquisition is impossible while suffering under oppression. In these ways,
oppression acts as a causal force which coerces individuals into non-virtuous states. Yet,
there are some instances where oppression actually aids in the development of virtue, yet
the virtue developed in response to oppression may tend toward the extreme. This then is
a third way in which virtues are affected by oppression. These virtues, which Lisa
Tessman calls "burdened virtues," differ from the above examples of temperance and
courage in that the above cases describe how an agent can be habituated by oppression
(or oppressive forces) into vice, whereas the burdened virtues are, in fact, extreme, yet
virtuous.
Tessman describes burdened virtues as those "traits that while practically
necessitated for surviving oppression or morally necessitated for opposing it, are also
costly to the selves who bear them."67 People faced with oppression, of themselves or
others, are faced with a dilemma; either accept their lot in life, and resign themselves to a
life bereft of flourishing, or, resist oppression in the hopes of achieving happiness. For
Tessman (and myself), "the alternatives to resisting oppression are unacceptable," and
thus oppressed people are forced to develop traits which allow them to adequately resist
and survive oppression.68
One of the strongest examples of a burdened virtue is that of proper anger. Here,
I wish to outline Aristotle's conception of anger, as an emotion, as well as the virtue that
governs this passion. Given an understanding of this Aristotelian virtue we can then turn
to contexts of oppression and see how this virtue is burdened and the harmful cost that
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the individual must pay for inculcating such a virtue within the circumstances of
oppression.
Aristotle describes, on multiple occasions (1103b19, 1105b21, 1106b18,
1135b20, 1147a14), anger as a passion or feeling. For Aristotle, this feeling of anger
admits of an excess, a deficiency, and also a mean. Thus, there is a virtue which applies
to this specific passion. The virtue governing our feelings of anger is called "goodtemperedness" (by Ross) or "mildness" (by Irwin) and is situated between irascibility, as
the vice of excess, and inirascibility, as the vice of deficiency (1108a4-9).
On two occasions Aristotle claims that the virtue governing anger is hard to name.
At 1125b27, he claims "the middle state [of anger]... [is] unnamed" and the extremes are
"almost without a name." At 1108a4, he claims that the mean state of anger, along with
the two related vices, "can scarcely be said to have names." Thus, what Irwin translates
as 'mildness' and Ross translates as 'good-temperedness' is, even for Aristotle, an odd
naming convention. I find both of these labels less than satisfactory and prefer to call this
virtue 'proper anger.'
My discontent with the naming conventions given by Irwin and Ross stems from
the way these terms appear to reduce the virtue governing anger to something closer to
meekness than justified anger. While it is the case that Aristotle claims that "good
temper in the middle position... inclines towards the deficiency," it does not seem fully
warranted to reduce, even linguistically, proper-anger to something akin to timorousness
or mildness. Aristotle does claim that anger is properly directed and experienced when
done "at the right things and with the right people..., and [for] as long as [one] ought"
(1125b32-33). Further, the person who is defective in anger, or the inirascible person, is

58

"thought a fool" for "not [being] angry at the things they should be angry..." (1126a4).
The language here is clear: there is proper anger. Given that Aristotle believes that there
is a time, place, manner, duration, and degree for righteous anger it seems disingenuous
to imply that individuals ought to cultivate a sense of mildness. Rather, individuals ought
to cultivate a sense of proper-anger which is subject to the standard constraints of the
other moral virtues.
One might object to the conception of anger being advanced here on the grounds
that Aristotle does, in no uncertain terms, not only warn us about the dangers of excessive
anger but also links it to incontinence in Book VII, Chapter 5. It might be claimed that
these two pieces of textual evidence indicate that 'mildness' (as tending toward meekness)
captures the spirit of Aristotle's warnings and is a more apt understanding of this virtue
than 'proper-anger.' Such a reading of Aristotle does not seem beyond the bounds of
reason and is, to my mind, the traditional reading of anger in Aristotle. Yet, I do feel that
this position fails to account for two important points. First, Aristotle's warnings
regarding anger do not seem unique but rather merely hark back to his discussion of
natural tendencies in Book II, Chapter 9. Here Aristotle asserts that in addition to each
individual's natural tendencies towards one extreme or the other regarding any particular
virtue, each virtue admits an objective natural tendency. These natural tendencies of the
virtues are those extremes which are "more erroneous" and easily fallen into than their
opposite extreme (1109a33). Anger, like all virtues, admits a more dangerous extreme,
yet the existence of this more erroneous vice need not push our conception of the mean of
anger to 'mildness' any more than the natural tendency of courage toward cowardice
should push us to accept rashness as more akin to the virtue. Secondly, while Aristotle
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does connect anger to incontinent states, he does this with a number of different passions
including greed and honor (1148b13), cowardice (1149a5-7), intemperance (1149a23),
and, (in fact) "every excessive state" (1149a5). While anger does make this list, and is
tied to a form of incontinence, it does not seem that Aristotle draws this connection in a
way that would indicate a special relationship. The connection of irascibility to
incontinence is merely an illustration of the multitude of ways in which one may be
incontinent, and as such cannot be used as support for the belief that the spirit of
meekness should be read into Aristotle's account of 'proper anger.'
It is because righteous anger exists as a virtue that the harmful and warping
conditions of oppression result in this virtue becoming distorted. The warping of anger,
unlike the effects oppression levies against courage and temperance, is to burden this
virtue and the individual who bears it.
Following Marilyn Frye,69 Elizabeth Spelman,70Audre Lorde,71 Diana Meyers,72
María Lugones,73 and bell hooks,74 Tessman chronicles the ways in which anger (and
even rage) play a pervasive role in the lives of the oppressed. From lesbian separatists to
black nationalists, anger plays an important role in the lives of the oppressed in that it
"signals a recognition of the wrongness of the subordination and refusal to accept it."75
Beyond merely reacting aptly to subordination, Tessman points out that anger also plays
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an important epistemic role. "[A]pproaching the world with a rancorous emotional
attitude as opposed to a more genial or "nice" one enables one to feel what one is not
expected or permitted to under dominant values."76
Anger allows the oppressed to acknowledge their oppression, condemn the
oppression, and see further ways in which oppression harms them. Proper anger, as
outlined by Aristotle, is to be measurably felt and expressed by individuals in
proportional response to warranted circumstances. For those suffering under systematic
oppression, the proper time for righteous anger is the duration of the oppression. This
makes the experience of proper anger close to a perpetual feeling. Further, the
experience and feeling of anger, as virtuously controlled, must be proportional to the
injury occurred. For the oppressed, the degree of anger that is proportionate to the
injustice of oppression not only pulls away from the 'mildness' claimed by Irwin's naming
convention but urges us well into irascibility if not rage. Here, Aristotle's claim about
"the fools" who do not feel anger seems especially poignant and the "if you are not
outraged then you aren't paying attention" rallying cry of consciousness raising activists
seems to capture proportionate response to the experience of oppression. Beyond mere
foolishness, those who do develop proper anger as a proportional response to injustice
fail to have the virtue. Those individuals who keep their anger firmly rooted in the
abstract mean tending toward inirascibility as Aristotle suggests do not have the virtue of
proper anger. They fail to have the appropriate emotional response to the circumstances
they find themselves in, and thus fail to have the virtue. Much like the firefighter or
soldier who maintains a pedestrian conception of courage while facing death, the
oppressed individual who maintains a mild form of moderated anger cannot be said to be
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virtuous. The appropriate and proportional response to the extremes of oppression
manifest as excessive virtues and thus, these extreme virtues are 'burdened.'
These burdened virtues carry a heavy cost for those who bear them and it is this
cost that Tessman sees as acting to "complicate this generally positive appraisal of
oppositional anger."77 Tessman maintains, rightly, that while the anger experienced by
the oppressed is excessive it is not extreme. In fact, excessive anger in the circumstances
of oppression more than fulfills the demands of virtue in that it occurs at the right time, in
the right way, and can be directed at the right target. Yet while virtuous, this trait of
cultivated anger (or even rage) "create[s] a tension" because while it "enables resistance
(and thus may further an eventual goal of flourishing for all), [it] disables a good life for
their bearers."78 Developing proper anger in response to oppression, and becoming
irascible, is psychologically harmful yet necessary. These burdened virtues, while
necessitated by oppression, are regrettable. All things being equal, we do not want to be
piqued, irascible, or indignant, but precisely because all things are not equal, we must
become exactly these things. For Tessman, the virtuous agent with habituated burdened
virtues can come to regret the self they have become, yet also understand that the
circumstances of their existence necessitate this revolutionary self. For Tessman, "there
should be no glory in resistance to injustice, just a sad and regretful recognition of its
necessity."79 This sad regret comes as the moral remainder of the burdened virtues and is
paid for by the oppressed.
In this third way, victims of oppression are put into a catch-22. The very tools
needed to fight their enslavement or oppression and achieve happiness are the means
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which keep them from happiness. This is a no-win situation for the oppressed and in
conjunction with the elimination of some virtues (as outlined above via temperance), and
the moving of other virtues into the realm of the supererogatory (as outlined above via
courage), demonstrates a third way which virtues (and their bearers) are harmed by
oppression.

D. Intellectual Virtues

Through the examples of temperance, courage, and anger we can see the three
different ways in which virtues are eliminated, limited and affected, and burdened for
oppressed people. Moving beyond the moral virtues, the intellectual virtues are also
curtailed by oppression. One of the salient features of oppression is the unequal
distribution of goods beyond the bounds of fortune. As indicated above, this may
concern the availability of food, but is not limited in form to any particular good. The
intellectual virtues, for Aristotle, require cultivation via teaching and learning, and thus
education is essential for their formation and development. This education can take the
form of schooling, but also mentorship and upbringing. In each of these ways, if others
are the victims of oppression, and this oppression has a negative effect on their
characters, then the teachers, mentors, and care-takers needed for the development of
intellectual virtues will be either limited or nonexistent. We know that oppression denies
equal access to education of equal quality, but we need to see that oppression also affects
other forms of ‘teachers’ who are needed for the achievement of intellectual virtues.
Sally Haslanger, in her account of oppression, comments on the work of Dorothy
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Roberts, who argues that the current child welfare policy of the United States is racist.80
One of the core claims made by Roberts is that “Black children are more likely to be
separated from their parents than children of other races” and thus “Black children spend
more time in foster care” and therefore Black children “receive inferior services.”81 If
Black families are subject to undue scrutiny by social service agencies and this scrutiny
results in the destruction of a high number of Black families and the institutionalization
of Black children, then it seems more than plausible that these children will lose the
necessary education and training which are required for the achievement of intellectual
virtue. I am not arguing that the nuclear family is the only necessary means for the
development of intellectual virtue or that children in dangerous homes should be left in
these homes because family structure trumps safety and welfare. Rather, what Roberts’
account shows is that this undue burden placed upon Black families undermines not only
the individual families but also the Black community. These children, who become
wards of the state, lack a community (and therein educators and parents). While unjust,
the harm of this hyper-scrutiny and the undue willingness to place Black children into
underfunded group-homes transcends concerns of justice for the virtue ethicist and must
be seen as a way in which oppression limits or burdens individuals in their achievement
of, in part, the intellectual virtues.
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E. Honor and Esteem

If the causal force of oppression is destructive in that it is detrimental to an
individual’s character and thus limits flourishing in individuals, it must also be true that
this damage caused in the lives of others continually negatively affects others. In the
Aristotelian moral framework there are goods of the soul which are accorded by others
which are necessary for flourishing and these goods are either denied or perverted by
oppression though the corruption of others. One significant and important way that the
corruption of others affects the individual is through a corruption of honor and esteem.
The assessment of honor and esteem plays an important social role within Aristotelian
virtue ethics. Here, I wish to first outline Aristotle's conception of honor and esteem and
show the important role that it plays in moral development. From here, I wish to show
how this conception of honor is corrupted by oppression, and more specifically, how
oppression damages entire communities of honor-bestowers and thus perpetuates the
corruption of each member.
Aristotle adamantly claims that honor should not be the end to which our lives are
aimed. Those who seek honor as a good-in-itself are chastised by Aristotle in Book I,
Chapter 5, in what he calls "the political life." Aristotle claims that people of "superior
refinement" often believe that honor is equivalent to happiness and thus honor is what we
ought to identify as our end. For these individuals, being held in high esteem by others,
and honored above all others, verifies their goodness. Aristotle responds to such a belief
by pointing out that being honored does not, in fact, guarantee goodness because it
"depend[s] on those who bestow honour rather than on... who receives it" (1195b24).
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One may be honored by dishonorable people, and held in high esteem, yet have earned
this privilege for all the wrong reasons. It seems reasonable to claim that the best car
thief will be honored and respected by other car thieves in virtue of their supreme
abilities, yet this honor is (clearly) ill-founded and does not demonstrate the goodness of
this venerated individual. Returning to this claim in Book IV, Aristotle says that
"[people] who are well-born are thought worthy of honour, and so are those who enjoy
power or wealth; for they are in a superior position, and everything that has a superiority
in something good is held in greater honour" (1124a21-24). These wealthy aristocrats
assume that in virtue of their social and economic superiority they are deserving of honor
and esteem. Yet Aristotle again points out that this is not the case because wealth and
social superiority are not guarantees of virtue. For Aristotle, "the good [person] alone is
to be honoured" (1124a25).
Honor is only properly bestowed to the virtuous individual in virtue of their
goodness. Thus, for Aristotle, honor is described as "a noble object" (1116a29) and a
"prize" (1123b35, 1163b3) which, when properly understood, is awarded as an accolade
of virtue. When honor is properly bestowed as the reward of virtue it becomes placed
among things which are good in themselves (1096b18).
Beyond merely being an awarded good for the achievement of virtue, honor can
be bestowed on those, in a limited way, who seek virtue. In this way, honor can be used
as a tool for moral development and growth. Aristotle points out that honor can be
bestowed as a means for encouraging noble acts (1113b24-26) and can serve as a means
of judging paths toward happiness (1097b1-4). In this way non-virtuous people can be
given limited esteem by others to help reinforce correct behavior and actions. Thus, these
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people, who "desire honour from good [people], and [people] who know," are able to
"[confirm] their own opinion of themselves" as on a path of moral growth based on the
"the strength of the judgment of those who speak [well] about them" (1159a16-23). In
this way the honor and esteem of others acts as a tool for moral reinforcement, allowing
individuals to verify that their actions and habits are working towards the achievement of
virtue. This echo's Aristotle's beliefs about the need for good friends as one of the
functions of good friends is moral reinforcement (11157b5ff).
Honor, and being esteemed, thus plays an important role in self-evaluation and
self-assessment. It is through the assessment of others that individuals are, in an
important way, given a tool for verification of positive moral growth and moral
fortification. Because oppression makes people non-virtuous and the esteem required for
virtue must come from virtuous people who provide esteem and respect qua your virtue
then oppression limits proper self-assessment, self-evaluation, and self-esteem. Honor is
warped and corrupted in an oppressive society, and the appropriate basis of honor and
esteem is corroded. Given the importance of honor and esteem within the Aristotelian
framework this corruption of honor via the moral corruption of others is a significant
problem. The manipulation which oppression mandates runs much deeper than merely
harming others in their individual pursuits of virtue but also limits honor and esteem by
corrupting communities of individuals as bestowers of honor.
Consider the example of body-image and beauty norms as set for women of the
western world. Naomi Wolf82and Ann Garry83 have both outlined the harmful ways in
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which the socially constructed beauty standards set for women place women into a
“double-bind” or a “double standard.” The starvation imagery of beauty, and the need to
“dress to impress,” create social categories of gender evaluation whereas women are not
only tied expressly to their bodies but are evaluated and judged based upon their
ability/willingness to conform to these standards. For Garry, women are placed into
ongoing social schemas where their compliance to beauty standards allows for them to be
judged as “good women” through their sexualization, but which at the same time also
harms them as they are equally judged as “bad [sexualized] women.”84 The women who
refuse to comply with patriarchal beauty standards are negatively judged (and thus
socially harmed), while those who comply become sexualized and, again, harmed. This,
for Garry, is the crux of the double-standard. The creation and maintenance of beauty
standards, which unduly and unfairly harms women, creates and maintains a social order
where women are harmed by being held in poor esteem by others and thus not held as
worthy of respect. This lack of social respect can also be internalized such that
individuals who lack the respect of others may come to view themselves as unworthy of
the very respect they are not given. Individuals systemically denied esteem lose not only
the external and instrumental good of proper esteem used for moral development, but also
may develop an internal disposition of negative self-assessment where they deem
themselves not worthy of esteem in the first place. What is truly troubling, for the virtue
ethicist, is that the double-bind of gender exploitation means that women are harmed,
internally and externally, by conforming to social norms but also harmed by rejecting
these social norms.
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If oppression limits not only the virtue of the individual but also the virtue of
others, and does so to the point of vice, then the cultivation of many virtues appears
impossible. For Aristotle, the acquisition of many of the virtues requires both the proper
disposition of the individuals as well as the virtuous character of others. These influential
others, most often typified by Aristotle as forms of friendship, aid individuals by
providing support, strength, and moral knowledge needed for moral growth. In short,
others are needed, in part, to properly bestow honor and esteem such that moral growth is
encouraged in others. Since oppression damages those individuals around us which we
need as bestowers of honor and esteem, then oppression's influence must be seen as a
pooling of individual and community damage where communities and individuals of
oppressed people are denied access to the means for the acquisition of virtue.

Section 2 – Oppression and the Manipulation of External Goods

While it is essential to understand that oppression curtails flourishing by
inhibiting agents from achieving and maintaining virtue, this alone is far from a complete
account of the ways which oppression both harms and limits individuals as understood by
virtue ethics. To fully understand how oppression curtails flourishing one must also
account for oppression’s detrimental effect via the manipulation and limitation of
external goods. This is because, for Aristotle, external goods are (in addition to virtue)
necessary for happiness. To demonstrate this there are three argumentative premises
which must be outlined and explained. They are (1) external goods are necessary for
flourishing (and while virtue alone is necessary for flourishing, it is not sufficient), (2)
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Aristotle explicitly accounts for this within the NE, and his account is found in his
description of “fortune,” "luck," and "chance," and, (3) fortune, or moral luck, cannot be
understood as mere happenstance.
Aristotle, in Book I of the NE, claims that “it is impossible, or not easy, to do
noble acts without the proper equipment” (1099b1). This proclamation comes after
Aristotle has defined the human good, via functionally accounting for human qualities
(1097b25), as “the activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are (sic) more
than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete” (1098a17-19). While
virtue, as an activity of the soul, is clearly necessary for (and privileged in) the
achievement of happiness, virtue alone cannot guarantee flourishing. This is because, as
we have indicated above, the virtues require agents to either use external goods (e.g.;
liberality requires the agent to not only possess money but be willing to part with money
for the good of another) or rely on the external goods of community/friends for
development (e.g.; knowledge cannot be produced solipsistically, but requires teachers,
mentors, and other virtuous people). Without the necessary external goods, an agent
cannot develop or maintain virtue.
This view is not without its detractors. Paul Farwell argues that external goods
cannot be essential for the development of virtue, and holds that a view such as the one
presented here is implausible.85 Farwell claims, that while external goods may be helpful
for exercising some virtues, virtue writ large does not require external goods. Farwell
hangs his argument on three rough premises. The first is that even without an abundance
of external goods, virtue can still be exercised. Second, he claims that many virtues
require no external goods for their acquisition. And third, that via Aristotle's example of
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Priam we must conclude that virtue must persist even when all external goods are
removed. I wish to take this criticism head-on, and address these claims individually. In
each case I show not only how Farwell is mistaken but how in seeing his failures we are
given an account of the necessity of external goods for virtue.
Farwell first claims that while external goods can be used to engage in certain
types of virtuous activity, the external goods are not essential for evaluating the character
of an agent. Citing Aristotle's understanding of liberality and generosity, Farwell claims
that the virtue of liberality need not be restricted to the wealthy due to the amount of
money they choose to give away. Paralleling the famous story from Scripture (Mark
12:43, Luke 21:2), Farwell claims that "the poor [person] who gives a small amount of
money may be more liberal than the rich [person] simply because he (sic) has less to
give."86 Here, Farwell is undoubtedly correct. Liberality, as a virtue, must be a
willingness to part with money and cannot be tied expressly to the amount of money that
is given. This is something that even Aristotle notes (1120b7). Yet this alone does not
show that the external good of money is not necessary for liberality, it merely shows that
the amount given is not sufficient for evaluating the state of character of the giver. If one
had no money, then giving money would be impossible and one could not engage in acts
of liberality.87 Farwell wishes to hang liberality, in total, on the willingness of the agent
to part with money, and this alone cannot be the case. The exercising of liberality
requires not only this willingness but also a success condition whereas money is
successfully given and thus hits the mark of the virtue. One may be willing to part with
money, even for noble ends, but if they have no money to give they cannot be said to be
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liberal as they are not giving. This is the game that many people play with the possibility
of winning the lottery. Many may claim that when they win the lottery they promise to
give a set amount or set percentage to charity. While possibly expressing noble hopes,
without the actual lottery winnings these are empty promises and are not indicative of
their liberality. Further, while small amounts of external goods, even on Farwell's
account, are needed to engage in liberal acts, Farwell fails to see that this action does not
constitute the virtue of liberality. To develop liberality, one must engage in liberal acts
habitually and inculcate not only the desire but also, and more importantly, the
willingness to part with money. While possibly developing generosity in other nonmonetary ways, those without any expendable income cannot ritually commit liberal acts
and cannot develop liberality. They may hope that their non-monetary generosity
cultivates a sense of giving which may "spill over" into the giving of money when the
rare opportunity of expendable money is available, yet without the actual giving of
money liberality cannot be practiced and therefore cannot be developed into the virtue.
In summary, Farwell claims, "a small amount of external goods does not prevent [the
giver] from acting virtuously, and likewise a large amount of wealth or power
underscores the need for virtue, since wealth and power have no ethical worth by
themselves but depend on how the noble and virtuous person uses them."88 What
Farwell fails to see is how both the rich person and the "poor person" both have external
goods, and use these external goods, even in his own language, to develop virtue.
Farwell's second argument is that there are “other virtues [which] require no
special external goods: self-control and gentleness in temper for instance.”89 Here, I wish
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to raise two objections. First, if Farwell is right in this claim, it is important to see just
how numerically limited these virtues would be. If there is some limited set of virtues
which are developed without any connection to external goods, the list would be quite
short. For the individual who did develop these scarce virtues, there would be many
more virtues which they would not be able to develop, and this hypothetical individual
seems lacking in so many respects that to pronounce them virtuous seems a
bastardization of Aristotle's conception of the complete life. Beyond this, there is a
deeper problem with Farwell's argument. Farwell specifically cites two virtues, selfcontrol and gentleness, and boldly claims "no special external goods" are necessary. To
claim that external goods do not play a role in the development of these virtues is to deny
any causal connection between external goods and these virtues, and this seems patently
false. Looking specifically at the two virtues listed by Farwell, self-control and
gentleness, there are plenty of important connections between them and external goods.
Gentleness is surely influenced by one's upbringing, and if one's care givers (as an
external good) help habituate these feelings in a child which, through time, can develop
into virtue, then we cannot claim no causal influence. In a similar vein, self-control can
be shown to connect to external goods. Self-control, manifest in acts of self-control,
requires an availability of external goods to prompt and condition the agent such that they
can refrain from these goods. Without the presence of an object which could be taken by
an action lacking self-control it seems wholly impossible to claim this agent exercised
self-control in not taking what was not present. For example, one cannot be said to be
dieting or fasting when they have no food (or access to food); this person simply goes
without. To claim that the real possibility of obtaining food is unnecessary for positing
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an agent's self-control over their impulses would be to claim that agents can be said to
control their impulses in the face of no other possibilities. Self-control, then, is both
inculcated and enacted only in reference to the specific and real external goods available
to agents.
The final argument presented by Farwell, and his most noxious, is that
Aristotelian virtue ethics maintains a conception of steadfastness of character in the face
of a radical loss of external goods and that this steadfastness of character shows that
external goods have no influence on virtue. Here Farwell anchors his argument directly
in Aristotle's claim that the virtuous person cannot be swayed from happiness even when
the victim of extreme and repeated misfortunes. Aristotle most famously claims this in
Book I, and raises the example of Priam whereas even in extraordinary circumstances
Priam "can never become miserable" (1101a6). Priam loses family, wealth, and health
yet fails to devolve into misery or vice.
I am sympathetic to Aristotle's arguments here and tend to agree that virtue, once
fully developed, cannot be easily lost simply do to external constraints or circumstances.
Thus, Aristotle's example of Priam seems quite apropos, but it is only because these
individuals have had the necessary luxury to develop virtue that they cannot lose it. In
the case of Priam, the individual suffering does so only after long periods of moral,
physical, and financial prosperity and in this way these examples are necessarily
backwards looking. Given the combination of luxury and privilege together with virtue,
the loss of privilege does not necessitate the loss of virtue and true happiness. Yet this
does not negate the claim that external goods are necessary for the development of virtue.
In fact, this seems to show the exact opposite. It is precisely because of the abundance of
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necessary external goods that these individuals were able to become virtuous and
therefore steadfast in character. The goods were necessary for the virtue's development,
and what Aristotle shows is simply that prosperity is not equivalent to virtue (or
happiness). It would seem that Farwell fallaciously reasons that the inability for Priam to
lose virtue is identical to that person who begins without external goods. This line of
reasoning is both unsupported by the text as well as argumentatively bankrupt. When
Aristotle returns to this discussion in Book VII, he not only notes that the external goods
are necessary, claiming "this is why the happy man needs the goods of the body and
external goods" (1153b17, emphasis added), but continues to say that even though
happiness and virtue are intertwined we must not make the mistake of confusing the two.
Aristotle concludes "because we need fortune as well as other things, some people think
good fortune the same thing as happiness; but it is not that "(1153b21, emphasis added).
Understanding this necessity of external goods allows us to understand why Aristotle
claims that “happiness [flourishing] seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition [to
virtue]” (1099b7). It is this necessity that Farwell fails to understand. Aristotle does
provide a clear account, through numerous and repeated claims, that external goods are
necessary for the development of virtue.
By necessitating external goods for the achievement of virtue, and therein
flourishing, Aristotelian ethics must carry with it an analysis of the dispensation of these
needed goods. While many of these goods can be acquired by agents in pursuit of the
good life, there are many cases where the acquisition of these goods lies beyond the
agent's control. Thus, Aristotle's conception of external goods carries with it a
conception of moral luck of which Aristotle was very aware.
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Aristotle's most detailed discussion of luck and chance are found not in the ethics
but rather in the Physics (specifically II, 4-6). Here, Aristotle accounts for luck (in its
various forms) as a type of accidental causation. This metaphysical, and strictly causal,
account of luck and chance is taken up by Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics (EE) and
extended to that luck which effects moral endeavors.90 This discussion of luck and
chance as it pertains to the moral sphere is later altered and softened by Aristotle in the
NE. 91 While the NE does contain a conception of luck and chance it is a less technical
conception than found in both the EE and the Physics. Specifically, what is missing in the
NE is an attempt to regularly use the terms luck or chance in any rigid or schematized
way. In contrast, in the Physics and the EE, Aristotle argues that luck and chance have
specific applications and pertain to a categorized understanding of accidental causation
relating to special subsets. In these other works "luck" coincides with deliberative reason
and thus only occurs within the human realm while "chance" can effect animals, plants,
or even rocks.92 In the NE, these terms lose their strict designation and are used more
interchangeably to identify those things, actions, and/or events which morally affect an
agent and which are beyond the agent's control. Similar to his use of "luck" or "chance"
to identify these non-intentional causal interventions, Aristotle also uses the term
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"fortune."93 In general, luck, chance, and fortune are simply used to identify "that which
is not within an agent's own control and yet affects the agent in a morally relevant way."94
One specific, and oft cited, instance of Aristotle's identification of moral luck is
found in his claim that beauty is necessary for the achievement of happiness (1099b3).95
Without beauty, virtue seems either impossible or unduly difficult because beauty is
socially needed for the development of friendship and love. The hideous person is likely
to scare away potential friends and the psychological damage of being repulsive in the
eyes of others will have a detrimental effect on this ugly person. Because aesthetic
qualities, like Aristotle’s other listed goods of “good family and goodly children,” are not
chosen by the agent but rather given to the agent, the distribution of these qualities is, for
Aristotle, constituted by fortune.
In a broader and less specific example of moral luck, Aristotle claims:

Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance; small
pieces of good fortune or of its opposite clearly do not weigh down the scales of
life one way or the other, but a multitude of great events if they turn out well will
make life happier..., while if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness; for
they both bring pain with them and hinder many activities. (1100b22-30).
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Passages such as this, in conjunction with his understanding of specific goods
such as beauty, demonstrate that Aristotle understands that any ethical system which
requires external goods for the achievement of happiness must accept that these goods
are, in many cases, beyond the agent's control and therefore agents are subject, to a
greater or lesser extent, to moral luck. This is by no means a unique insight by Aristotle.
Conceptions of moral luck appear to have played a central role in the philosophies of
Aristotle’s contemporaries thus leading Aristotle to claims that “some identify happiness
with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue” (1099b8-9). Aristotle
distinguishes his view from those of his contemporaries by (correctly) identifying the
reality of moral luck yet not reducing virtue and happiness to merely the product of
fortune.
Aristotle's inclusion of moral luck, as one factor in the achievement of virtue and
happiness, seems wholly correct yet his description of luck is also lacking. Identifying
"luck," "chance," and "fortune" as existent factors beyond an agent's control is correct but
it fails to account for the ways that these factors are subject to intentional manipulation.
Here, the language of “luck” and "chance" seems to do a disservice in that may lead one
to believe that external goods are merely distributed by happenstance. While surely some
goods are distributed by happenstance, others are systematically apportioned and the
moral good they serve is limited to those who find themselves in a position of privilege.
It is those goods which are allotted not by pure happenstance but by design which
connects external goods to oppression. Social structures and regimes act as vehicles for
the dispensation of external goods and oppressive structures can, and do, limit these
goods to oppressed people. If the limiting of these goods is a barrier for the achievement
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of virtue and happiness, and oppression acts to limit these goods, then oppression can act
via the dissemination of external goods as a barrier for happiness.
The most obvious example of this oppressive manipulation of external goods is
found in money and wealth. Disparity in wealth and capital divides economic classes and
the wealth that individuals possess, or have access to, cannot be attributed to either
willingness (or unwillingness) to gain on one hand, and, chance apportionment on the
other. Poverty, something Aristotle refers to as an evil (1115a11), as near death
(1116a13), and as a grave misfortune (1155a11), is often handed down generationally96
and the economic privilege afforded to some is paid for by the poverty of others. The
privilege of cheaper and more widely available goods has always relied on systems of
economic slavery to produce and distribute these goods while keeping production costs as
low as possible. We can see this in institutionalized systems of slavery and bondage
where all wealth is taken from individuals and the fruits of their labor are sold for the
economic benefit of not only the seller but also the buyer. Wage slavery works in,
economically, similar ways such that workers are paid sub-living wages in order to keep
the products they produce competitively priced for mass consumption. It is not merely
happenstance that these individuals are placed into states of poverty, but rather a
necessary and supported form of economic exploitation of a given mode of capital
production and distribution. Disparities in wealth are not merely coincidental but
economically designed and the moral good that money provides is distributed unequally
between classes, races, and geographical regions.
Beyond money, many of the goods of the body that Aristotle highlights as morally
necessary are influenced through the availability of external goods. While health is a
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bodily good needed for achieving virtue and happiness, access to health care is the
necessary means for maintaining proper health and is an external good which works in
service of the bodily good. Access to health care, and more specifically denied access to
health care, is a manipulation of an external good which (in conjunction with access to
wealth), can prohibit individuals from achieving the goods necessary for happiness.
Similarly, as cited above, while beauty is a bodily good, the social expectations of beauty
standards are external goods which are structured in such a way as to disadvantage
individuals beyond their control.
A further way one can see the manipulation of external goods beyond the bounds
of agent control is in the political structures of the state. Often, political structures assign
goods to individuals based upon their membership. One's citizenship can be a matter of
birth or choice, but when one is born with a citizenship designation which limits voting,
access to social services, basic political freedoms (such as freedom of movement) these
individuals suffer at the loss of these external goods. Mirroring Aristotle's claim for the
need of "good birth" in a proper family, similar "good birth" is needed in citizenship
affiliation. Being born a Palestinian is obviously beyond the control of a child born to
Palestinian parents living in the Occupied Territories, but this person's restricted freedom
of movement and governance is not merely a confluence of random factors but rather the
denial of basic rights by an unjust and oppressive occupying authority. Similarly, being
born an African American prior to the 15th Amendment to the US Constitution, which
guaranteed voting rights to all citizens regardless of race or ethnicity, is morally unlucky
but the moral harm perpetrated against these individuals was an intentional product of
racist political structures.
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In each of these examples, individuals suffer morally due to factors outside their
control, and thus are victims of moral luck. But these harms are intentional, systematic,
purposeful, and oppressive. It is circumstances such as these that demonstrate the moral
harm that manipulated external goods levels against individuals. Once we see that these
external goods are necessary for Aristotelian flourishing and that Aristotle accounts for
the necessity of these goods and that it is not merely unexplained causal effects which
limits these goods we can see how the manipulation of external goods is used to oppress
people and how these oppressed people are curtailed in their pursuit of the good life.

Section 3 – Oppression and Base and Shameful Actions

In this final section I will show how oppressive forces harm agents through the
habituation of base and shameful actions. This third assessment, in addition to the above
stated arguments concerning the affected/eliminated/burdened nature of virtues and the
manipulation of external goods, helps substantiate a final way in which oppression's
harms must be evaluated by virtue theory. In part, this section acts to show the
shortcomings of Aristotle's view of base and shameful actions, but it also attempts to
build on Aristotle's views in light of these shortcomings to advance a conception of base
actions that accounts for the material conditions of oppression while also explaining the
immense danger these actions cause.
In order to understand Aristotle's conception of base and shameful actions we
must first see the complex nature of his assessment of "the base" as presented throughout
the NE. Aristotle uses the term "base" throughout the NE but does so in no less than
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three distinct yet related ways. In each of these ways he more often than not contrasts
"the base" with "the noble." This recurring juxtaposition begins in Book II where
Aristotle claims "there are three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the
advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, [and] the painful"
(1104b30). Here, Aristotle expressly contrasts "the noble" and "the base" and labels them
as contraries. Following this schema, when he identifies the category of the base he
continuously invokes this contrary relationship with the noble (see 1113b9, 1117b9,
1120a13, 1173b28, 1175b29, 1179b13, 1179b30).
The first way Aristotle uses the term 'base' is to identify certain human impulses.
In Book VII, when discussing the dual role of pleasure as morally significant yet also
morally corrupting, Aristotle notes specifically that "there are pleasures that are actually
base" (1152b21). Here, it is the pleasures, or the drive for the satisfaction of this
pleasure, that is deemed base. The pleasure at hand here is the pleasure of children and
brutes. The baseness of this type of pleasure is rooted in its simplistic, low, and
animalistic qualities. This discussion from Book VII is mirrored in Book X as Aristotle,
in returning to the discussion of pleasure, identifies the noble sources of pleasure and
contrasts them with the base (1173b28). Again, the base sources are delineated as those
tied to our basest instincts.
The second sense of base that Aristotle uses throughout the NE is intimately tied
to the first, yet importantly different. Aside from identifying base impulses, Aristotle
identifies "base objects" (1175b30). Base objects are simply those objects which are
desired by base instincts. It is important to see that while Aristotle is again invoking
'base' to describe a type of desire or impulse, he is also disconnecting base from the
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impulse and identifying it as residing within the object desired. While base impulses
desire base objects, base objects possess baseness independent of their desirability. The
clearest example of this, as hinted at by Aristotle, is found in appetites and food. While
one's base desires may impel one toward bingeing on junk food, the baseness of junk
food as an object of desire is not simply reduced to its being desired via base impulses.
Rather, the baseness of junk food is rooted in its utter lack of nutrition. So while base
desires drive agents to base objects, baseness is a quality possessed independently by
objects as well as contained in certain impulses. Thus, in the closing pages of the NE,
Aristotle claims that "virtue [is] loving what is noble and hating what is base" (1179b30).
Proper desire, manifest as "love," is virtuous but is still ontologically distinct from the
objects of love which, for virtue, must also not be base. Thus, in the second way
Aristotle identifies "base" as an independent quality of select objects.
The third and most often used sense of the term 'base' employed by Aristotle
throughout the entirety of the NE, and the sense of 'base' that is central to this section, is
as an assessment of actions. At points, Aristotle identifies specific actions which are
base. He claims that telling falsehoods or breaking promises is base (1127b5), taking as
compared to giving is base (1120a14), and bravely facing pain is noble whereas to not do
so is base (1117b8). In addition to specifically identifying individual base (or not-noble)
actions, Aristotle accounts for the baseness of actions in general. If we return to
Aristotle's first use of the term 'base,' as noted above, base defines one of the ways, if not
the central way, we must avoid acting. The actions Aristotle proposes, which are to be
assessed as either base or noble, are restricted to those actions which arise as voluntary
choices. To understand base actions, we must first see that one of the conditions of a
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base (or noble) action is that the action is, to a large degree, under the agent's control.
Here, it is worth quoting Aristotle at length:

For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice
versa; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will
be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble, is in our
power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our power. Now if it is in our
power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this
was what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous or
vicious (1113b713).

In typically elliptical form, Aristotle claims that baseness, as the quality of certain
actions or willful inactions, is restricted to those actions or inactions in which we have the
power (read: ability) to act or not to act. This baseness of action is thus easily applied to
"bad actions" in general (1179b13), and more specifically to actions of adultery, theft,
and murder (1107a11). While obviously immoral actions are easily called base by
Aristotle, he famously devotes a large section of Book III to assessing the nature and
scope of voluntary actions in accordance with the evaluation of their nobility or baseness
as most contentious action (or inaction) fails to be clearly and definitively voluntary.
In describing how actions accord with freedom, Aristotle references two
hypothetical situations where necessary actions are done under coercion yet which cannot
be properly called ‘involuntary.’ The two examples given by Aristotle are of the tyrant
and the ship captain. In the tyrant example Aristotle proposes a hypothetical scenario
where “a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one’s parents and
children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise
would be put to death” (1110a5-8). The ship captain is presented as in an analogous
situation, where she is caught in a storm and must throw the ship’s cargo overboard to
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secure the safety of herself and her crew (1110a9-12). In both scenarios, the moral agent
is presented with a situation in which they are coerced into base and shameful actions due
to an external influence. For Aristotle, these actions are justified and “worthy of choice”
because (a) the end of the action is “done from fear of greater evils or for some noble
object,” (b) while the action is base the action would otherwise not be performed if the
external constraint were removed, and, (c) “any sensible man” would perform these
actions in these situations. Aristotle’s assessment of these so-called mixed actions is
done to show that evaluation of actions must be “used with reference to the moment of
action” and that the strict and simplistic criteria of “the moving principle” cannot
categorize all actions as either completely voluntary or completely involuntary. While
these examples illustrate Aristotle’s assessment of free actions, they also shed light on the
base and shameful actions which can be necessitated by oppression.
Much like the tyrant, the existence of oppression forces agents to perform base
and shameful acts. Where oppression differs from Aristotle’s example of the tyrant is
that oppression does not exist wholly in discrete and dramatic moments but rather affects,
coerces, and conditions agents over prolonged periods of time. Aristotle’s example of the
tyrant depends on two implied premises. The first is that if this one base action is
performed then the noble end (of saving the family) will be accomplished. The second is
that this base action is discrete and performing this action, in unique situations of
mitigating circumstances, will not affect the development and maintenance of one’s
character. These two premises fail to obtain in cases of oppression. Oppression’s
longevity, and the continuous effects that are exerted upon agents, means that the base
and shameful actions which oppression coerces individuals into are not discrete.
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Oppression can coerce individuals into a continual cycle of base actions which do not
achieve noble ends and which do radically affect the development and maintenance of
one’s character. The continual and on-going pressure exerted by oppression, by coercing
agents to base actions, can become a form of negative habituation.
Let us take, as an example, the debt bondage ring run by Carlos Andres
Monsalve. Monsalve orchestrated the immigration of women from Guatemala to the
United States such that these women entered into debt bondage agreements with
Monsalve where they agreed to work as housekeepers to pay for their initial illegal
migration, their eventual legalization and naturalization, and their housing and care.97
The initial debt was set at $5,000 (USD) but upon arrival in the US they were informed
that their debt had jumped to upwards of $30,000. The women were told that their debt
would now need to be paid-off by working as prostitutes. Under the escalating fears of
abandonment, expulsion, and physical torture these women began performing up to 25
sex-acts a day for $30 an act.
These women, who were clearly subject to an oppressive structure of exploitation
and coercive force, were compelled to commit base and shameful acts. Yet, unlike the
scenarios presented by Aristotle, their exploitation was not limited to discrete and
unconnected actions but rather a life of servitude and sexual exploitation. The continued
performance of these base sexual acts has substantial effect upon these women’s
characters. Melissa Farley, a researcher and clinical psychologist and founding director
of Prostitution Research and Education, surveyed and analyzed multiple psychological
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studies done on prostitutes.98 Here Farley concluded that prostitution, be it forced and
illegal (as in the case of the women enslaved by Monsalve) or self-chosen and legal,
results in "dissociation," Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, and "other mood
disorders."99 Farley's work, and the individual studies she cites, substantiates the ways in
which habitual sexual action in exchange for money or services results in harm. This
substantiated psychological harm can be further explained by virtue ethics through
habituation. The continual performance of an action, according to Aristotle, can, through
the process of habituation, have an effect on the moral character of an individual.
According to Aristotle, “states of character arise out of like activities” (1103b21) and
thus, “we become just by doing just action, and temperate by doing temperate acts”
(1105a18). While this is most often associated with moral development (as seen in
Aristotle’s examples of justice and temperance), it can also explain moral decay. If we
become just by performing just actions, so too we become unjust by performing unjust
actions. When one continually commits negative and harmful actions, the actions can
bring about vice or viciousness.100 The women exploited and oppressed by Monsalve
were forced to commit harmful and base actions and these actions, via their repetition and
eventual habituation, curtailed (if not prohibited) their flourishing.
While possibly an extreme (although not uncommon) example, human sexual
trafficking can help illuminate how oppressive structures force the habituation of base
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and shameful actions and how this habituation must curtail the flourishing of these
oppressed people. While an example of sexual debt-bondage may illustrate this point, it
can also leave one with a sense that this moral reality is reserved exclusively for extreme
scenarios, and this, most certainly, is not the case. Similar results can be found in the
way worker safety is commodified and the way workers choose, in a truly Aristotelian
"mixed" sense, to labor under unsafe working conditions.
When looking at unsafe working conditions it is difficult not to begin with the
commercial meatpacking industry. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
meatpacking industry is one of the most dangerous industries in the United Sates.101 The
meatpacking industry has one of the highest injury rates of all industries, and injuries in
this industry occur at roughly three times that of other manufacturing industries.102
Most of the physical injuries in the meatpacking industry are a result of the
extremely high volume of meat processed and the rate at which animals are slaughtered.
In the United States over 9 billion animals are slaughtered per year.103 In industrialized
plants, this butchering is done by workers through a series of "cuts." Animals arrive infront of workers on moving conveyer systems and workers are trained to perform specific
and targeted "cuts" to the carcass. In many slaughterhouses over 350 animals are
butchered per hour, and the cutting process moves at break-neck speed. The speed of the
process is extremely dangerous and it is a well known fact that slaughterhouse workers
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toil in some of the most unsafe environments in the industrial sector. Typical injuries
range from deep lacerations and amputations to third degree burns (often from a machine
called the "gut-cooker"). According to Eric Schlosser, "Every year about one out of three
meatpacking workers in this country - roughly forty-three thousand men and women suffer an injury or work-related illness that requires medical attention beyond first aid."104
In addition to the physical danger of slaughterhouse work, meatpackers also face
a myriad of psychological dangers. The speed at which slaughterhouses operate means
that workers are not given time to ensure that animals are killed quickly, humanely, or
even completely. In 1958, congress passed the Humane Slaughter Act (HSA) which
regulates the slaughtering of animals. The HSA holds that, "It is therefore declared to be
the policy of the United States that the slaughtering of livestock and the handling of
livestock in connection with slaughter shall be carried out only by humane methods.”105
While the HSA purportedly ensures that animals are slaughtered humanely, this law fails
to ensure the reality of the promise. From its passage in 1958 until 1978, when the HSA
was updated, USDA regulators were given no authority to intervene when
slaughterhouses were found in violation of the law. Slaughterhouses were given the task
of self-regulation and no punishments existed for failures to comply. In 2002, the HSA
was updated again via a congressional resolution. This resolution, as part of the Farm
Bill, resolved that the HSA "should be fully enforced." Forty-four years after its
passage, congress was forced to pass a resolution which called expressly for the
104

Eric Schlosser, Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal (Houghton Mifflin, 2001), 172.
Interestingly, the HSA only expressly mentions the slaughtering of "cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep,
[and] swine." The industrial meat industry, along with a complacent and co-conspiratorial USDA, has
taken this to mean that animals not expressly outlined in the original legislation fall outside the purview of
the law and can therefore be slaughtered in inhumane ways. This is most prevalent in the commercial
slaughtering practices of chickens and turkeys, but applies also to the killing of fish, rabbits, and other
types of fowl.
105

89

enforcement of the law which, up until this point, has no real mechanisms for enactment.
Even following this resolution, the inhumane conditions of slaughterhouses persist, and
these conditions require workers to treat animal suffering as merely an unavoidable
aspect of their work.
Journalist Ted Conover spent a number of months working as a USDA inspector
in Nebraska's slaughterhouse industry. He describes the killing process he witnessed, and
reports that animals were intentionally left living during the butchering process.106 A
fellow USDA inspector told him that "the pumping of their hearts will help drain the
blood from their bodies once their necks are sliced open."107 Conover describes semistunned cattle dangling from chain hoists while their throats are slit open. The cattle's
hearts pump the blood out of the living body and onto the killing floor while various
workers performed their "cuts." Conover describes animals with dangling eyeballs and
twitching muscles as he chronicles the deliberately slow death of cattle which,
paradoxically, occurs on the ultra-fast paced conveyer line. This inhumane environment
is not unique to the cattle industry nor is it localized to a specific plant or company.
Hauntingly similar stories have been shared by whistle-blowers, undercover journalists,
and activists in the poultry and pig industries.108
While the suffering experienced by animals in this horrific industry is, in itself,
extremely morally troubling for virtue ethicists,109 there are also important ways which
the moral character of those who inflict this suffering is equally significant. Without
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minimizing the severity of the moral wrongs inflicted upon, literally, millions of animals
a year in the industrialized meat industry, this industry also causes untold moral damage
to those who work in these factories. Workers, who in the course of their daily working
lives, inflict this suffering on the animals being slaughtered are morally harmed by the
tasks they perform.
Workers in this ‘industry of death’ work in pools of blood, enveloped by the
deafening noise of machinery and animal cries, and "experience, on a daily basis, largescale violence and death that most of the American population will never have to
encounter."110 Exposure to this cruelty has significant impact on the emotional and
psychological wellbeing of these workers. It has been reported that slaughterhouse
workers experience higher than average instances of social withdrawal, drug and alcohol
abuse, and anxiety.111 Further, slaughterhouse workers are now being diagnosed with
PTSD.112 In some extreme cases, workers have been known to "kill for fun,"
intentionally maiming living animals, and have even resorted to forgoing the killing
machinery in order to kill animals by hand.113 In preliminary research, it has also been
shown that there is a correlation between slaughterhouse workers and instances of violent
inter-human violence.114 In all of these ways, it is believed that the "nature of the
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slaughterhouse work may have caused psychological damage to the employees" such that
"employee's actions certainly rise to the level of abnormal cruelty that would cause
concern among the general population.115
These reports, studies, and diagnoses reveal the moral damage inflicted on these
workers. By inflicting suffering on animals, these workers are forced into emotional
states which inhibit their moral growth and prohibit their flourishing. Empathy and
sympathy are not emotions that these workers can properly experience if they are to
carry-out their work. A worker who is literally faced with this level of immense suffering
must learn to quiet their emotional responses and develop a level of emotional
detachment. This emotional numbing and detachment is not something that one can turnon and turn-off at their discretion and becomes an emotional state carried out of the
factory and into their wider lives. For many of these workers this emotional detachment
is aided by routinely and habitually using and abusing drugs and alcohol. These
mechanisms of self-abuse help achieve the emotional goal of lessening the experiences of
their working lives. Individuals who cannot quiet their emotional responses are left with
emotional and psychological disorders, such as PTSD. These individuals have their
emotional and psychological states warped into harmful states of excessive fear,
emotional uncontrollability, anxiety, sleep deprivation, and even uncontrollable and
unwanted thoughts. If these psychological, mental, and emotional states of excess,
marked by PTSD and substance abuse, can be avoided (in what must be both called and
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bemoaned as a "best case scenario") then this individual achieves emotional
disconnection. This strong emotional disconnection (or disassociation) can result in the
demonstrated instances of anti-social behavior, such as social withdraw, and even the
deviant behaviors of some workers, found in inter-human violence and "killing for fun."
It would seem then, workers are left with the options of achieving emotional numbness
and detachment via various harmful means, suffering at the hands of emotions they
cannot control, or achieving emotional disconnection and suffering its disastrous
consequences. In any case, these are states which are clearly at odds with the Aristotelian
conception of proper virtue, positive states of character, and human flourishing. For
these workers, the continual exposure to violence, the pressure to act in accordance with
inhumane industry standards, and the emotional distancing that this must induce warps
these individuals into damaged and vicious states.
The connection between the sexual debt-bondage case and the example of
slaughterhouse workers is that in both cases agents choose to routinely perform actions
which are base and shameful. The baseness forced upon the women enslaved by
Monsalve is the boldest and most robust sense of base as described by Aristotle. The
sexual actions they are coerced to perform are, in the first sense, base due to their service
of the brutish sexual appetites of their johns. In the third sense of base used by Aristotle,
the actions performed by these women qualify as base due to the otherwise
unchoiceworthiness of their actions. All things being equal, these are not the appropriate
choices one should make in service to their moral growth, character development, or
happiness. The use of slaughterhouse workers, in conjunction with the sexual debtbondage case, helps show how similar reasoning can be circumstantially pressed onto
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agents which results in moral decay, and therein be base, yet not to the same degree.
While lacking the sexual content of the actions performed in the sexual debt-bondage
case, the actions performed as work in the meatpacking industry are no less base. The
inhumane actions of brutality inflicted by slaughterhouse workers during the slaughtering
process, in their cruelty, are base in Aristotle's third sense of the word. These actions are
unfitting a person with a properly aligned moral compass and are properly called "base"
and "bad." In a second way, the impulses behind this institutionalized cruelty must also
be labeled as "base" in Aristotle's first sense of the word as they lack essential emotional
sensitivity. Thirdly, the treatment of the animals by the slaughterhouse workers does not
"serve noble ends." The consumer-ready meat produced by this industry is an
unnecessary commercial good. It is not the case that meat is the only means for feeding
people and the cruel and inhumane treatment of animals is the necessary means for
obtaining this irreplaceable good. The meat produced and sold to consumers fulfills only
basic peculiar desires which are fungible goods easily replaced when the moral
circumstances of their production are known. In this third way, the 'necessary' actions of
meatpackers are, in no sense, necessary and do not serve noble ends. Thus, both the
sexual debt-bondage example and the example of the actions of meatpackers are similar
and analogous. In both are cases agents choose, in a "mixed" sense, that which is base
and shameful and this choice results moral harm, moral decay, and moral damage.
While drawing important connections between the examples of sexual debtbondage and slaughterhouse workers in regards to the harm of base and shameful actions,
it is equally important to note that there are significant disconnections between these two
groups. The first, and most important, disconnect between these two cases is the severity
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of moral harm caused in each case. The severity of harm inflicted on a sexual slave is
exponentially higher, more malicious, and more pernicious than the moral harm inflicted
on slaughterhouse workers and it would be irresponsible to not clearly indicate this
important difference. Yet, even with this noted, the moral damage identified in
slaughterhouse workers as a result of their coerced and base decisions is none the less
present, real, and harmful. Thus, these two cases, in reference to severity of harm, differ
only in degree. The second way these cases differ is in the level of choice that the agents
in each case possess. One may object to the connection being drawn here between sexual
slavery and meatpacking because agents working in the meatpacking industry begin, and
continue, their employment voluntarily whereas the women controlled by Monsalve are
truly enslaved. While this is, as a point of fact, true it in no way alters the moral
evaluation of these cases. As with moral harm, the voluntariness of actions, for Aristotle,
comes in degrees. Both the actions of the sexual debt-bondage slaves and the
meatpackers are coerced and cannot be said to be fully voluntary. The threats leveled
against the women enslaved by Monsalve and the economic pressures of employment and
enforced industry standards in slaughterhouses both act to coerce agents to perform base
and harmful actions. In a similar way, the actions of the sexual slaves and the
meatpackers are not so over-determined by this coercion as to make these actions
involuntary. At the moment of action, these unfortunate and coerced agents still possess
an ability to refuse, even if this refusal comes at an unacceptable cost. This means that
the actions in both the sexual debt-bondage case and the case of the slaughterhouse
workers are truly "mixed" and both involve, to varying degrees, the choice of the agent.
While important differences exist between the levels of coercion in these two cases (and
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therefore the level of choice available to the agents) both are mixed actions, varying only
in degree and not in kind. It is the moral harm caused to slaughterhouse workers and the
women enslaved by Monsalve that is similar and it is this similarity that connects these
cases. Both are cases where individuals are coerced into the continual performance of
base and shameful acts and the effect of these continued actions harms, corrupts, and
damages the acting agents which, in turn, severely limits the availability flourishing.
If the differences between these cases are only differences of degree, then it seems
reasonable to extend this type of moral damage beyond even these two cases. This type
of moral harm, typified at the extreme by sexual debt-bondage slaves and to a lesser
degree by meatpackers, extends, by degree, to other professions and lifestyles. The
implications of Dillard and McWilliams research done on slaughterhouse workers seems
to point to possible similarities in other types of labor. Members of other high-risk
professions can and do suffer from the same negative habituation. Police officers,
firefighters, manual laborers, and even public school teachers all struggle to weigh the
competing values of personal safety and financial obligations. Where national and local
governments weigh economic concerns against safety regulations, and where employers
treat worker health and safety as negotiable and transmutable budget expenditures, the
health and safety of all workers is utterly commodified. It is this commodification of
worker safety that forces all workers, to varying degrees, to choose courses of actions
which, all things being equal, they should not choose. It is precisely because all things
are not equal that their choices are coerced and, in an Aristotelian sense, "mixed." All
workers, who must accept working conditions which they know to be less than safe,
unsafe, or dangerous, must normalize their decisions and repeatedly working in such
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conditions distances workers from the reality of the unchoiceworthiness of their
decisions. This continual acceptance (via continued actions) for that which is
unchoiceworthy is what Aristotle's examples of base actions does not account for.
Aristotle does not address the abundance and pervasiveness of base (or otherwise
unchoiceworthy) necessary actions that oppressed people must habitually make, and fails
to consider how the repetition of these coerced choices has a cumulative effect on
oppressed individual's wellbeing, happiness, and virtue.
Much like Aristotle's examples of the despotic tyrant and the rogue storm while at
sea, oppression forces (to varying degrees) the performance of base actions. While
Aristotle did not expressly consider the possibility of these base actions being performed
on a routine basis, and he treated base actions as relatively isolated incidents, the moral
framework of virtue theory can account for the repetitive nature of such actions and the
damning effect of this repetition. It is through this account that we can see how
oppression's coercive force acts as an external influence and curtails flourishing. In this
way, to account for and substantiate the harmful effects of oppression we must consider,
in conjunction with oppression's effects on the acquisition of virtue and its manipulation
of external goods, the essential and damning ways in which base and shameful actions
play a vital role.

Section 4 – Conclusion

The central aim of this chapter has been to move from a prima facie
understanding of oppression's harms to a substantiated account of these harms as
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understood by virtue ethics. It was argued here, in three sections, that the limitation on
the availability of flourishing can be found in three distinct forms.
The first way oppression limits flourishing is by limiting virtue. It was argued in
section one that under the conditions of oppression virtues can be made either (a) an
impossibility (as demonstrated via temperance), (b) radically affected such that the
development of certain virtues can be made extremely onerous and unrealistic (as
demonstrated via courage), or, (c) heavily burdened into becoming somehow damaging
in themselves (as demonstrated via proper-anger). In each of these ways oppression acts
as a force which limits the acquisition, development, and maintenance of virtue. Since
virtue is needed for the achievement of the good life and flourishing, oppression acts as a
barrier for this achievement.
The second way oppression limits flourishing is through the manipulation of
external goods. Arguing against Farwell, and using Farwell's position as a foil, section
two first establishes that external goods are, in fact, necessary yet not sufficient for the
achievement of flourishing. These necessary but not sufficient goods, external to the
agent, require Aristotle to present a corollary picture of how factors outside the agent's
control alter the dispersal of these goods. Deemed "moral luck," it was argued that while
Aristotle did account for the fortunate/unfortunate allotments of external goods he also
failed to understand the political, social, and structural ways these goods are intentionally
manipulated beyond the bounds of mere happenstance. When manipulated via
oppressive structures and regimes, the limitation of external goods limits the necessary
goods for the achievement of flourishing.
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The conjunction of sections one (on virtue's limitation) and two (on external
goods) demonstrate how all of the necessary and sufficient goods needed for the
achievement of flourishing are skewed by oppression. In this way, all aspects of the
moral life fall under oppression's harmful influence such that flourishing, for the
oppressed, is not only curtailed but possibly prohibited.
The third and final way oppression was shown to act as a limitation on the
achievement of flourishing was through an assessment of base and shameful actions.
Section three began by accounting for the different ways Aristotle conceived of that
which is base. In conjunction with his identification of so-called "mixed" acts, it was
claimed that oppression can force individuals into base and shameful actions (of varying
degrees of severity) which, in turn, affect the possibility of achieving flourishing. Here,
this section used case studies (and related research) of prisoners of sexual debt-bondage
and workers in the meatpacking industry to show how mixed actions can negatively
habituate individuals to varying degrees of moral harm which, in turn, acts as a barrier for
the achievement of flourishing.
The harms presented here, which are done as a way of substantiating oppression's
damning influence, furthers scholarship on the (im)morality of oppression in two
important ways. First, they descriptively present an analysis of oppression's influence
from within the virtue ethics tradition. The normative framework of virtue ethics requires
a uniquely virtue based account of oppression's harm and this chapter has sought to
provide this detailed analysis. Secondly, the harms presented here, as understood by
virtue ethics, take a large and broad look at the human life. The framework of virtue
ethics attempts to encompass and engage in all aspects of human life treating human

99

flourishing as the result of a complete life. Connecting the harmful effects of oppression
via virtue ethics uses this encompassing framework to trace the harmful effects of
oppression to our desires, our emotions, our choices, our habits, our interactions with
others, and our political existence as social beings. Virtue ethics, and the account of
oppression given here, attempts to meet these ethical demands in the wide and varied
arenas in which the ethical life is lived and developed. The resulting picture of
oppression and its harms demonstrates the extent and depth of oppression's devastating
effects on the oppressed.
If oppression, in all of these ways, denies flourishing, it is clear that we need to
accept that oppression must be resisted and once this barrier to flourishing is removed
such full human potential is made available to all individuals and communities. This
resistance is the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE

ESTABLISHING AN OBLIGATION TO RESIST OPPRESSION

Understanding the complex ways that oppression harms agents, as argued for in
the previous chapter, mandates a moral response from virtuous agents. This chapter
argues that Aristotelian virtue ethics generates a strong moral obligation which requires
agents to resist oppression and obligates individuals to actively engage in liberatory
struggles against oppressive forces.
At first blush, this language of obligation used in conjunction with the
Aristotelian moral framework might appear to be an unnatural mixing of moral theories
as if a square peg has been placed into a round hole. After all, the modern revival of
virtue ethics traces its roots to Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy,” in which
Anscombe calls for a return to virtue theory in light of the fact that the moral language of
“must” and “ought” fails to have any sensible meaning. Anscombe urges for a return to
the tradition of virtue ethics as it is here that she believes that the juridical "must" and
"ought" play no role. In many ways Anscombe's call has been answered. Moral theorists
took up the mantle of virtue theory, jettisoned the juridical language of obligation and
"must," and began working on expanding, extolling, and exploring virtue's role in modern
moral discussions. For many, like Christopher Miles Coope, who claims that the very
idea of 'obligation' is “a problem specific to justice… and [within a virtue ethical
framework] not readily comprehensible,” the virtue framework cannot nor should not
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attempt to conceptualize ethics as yielding obligations or asserting moral claims as
obligatory.116
It is my belief that even if we take Coope and Anscombe's criticism seriously, and
fulfill the demands of ethics from within a uniquely virtue framework, the language of
obligations still emerges and, more specifically, agents are obligated to engage in moral
resistance to oppression given oppression's harmful effects.
To establish and defend this view, this chapter begins with an analysis of Rosalind
Hursthouse's conception of "v-rules." From this conception of v-rules, I will advance a
picture of the derivative rules which the v-rules entail. These derivative rules (or "drules"), and the action guidance they provide, obligate agents in circumstances of
oppression and necessitate that agents act to resist oppression in all its forms.

Section 1 - Hursthouse's V-Rules

Hursthouse develops her conception of the so-called "v-rules" as a way of
responding to the critics of virtue ethics who claim that virtue cannot provide anything by
way of practical action guidance. For these critics, the reliance on so-called "agent
centered" ethics leaves individuals unable to determine the appropriate moral actions
required in specific situations as the broad ethical dictums to "become virtuous" or
"achieve eudaimonia" do not translate into practical application. Hursthouse responds to
these critics and develops a strong conception of virtue based action guidance which
explains how virtue ethics instructs agents as to their actions.
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For Hursthouse, the overarching rule for action guidance found within virtue
ethics is the general principle which holds that right action is defined by the action(s) of
the virtuous agent. As a foundational premise, Hursthouse expresses this principle as:

Pve.1. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically
(i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances.117

Hursthouse admits that this first rule concerning the action guidance found in
virtue ethics may sound like an unhelpful truism, yet is no different than any other
general rule for action guidance found in any other brand of moral theory. All moral
theories begin with broad premises and these basic premises are, by themselves, generally
unhelpful for determining what, specifically, an agent should or should not do.118 Using
the framework of Utilitarianism for comparison, Hursthouse shows that the first principle
of utility is, when taken by itself, equally unhelpful for guiding actions. This first
principle of utility can be expressed as:

Pu.1. An action is right iff it tends to maximize total happiness.

Much like Pve.1., Pu.1. fails, by itself, to provide concrete action guidance. Pu.1.
does not clarify or explain how happiness is to be understood or how maximization is to
be calculated or how the "tendency" requirement is measured and thus further principles
must be explained. Similarly, Pve.1. does not, by itself, define the virtuous agent or
define the virtues or explain action's connection to character, which leaves Pve.1. unable
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to singularly guide actions. For Hursthouse, the broad foundational premise of Pve.1.
must be unpacked and added to other ethical principles contained and entailed with the
normative framework of virtue ethics. Action guidance is not provided solely by Pve.1.,
but emerges when Pve.1. is conjoined with additional elaborative principles. The
subsequent premises needed, according to Hursthouse, are:

Pve.2. A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character traits,
namely the virtues.
Pve.3. A virtue is a character trait...119
The action guidance prescribed in Pve.1. is given content by the subsequent
premises. While Hursthouse ends this elaboration with Pve.3., it seems warranted to grant
at least one additional premise which flushes out this entailed chain. The additional
premise would be as follows.

Pve.4. - Virtues are developed by agents through either teaching/learning (in the
case of intellectual virtues) or through habituation (in the case of moral virtues).

It is at this point that the action guidance entailed in Pve.1. becomes clear.
Certain actions are necessary for the development and maintenance of the virtues, and
other actions are to be avoided for the same reason. Hursthouse dubs the "large number
of rules" which Pve.1- Pve.3 (and presumably Pve.4) generate "v-rules."120 It is v-rules
which specify the content of action guidance in virtue ethics. For Hursthouse, v-rules are
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derived directly from the virtues and vices and their normative force is imparted as being
derivative of Pve.1.121
We can see here that, for Hursthouse, v-rules emerge as a component of
Aristotelian virtue ethics' schema for action guidance. At this preliminary point, let us
consider an example as means of clarification. For this clarification, consider the virtue
of liberality. Liberality, the virtue which governs those things regarding wealth,
necessitates that a virtuous agent be liberal, generous, and charitable. This virtue
generates, amongst others, the v-rules "be liberal," and the related vices of liberality
instruct agents by the v-rules "do not be miserly" and "do not act as a spendthrift."
Here, some might object that while the v-rules are entailed by the existence of the
virtues (and vices) and do instruct agents how they are to act, they still provide little by
the way of concrete action guidance. After all, being instructed to "act charitably" does
not seem particularly helpful when faced with situations where agents are presented with
complex scenarios of competing demands. Must an agent part with their money
whenever asked for spare change? How should one decide between, on one hand,
making a charitable donation or, on the other, saving this would-be-donated money for
potential future circumstances of self-need? Here, it might seem that being instructed to
merely "act charitably" does not provide the strong action guidance needed to determine
the required actions.
Objections such as these fail to see how the virtue concepts, as captured by the vrules, are "thick" and carry with them more instructive and informative content than these
critics give them credit for. For Hursthouse, the v-rules generated by the virtues "connote
not only doing what the virtuous agent could do, but also doing it 'in the way' she
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would."122 This “in the way she would,” points to the complex schema of the virtues
found in Aristotelian virtue ethics as well as all of the factors involved in determining,
identifying, and enacting the virtues. For Aristotle, the virtues are not presented as
axiomatic goods without conditions or parameters, but are restricted to delineated
conditions, constraints and boundaries. These boundaries describe the limits of the
virtue's the mean as well as the ways in which agents can be said to fail. These boundary
conditions are all contained in the specific, and seemingly vague, v-rules as they are "the
ways the virtuous agents acts."
For clarification, let us return to the example of liberality. Aristotle describes the
liberal person as one who does not give money to the wrong person (1120a28, 1120b6),
one who gives without pain (1120a30), one who takes (acquires) money from the right
sources (1120a33), and one who uses their wealth to confer benefit to others (1120a35).
Those who error in regards to these conditions find themselves either prodigal (the
related vice of excess) or "mean" (the related vice of deficiency). While at the most
general level, agents are instructed to "be liberal" (as this is the v-rule), this liberality is,
in part, measured by the ability and willingness of agents to act in ways delineated by the
conditions and boundaries of the virtue. To fulfill the v-rule of liberality qua charity is
to, for example, give money to those in need and to do so unbegrudgingly.
For Hursthouse, and Aristotle, the determination of these boundaries and
conditions, and the specifics of the otherwise broad virtues (and v-rules), are to be
determined by agents using phronesis. Through the use of practical wisdom agents can
determine the practical implementation of the virtues and the fulfillment of the v-rules. It
is practical wisdom which yields the derivative content of the virtues and the v-rules, and
122
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this derivative content can be deployed by agents in concrete situations where the
specifics of individual action are needed.
Through the schema of the v-rules, and the derivative content yielded by practical
wisdom, Hursthouse gives us a strong conception of the action guidance found in virtue
ethics. To my mind, Hursthouse more than adequately answers the critics of virtue ethics
who see it as unable to practically instruct agents as to proper action. Seeing as how
these critics are the target of her argument, I believe that the scheme that she advances
succeeds. Yet, at this point, I want to break from Hursthouse's conception of the v-rules
and push them further than she intends.

Section 2 - Rules Beyond the V-Rules

Hursthouse maintains that the v-rules must always remain tied to the virtue
concepts. The v-rules operate by iterating the specifics of moral action in direct reference
to the language, and therefore meaning, of the virtues. For Hursthouse, this linguistic
connection is of central importance. Keeping the v-rules tied, expressly, to the virtue
concepts keeps them anchored in the eudaimonistic framework. So while there are many
obvious moral maxims which most will admit are morally significant in virtue ethics
(such as "do not murder"), the v-rules, themselves, do not extend to these actions. This is
not to say that these actions are therefore not prohibited but rather that the v-rules which
provide action guidance to agents do not extend to such prohibitions. The obvious
prohibition on murder which virtue ethics maintains is to be understood as the practical
manifestation of v-rules which ask agents to "be gentle" and to "maintain proper anger."
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For Hursthouse, such practicality is given to agents through the exercise of practical
wisdom which operates under the direction of the v-rules.
The virtue concepts that Hursthouse sees as both central to her conception of the
v-rules and essential for their implementation extends beyond the enumerated virtues
listed by Aristotle and includes those virtue concepts which express states of character,
both positively and negatively, without being, in themselves, virtues or vices.
Hursthouse, briefly, provides examples of this extensive virtue and vice vocabulary
which remains available for v-rule analysis. This list includes irresponsibility,
fecklessness, laziness, uncooperativeness, and being inconsiderate, to name just a few.123
These virtue (and vice) concepts help give strong action guidance and can be expressed
as v-rules. Thus, we can say that, for example, there is a v-rule which instructs agents to
not be lazy. This v-rule (which would read something akin to "do not be lazy" or even
"do not be slothful") is important in that virtue ethics requires agents to actively and
rigorously engage in the project of virtues acquisition. After all, virtue cannot be
stumbled into blindly nor quickly and requires continuous work by the agent. While this
v-rule concerning laziness instructs and guides agents in accordance with virtue ethics, it
is not derived directly from the existence of a specific virtue. Aristotle, while describing
idle laziness as the earmark of the incontinent (1166b11), does not discuss laziness at any
length and certainly does not identify laziness as a vice with a corresponding virtue. Yet
this does not preclude, for Hursthouse, the vice concept of slothfulness from being
included in both our list of virtue and vice concepts or the v-rules.
The boundaries for the v-rules, for Hursthouse, is the virtue (and vice) concepts.
The v-rules express the virtues and can only do so by remaining tied to the virtue
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concepts. Any further, more specific, action guidance derived from the v-rules which
falls outside the parameters of the virtue concepts falls, therefore, outside the scope of the
v-rules. Any further action guidance derived from the v-rules is to be yielded by practical
wisdom but cannot be called v-rules as many of these specifics break away, even
linguistically, from the virtue concepts. Hursthouse's emphasis is on the v-rules, and her
belief that the v-rules must remain the sole and central mechanism for action guidance,
means that she resists moves to identify any derivative content into a further system of
'rules.' Systemizing these details into a schema of rules, within the larger picture of the vrules, is precisely what I want to do. In doing this, I do not reject the picture of v-rules
offered by Hursthouse but rather seek to identify how eudemonistic virtue ethics
generates rules beyond those identified by the v-rules. In fact, the action guidance I want
to identify is meant to lie within, and act in conjunction with, the Hursthousian schema.
The rules I wish to identify are those specific actions or circumstances which
constitute the conditions and parameters entailed by the v-rules and discovered through
practical wisdom. These specific charges, which Hursthouse is happy to leave
unspecified in favor of a continued focus on the v-rules themselves, form a class of rules
derived from the v-rules, and which I will call “d-rules.”124
The relationship between the d-rules and the v-rules can be understood in two
ways; as a 'nested relationship' or as a 'corollary relationship.' The nested relationship is
best seen by looking at the way that d-rules emerge from the v-rules as a way of
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I have chosen not to extend the label "v-rule" to these derivative rules (or d-rules), preferring to
identify them by a unique name. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the differing nomenclature helps
keep clear the division between those aspects of Hursthouse's theory which I follow as she explains them
and those aspects and areas where I break away from Hursthouse's account. Secondly, the differing
nomenclature is an attempt to respect the adamancy Hursthouse expresses that the v-rules, properly,
cannot be extended in the ways I originally hoped. Thus, by coining a different term for these moral rules
I can keep the v-rules as Hursthouse intended while adding that which I see as necessary.
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clarifying the entailed moral content of the virtue concepts. To see this relationship it is
helpful to return to the example of liberality. Beginning with the virtue of liberality, we
can derive the v-rules "be liberal" and "be generous." As Aristotle explains, liberality is,
in part, marked by gaining (or attempting to gain) money from the proper sources and the
illiberal person seeks money through nefarious sources. Thus, practical wisdom tells us
that "one should earn money only through the right sources." Here, this entailed claim,
which instructs agents as to what they should (or should not) do, is a general instance of a
d-rule. "Earn money only through the right sources," as a rule, has no (literal) connection
to the virtue of liberality and does not express the moral rule in purely virtue concepts,
and therefore cannot be a v-rule. Yet the importance of such a dictum is necessary, and is
necessarily entailed, by the Aristotelian concept of liberality. Getting more specific, we
can clarify what "right sources" mean. Using Aristotle's assertion that money is to be
given in order to benefit others we can conclude that wealth generating schemes which
necessarily cause harm to others are wrong and run afoul of the virtue of liberality. Thus,
we can iterate the derivative content of the v-rules and, as obvious as this sounds,
practical wisdom presents d-rules to agents which forbids the trafficking of heroin and
the use of ponzi schemes. Both the trafficking of heroin and the earning of money via
pyramid schemes must result in harm being inflicted on the other person in this financial
interaction. Here, we can see that v-rule(s) which the virtue of liberality generates, in
conjunction with the practical wisdom of the agent, generates further forms of action
guidance. In this way the d-rules can be said to be nested within the normative content of
the v-rules and the virtues (and virtue concepts), and they express this moral content as a
rule.
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The other way d-rules can be expressed is as being in a corollary relationship with
the v-rules. The existence of wit as a virtue (1128a1) yields the v-rule to (in Aristotle's
words) "be a ready-witted person" and the vice of buffoonery yields the v-rule "do not act
a fool." These v-rules, which remain tied directly to the virtue concepts of readywittedness and foolishness, entail a corollary proposition (and therein a d-rule) that "one
must cultivate a proper sense of humor." There is an important distinction between
"develop a sense of humor" and "be ready-witted" in that the latter expresses a moral
claim in reference to direct virtue concepts while the former does not. Here, the v-rule
which is tied to the virtue concept of wit has a non-virtue concept corollary about one's
sense of humor. This example helps show how the v-rules' express connection to the
virtue concepts give rise to moral claims that extend beyond these virtue concepts yet,
through derivation, remain intimately tied to the virtues themselves. Here, d-rules can
emerge as conjuncts with the v-rules and can direct agents to the moral necessities
entailed by the virtues, virtue concepts, and the v-rules.125
In these two ways, both as nested and corollary relationships, the d-rules emerge
as a source of action guidance which works in conjunction with v-rules. This
identification of d-rules, or at least something akin to the d-rules, as operating within the
schema of v-rules is not a foreign idea to Hursthouse. Hursthouse expressly notes the
significance of what she calls "mother's-knee rules."126 These mother's-knee rules, such
as 'do not lie' and 'keep promises,' provide concrete action guidance for children and are
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This corollary relationship between wit, on one hand, and one's sense of humor, on the other, can be
further explored by seeing the additional nested relationships of further d-rules that can be employed to
not only clarify what qualifies as "a proper sense of humor" but also why one is, obviously, forbidden from
telling racist jokes. The corollary relation between wit and humor exists alongside the nested relationship
of proper humor and a prohibition on racist jokes.
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given to children as a simplistic moral measure in the early stages of moral education.127
Hursthouse restricts these knee rules to children as their cognitive ability to "grasp 'act
charitably, honestly, and kindly, don't act unjustly,' and so on" seems quite impossible.
For these children, these indispensible rules cannot stand alone and their moral
explanatory power must be tied to moral education built on the virtue concepts. For
Hursthouse, "virtue ethicists want to emphasize the fact that, if children are to be taught
to be honest, they must be taught to love and prize truth, and that merely teaching them
not to lie will not achieve this end."128 Thus, Hursthouse claims "it is a mistake to define
a virtuous agent (and therein virtuous action) as simply one disposed to act in accordance
with deontologist's moral rules.”129
While accepting Hursthouse's point about the moral education of children, I
believe that these so-called knee rules can be expanded beyond the education of children
and can apply generally to all those actions which agents are instructed regardless of age
or mental abilities. It seems that Hursthouse's worry with these knee rules is that, in their
seemingly deontological form, that they will, by themselves, be used to define right
action, goodness, and virtuousness. But this need not be the case. The d-rules, which
seem, in form, to be quite similar to the mother's-knee rules, are only given moral
importance as being derived from the v-rules (and therein the virtues and virtues) or
acting in conjunction with the v-rules and the virtue concepts. Agents are not made
virtuous by merely acting in accord with the d-rules, but the d-rules are adhered to by the
virtuous agent. The "indispensability" that Hursthouse identifies in the knee rules is that
they are connected to the virtue concepts through moral education. In the same way, the
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d-rules are inherently connected to the virtue concepts through the practical wisdom of
the virtuous agent. This is why the d-rules cannot exist outside the moral framework of
the v-rules and all that this framework entails. I want to be clear here; I do not believe
that the d-rules can be removed from the schema of the v-rules and maintain any sensible
moral content for the virtue ethicist. This is why the Hursthousian framework which
begins this chapter is essential. Were one to simply or merely, to borrow terms from
Hursthouse, identify d-rules as consistent with the action guidance found in virtue ethics
and then place them center-stage, they would be removing the moral framework of the
virtue concepts which act to give these d-rules moral grounding.

Section 3 - Hard and Soft D-Rules

As of this point, I have argued that the action guidance which v-rules provide
must be extended to those actions which can, and must, be derived from the virtue
concepts yet remain unteathered to the virtue concepts embodied in the v-rules. These
derived rules, or d-rules, which the v-rules make possible operate in differing ways and
thus d-rules can be further subdivided into two classes: hard d-rules and soft d-rules.
Definitionally, hard d-rules are those d-rules which guide actions without
flexibility and specifically note what agents are, or are not, to do. Soft d-rules on the
other hand are those d-rules which, while providing action guidance, are flexible in their
implementation and execution and require agents to exercise practical wisdom to
determine how and when to act.
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A parallel can be drawn between hard and soft d-rules and the perfect and
imperfect duties outlined by Kant. Kant, following the first formulation of the
Categorical Imperative (which holds that agents are to "act only according to that maxim
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law")
distinguishes between perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties are those duties that
admit no exception and are therefore to be followed in any and all situations. Imperfect
duties, while also categorical in nature (as compared to hypothetical), are those duties
which allow for exceptions and are to be fulfilled by agents to the best of their ability. To
see this difference at work, we can look to Kant's four examples. Kant claims that the
action of suicide to avoid the unpleasantness of life violates a perfect duty to oneself and
the perfect nature of this duty means that agents are to, without exception, refrain from
acts of suicide.130 Charity, or the helping of others, is, on the other hand, an imperfect
duty such that there are a vast number of exceptions which agents must juggle when
deciding how and when to help others in need. The imperfect nature of this duty means
that agents can, and should, exercise judgment in determining the appropriateness of
appeals for aid from friends and strangers and agents need not universally capitulate to all
130

Kant does return to the example of suicide in the Metaphysics of Morals (6:422-6:424) and his account
here seems to muddy this water. Here, he raises three "casuistical questions." These questions ask if
suicide is permissible in the cases of (1) saving one's country, (2) avoiding an impending death sentence
(as Seneca did), and (3) when one is bit by a rabid dog and contracts hydrophobia (as hydrophobia is an
incurable disease which erodes one's rationality). In these cases he leaves open the possibility of taking
one's life. On the surface, this appears to contradict his identification of suicide as categorically
forbidden. Yet, these cases are, in fact, not cases of suicide. Actions in which agents take their own life
can be said to be a genus of action, and suicide is a specific species. Suicide, for Kant, is (by definition) the
taking of one's own life for a specific reason; namely to avoid perceived unpleasantness. Thus, these
other actions of the voluntary taking one's own life are different in analytical form, and the prohibition on
suicide does not answer these cases. Thus, according to John Atwell, Kant's casuistical questions in no
way undermine the categorical nature of the duty to refrain from suicide as "the respective actions are
not to be labeled ‘suicides.’” John E. Atwell, Ends and Principles in Kant’s Moral Thought (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1986), 79. While Kant's explanation here, or rather the noticeable lack of explanation given by
Kant, may be unsatisfactory, it does show that Kant's perfect duty concerning suicide is, to his mind,
exceptionless.
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cries for assistance. Agents, in these imperfect cases, are commanded to "help others" (or
"provide charity"), and therefore cannot universally reject this obligation yet it need not
be discharged whenever one is approached for aid. Agents are to use their discretion to
determine the best way to effect and implement their charity.
This difference between perfect and imperfect duties is similar to the distinction
being introduced here between hard and soft d-rules. Hard d-rules are those rules which
obligate agents in a strong sense and admit no exception. Soft d-rules are those rules
which must admit exceptions, and it is the practical wisdom of the agent plays a
significant role in helping determine when and how the agent is to act in accordance with
the v-rules.
Soft d-rules capture many of the ways that the practical path to virtue is, in the
Aristotelian sense, meant to unfold. The flexibility, and the latitude to which agents are
given for implementation, of soft d-rules fulfill the goals of two of Aristotle's most
important examples in Book II. The first is the relative nature of the mean as explained
by the example of Milo the wrestler (1106a5), and the second is the analogy of the bent
wood in relation to individuals' natural tendencies (1109a30-1109b7). The practical
action guidance given to agents concerning temperance, as shown through Milo the
wrestler, helps show that the quantities of food which one should consume cannot be
mathematically determined. Milo must consume more food (or, to update the example
based on contemporary dietary understandings, more calories) than the novice gymnast
because his work and life as a wrestler requires this amount of food for the healthy
functioning of his body in accordance with his life as a wrestler. Agents, acting under the
d-rule to "eat properly," (derived from the v-rules to "remain temperate") are all
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instructed in a similar manner and to the same end but the details of this charge are
specific to the agent and their particular lifestyles and situations. In conjunction with the
example of Milo the wrestler, Aristotle uses the example of straightening bent wood to
explain how the natural tendencies of individuals vary from person to person and must be
accounted for in different ways amongst individuals seeking virtue. For every individual,
there are natural tendencies which pull them towards different vices and these tendencies
need to be accounted for when establishing habits for the acquisition of virtue. Keeping
with the example of temperance, one individual may see that they are naturally drawn
towards eating excessive amounts of junk foods or eating in excess for pleasure while
another individual may not suffer from the same tendency towards over-indulgence and
may find little to no pleasure at all in eating. For these two individuals, each must come
to know their own tendencies. When establishing proper eating habits each must initially
err in their consumption past the mean towards that vice which does not come naturally
to them. Much like how carpenters must bend wet wood beyond the point of straightness
for a period of time in order to overcome the warped and bowed nature of the lumber,
individuals must attune themselves to the naturally bent nature of their individuated
desires in order to arrive, in the end, at the relative mean.131 Both the bent wood analogy
and the example of Milo the wrestler indicate the important ways that the practical paths
to virtue must be, to a degree, individuated and relative to individual pursuits. It is the
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Aristotle's example of the bent wood also carries with it a second point. For Aristotle, natural
tendencies are both individuated and universal. This means that there are some natural tendencies
unique to individuals and other natural tendencies which all people, in virtue of their humanity, possess.
This second sort of natural tendency, which I have not explained here, simply holds that between the two
vices related to a specific virtue one is more erroneous. The more erroneous vice between the two is that
vice which all people are naturally drawn to and which is harder to escape. While I only focus on the way
this example is applied in individual cases, it should be noted that this example has this equally important
second aspect.
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flexibility in implementation that guides agents in accordance with soft d-rules. The soft
d-rule which guides agents in their eating habits for the acquisition of temperance is
intentionally flexible. This flexibility in the d-rule(s) allows agents latitude to encompass
and accommodate their natural tendencies such that they can act in accordance with the
v-rule(s) under the specifics of individuated and personal details.
Hard d-rules, on the other hand, lack flexibility and the action guidance provided
by these rules leaves no room for variation between individuals. In the most obvious
cases, hard d-rules come in the form of universal prohibitions. Most will agree that,
regardless of the moral framework in which one is working, there are many actions (or
courses of actions) which must be categorically prohibited. These categorical
prohibitions, while most often associated with certain juridical moral theories such as
deontology and divine command theory, are also found in virtue ethics. Aristotle
expressly notes the existence of these sort of universal prohibitions. In the NE,
immediately after defining moral virtue as operating by the doctrine of the mean and
elaborating what constitutes the conditions and parameters of 'the mean,' Aristotle notes
that there are some actions which do not, nor cannot, admit of a mean. He characterizes
these actions as morally wrong "however they are done" (1107a24), and notes that it "is
not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to [these actions]... [as they] must always
be wrong" (1107a13-14). For Aristotle, these actions are universally forbidden and, to
return and borrow the language of Kant, are prohibited without exception. The specific
actions listed here by Aristotle are "adultery, theft, [and] murder" (1107a11). Aristotle
returns to this idea later in the text and reiterates his claims that adultery, theft and
murder are all categorically prohibited actions and expands this list to include the actions
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of "poisoning, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness... robbery with violence,
[and] mutilation" (1131a6-9). It would seem that this expanding list of universally
prohibited actions is not presented as an exhaustive or definitive list. There are many
actions which virtue ethics must prohibit without exception.
To help explain these lists of categorically prohibited actions, Aristotle
specifically elaborates on the example of adultery. When one evaluates the act of
adultery they need not consider whether the act was committed "at the right times, with
reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the
right way" (1106b21) as the act itself admits none of these conditions.132 This means
that the moral wrong found in adultery is not due to choosing the wrong person with
which to engage in an adulterous affair (such as choosing one married person over
another to sleep with because one lives closer to you and therefore will require you to
drive less and therefore contribute less harmful carbon emissions during the course of the
affair), or engaging in adultery in inappropriate locations (such as in a marital bed as
compared to a cheap motel), or performing adulterous acts for the sake of nefarious
motives beyond lust (such as out of spite). None of these considerations contribute or
explain the badness of the act of adultery. The baseness of adultery is in the action itself.
In this way, Aristotle proclaims adulterous acts to be intrinsically wrong.
Corresponding to this account of adultery's intrinsic badness, virtue ethics can be
said to generate a strong prohibitive d-rule, namely "do not commit adultery," which
instructs agents how they are to act. This strong d-rule, as it instructs agents without
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Aristotle reiterates these criteria for the mean, in various formulations, on a number of occasions (see
1109a27-28, 1115b16, 1126a6 to name a few). By the end of Book II, Chapter 5, this list is, to Aristotle's
mind, adequately repeated enough to warrant a "and so on" after again identifying the "right things [and]
in the right way" (1126b7). What this shows is that it should be, by this point in the NE, obvious what
constitutes the varied conditions of the mean and continued repetition is unnecessary.
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exception or flexibility, is a hard d-rule. For each of the acts Aristotle lists as
categorically prohibited, agents are presented with hard d-rules which demand strict
exceptionless compliance. Given Aristotle's list of universally prohibited actions, agents
are presented with a myriad of hard d-rules which include "do not murder," "do not plot
or carry-out assassinations," "do not bear false witness," and, "do not engage in acts of
mutilation."
What is noticeably missing from Aristotle's account of universally prohibited
actions, and therein the source of many of the hard v-rules, is an explanation of why these
actions must be categorically prohibited. Aristotle's proclamation that certain actions do
not admit a mean, and his subsequent analysis of the example of adultery, may sound
convincing but it, by itself, does not explain why these actions must be categorically
forbidden. The examples listed by Aristotle coincide with commonly held beliefs
regarding the badness of murder, adultery, theft, and assassination but, our willingness to
acquiesce to these obvious moral maxims does not explain why, for Aristotle, these
actions are intrinsically wrong.
It might appear that Aristotle's claim that these actions "do not admit of a mean"
is why they cannot be schematized (and therefore evaluated) as part of virtue, but surely
this cannot be the source of their badness. Some of the listed actions and feelings given
here by Aristotle could be said to admit a mean. A severely egoistic account of virtue
might justify theft on the grounds that individuals ought to secure goods for themselves at
all costs, and a system of virtue constructed on notions of the total depravity of human
beings (as derived from most stringent strands of Calvinist theology) might cast shame as
a desirable state when moderated with constant atonement. Accounts of virtue such as
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these should, I hope, sound unappealing, but their possibility shows that the intrinsic
badness of these actions and feeling are not a priori and the normative force behind the
associated hard v-rule requires theoretical structures to motivate our understanding of
their universal prohibition.
Returning, briefly, to Kant, we can see how other moral theories can give
normative force to similar categorical prohibitions. Kant's proceduralist structure allows
for the grounding of differing types of duties and gives normative force to both imperfect
and perfect duties as different, yet related, failures of law. For Kant, the failure of
maxims to conform to "law as such" denies their inclusion within the sphere of
acceptable actions since voluntary human action must conform to the "form of law itself"
to be a candidate for human moral decision making (4:402).133 When maxims fail to
conform to law-like structure, by failing the test outlined in the Universal Law
Formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the actions are normatively prohibited.
Potential actions, expressed as maxims, can fail this "test" (i.e.: generate contradictions)
in a multitude of ways and the differences in failures creates differences in types of
duties. Kant briefly notes this important distinction after explicitly working through the
cases of suicide, selfishness, sloth, and lying. While each of these cases admits a
contradiction, the nature of their contradictions differ. In the cases of lying and suicide,
"[the actions] are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be thought without
contradiction as a universal law of nature, far less could one will that it should become
such" (4:424, emphasis in original).134 In the cases of sloth and selfishness, the maxims
can be conceptualized as universal laws but "it is still impossible to will that their maxim
133
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be raised to the universality of a law of nature” (4:424, emphasis in original).135 These
two types of contractions, being contradictions in the maxim and contradictions in the
will, generate the two types of duties, perfect and imperfect.136 Contradictions in the
maxim generate perfect duties and contradictions in the will generate imperfect duties.
Kant can, using this schema, provide an account of categorical prohibitions which come
in the form of perfect duties and can do so by employing his procedural account of
logical consistency. It is the inability of the maxims to even sensibly be conceptualized
as universal law which makes them bad and allows for their prohibition in a system
which demands law-like form.
While fine and well for those who are inclined to deontology, such an analysis is
unavailable to Aristotle and virtue ethicists. Aristotle cannot rely on a logical testing
mechanism to motivate his categorical prohibitions as his moral theory is free of such
proceduralist underpinnings and does not rely on analytic conceptions of law-as-such. So
how does Aristotle ground such claims?
In Book II, where Aristotle initially discusses these intrinsically bad actions, he
does not see the need to explain why these actions in particular, or even in general, must
be forbidden. These actions are simply decried and it appears that Aristotle believed that
their intrinsic badness was simply obvious. This alone does not explain why it is that
these actions must be categorically prohibited (and therein governed by unwavering hard
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d-rules).137 Thus we must look beyond this preliminary account presented in Book II in
order to find the foundations for the intrinsic badness of these actions.
Turning to Book V, Chapter 2, where Aristotle returns to this discussion of
categorically prohibited action, we can begin to see the roots of his argument. Here in
Book V, Aristotle restructures the discussion of these prohibited actions around the
nature of injustice. Here Aristotle explores two different ways people can be said to be
unjust. In one sense, a person can be said to be unjust when they lack the specific virtue
of justice. In this sense, an individual's actions can be called unjust when they are the
actions which embody the specific vice of injustice qua that which is "contrary to the
law" (1130a23). In a second sense, individuals are called unjust when their actions (and
presumably their character) exhibit "other forms of wickedness" beyond the specific
virtue of justice (1130a18). Here, we can call someone unjust in a general sense meaning
that they are one who lacks virtues of various kinds (beyond merely the virtue of justice)
and is not, therefore, the virtuous agent. To illustrate this point, Aristotle (re)turns to
137

While most everyone agrees that adultery is an obvious case of an intrinsic wrong it should be noted
that there are dissenters from this view. The most notable is Joseph Fletcher. See his Situation Ethics:
The New Morality (Westminster Press, 1966). Fletcher, as a situation ethicist, argues that there can be no
universal prohibitions in ethics as all ethical rules have exceptions. Specifically in reference to adultery,
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done a good and right thing?" (ibid). For Fletcher, the obvious answer to these questions in an
unequivocal "yes" and therefore, for Fletcher, this case shows that even adultery has exceptions.
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adultery. He claims, "If one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money
by it, while another does so at the bidding of appetite though he loses money and is
penalized for it, the latter would be held to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the
former is unjust, but not self-indulgent" (1130a24-28). In this example the adulterous
acts of the two men relate to different virtues. The first case of adultery is, as odd as it
sounds, a failure of liberality. This man, in his adultery, exhibits unjust "graspy-ness" as
he is using the adulterous acts (somehow) as an avenue for unjust financial gain. Clearly
such attempts violate the "right source" criteria detailed in Aristotle's discussion of
liberality (1120a32). The second man's adulterous actions are motivated by selfindulgence and are not a failure of liberality but a failure of temperance. It is this second
case that captures the archetype of the cheating partner as one who is driven by
uncontrollable lust and sexual desire into seeking sexual gratification beyond the confines
of their avowed monogamous relationship. While both men are adulterous, and both are
unjust, they differ in their moral failures.
Drawing from this discussion, we can see that Aristotle's account of adulterous
actions, while possibly running afoul of many different virtues based upon the feelings,
desires, and aims of the adulterous agent, will always be base. The intrinsically bad
nature of the action of adultery stems from the fact that it will always, and in every
instance, exhibit a vice and demonstrate the viciousness of the acting agent. While the
vice exhibited may vary between agents, the action will always indicate the presence of
some sort of viciousness. Moving beyond adultery, similar examples can be found
surrounding each of the actions Aristotle lists as categorically prohibited. One many
murder another for financial gain (and fail miserably and horribly in respect to their
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liberality) or out of rage (and therefore fail miserably in respect to good-temperedness),
but both are necessarily vicious. For each of the actions Aristotle identifies as
"intrinsically bad," utter and inescapable moral failure must be the result of their
performance.
It is here that we can understand Aristotle's argument for the categorically
prohibited nature of these actions. It is not the case that these actions, whose badness
Aristotle initially claims is indicated by their name alone, are morally condemned by
either (a) an axiomatic a priori claim, or, (b) by the near universal agreement people
share that these actions must be obviously immoral. These actions are prohibited because
they are, whenever they are performed and under all circumstances, indications of severe
moral failure (i.e.: viciousness) and must be actions which when undertaken necessarily
prohibit agents from achieving virtue.
This understanding provides not only the necessary moral argumentation to
support Aristotle's assertions that there are universally prohibited actions, but provides
the normative force for hard v-rules. Hard v-rules provide strict action guidance in
situations where the performance of an act (or a course of action) necessarily results in
either the inability to acquire virtue or a loss of virtue. In conjunction with virtue as
necessary for the achievement of flourishing, we can say that hard d-rules govern those
things which necessarily act as barriers for the achievement of flourishing.
Since hard d-rules govern those things which necessarily prohibit virtue and
flourishing, we can see how Aristotle's enumerated list of exceptionless actions (or
inactions) is not exhaustive. In addition to murder, adultery, et al. it is possible to expand
this quite minimal list to other actions which, like those listed by Aristotle, are
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government by hard d-rules. To Aristotle's list we can add, for example, further
prohibitions on the sexual abuse of children (expressed in the, obvious, hard d-rule "do
not interact sexually with children") and use of human slaves ("do not traffic human
beings"). Like adultery and murder, both the trafficking of humans and the performance
of sexual acts with children admit no mean, always violates the specific criteria of virtue,
and always indicates wickedly evil states of character which necessarily prohibits
flourishing.
At this point, it seems wise to pause take stock of what we have and look at how
the general argument presented here has proceeded. V-rules, writ large, provide the
necessary action guidance needed in virtue ethics. The v-rules are understood and
clarified though the use of practical wisdom. While Hursthouse leaves these specifics
unsystematized (relying on the mechanism of practical wisdom to yield further needed
details), I have introduced the concept of d-rules to help explain and systematize this
derivative content. The d-rules, which are given by the v-rules, range quite widely in
their flexibility and specificity and can be said to emerge from all aspects of virtue
theory. It is into this conception of d-rules that I have introduced the categories of hard
and soft. Soft d-rules are those rules which instruct agents with flexibility and latitude
and which can only find implementation through an agent’s use of practical wisdom to
determine the details of their dischargement. Hard d-rules, on the other hand, are those
rules which guide agents without flexibility and strongly obligate agents to specific
courses of action without latitude.
Of specific interest here is the workings of hard d-rules. To explain hard d-rules,
and see how and when they obtain, one can look to the categorically prohibited actions
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enumerated by Aristotle. The paradigmatic examples of hard d-rules then become those
actions which virtue ethics sees as categorically prohibited. When looking at these
actions, and understanding why it is that they must be categorically prohibited, we see
that the performance of these actions (in any and all circumstances) must necessarily
indicate a vicious character. Beyond indicating the state of one's character, the presence
of these actions in one's life denies the possibility of virtuous development. One cannot
develop virtue, or be said to be working towards flourishing, with these actions in their
life. In this way, virtue ethics differs from other moral theories (such as deontology) in
its assessment of these sort of actions in that the moral failure found here is a direct result
of the way these actions necessarily limit the availability of flourishing. It is here that the
core of the argument is found: virtue ethics must categorically prohibit that which denies
flourishing. This categorical prohibition is then expressed as a hard d-rule.
While these hard d-rules are easiest to understand in reference to Aristotle's list of
intrinsically bad acts, they apply more broadly to this moral core of that which
necessarily prohibits flourishing. It is here that the discussion of oppression reemerges.
As shown in chapter two, when the reality of oppression is taken seriously within the
virtue ethical framework one comes to see oppression as uniquely crippling and harmful
as it necessarily limits the availability of flourishing for the oppressed. If hard d-rules
generate strong prohibitions on those things which limit the availability of virtue or
flourishing, and oppression acts to limit, if not eliminate, the possibility of flourishing
and virtue for the oppressed, then virtue ethics must advance strong prohibitions, in the
form of d-rules, concerning oppression.
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Section 4 - V-rules, D-rules, Oppression, and Resistance

The strong rules which virtue ethics generates regarding oppression can be seen as
emerging in three distinct ways; the first concerns one's ability to oppress others, the
second concerns the oppression that an individual experiences directly as an oppressed
person, and the third concerns oppression that is leveled against others where the agent
experiences no direct first-hand effect of the oppression. In each of these three ways, the
d-rule concerning oppression levels strong condemnation against the oppressive force(s)
and advances a definite schema of action guidance in the face of oppression. In what
follows I would like to explore each of the three ways the d-rule concerning oppression
manifests and chronicle the action guidance that the d-rule prescribes.

A. The Oppression of Others

Turning first to the most obvious case, we can see that the hard d-rule concerning
oppression manifests, in the most simple way, as a strong prohibition on the oppression
others. As obvious as this sounds, virtue ethics must prohibit the oppression of others as
actively oppressing others violates, in egregious ways, the ways that we are required to
treat others. In short, the hard d-rule concerning the oppression of others manifests as the
simple dictum, "do not oppress others."
While obvious, what is of interest here is the limited scope of this prohibition.
This hard d-rule concerning the oppression of others cannot be understood as prohibiting
any and all participation in oppressive systems and structures, as participation in
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oppression, as either the oppressor or the oppressed, is, for the most part, unchosen. As
argued for in chapter one, agents do not choose to be oppressed, and all those who benefit
from oppression's existence are not voluntary beneficiaries. The involuntary and
unearned social and economic benefits of privilege, which manifests through the
oppression of others, cannot be merely shaken off or denied by the privileged. Peggy
McIntosh, in her work on white privilege and male privilege, describes privilege as:
... an invisible package of unearned assets which I can count on cashing in each
day, but about which I was "meant" to remain oblivious. White privilege is like
an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps,
guides, code-books, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank
checks.138

This imagery of the invisible weightless knapsack seems particularly apropos
here. Even when one comes to see the privilege they have (be it white privilege,
heteronormative privilege, class privilege, or male privilege), this knapsack of assets is
still carried and "cashed in." Individuals of privileged classes or groups, through their
actions reinforce the privileges they have been granted.
Thus, this first instantiation of the hard d-rule concerning oppression, which
unwaveringly and steadfastly prohibits the oppression of others, is, in reality, limited in
its application to those who actively promote, champion, and consciously advance
oppressive structures and systems, and herein lies the irony. Those whose actions and
beliefs violate this moral dictum are precisely those individuals who are unresponsive to
moral arguments of this nature. White nationalists, defenders of capitalist exploitation,
avowed misogynists, and anti-queer activists and politicians all run afoul of this obvious

138

Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See
Correspondences Through Working In Women’s Studies,” in Race, Class and Gender: an Anthology (Third
Edition), eds. Margaret L. Andersen and Patricia Hill Collins (Wadsworth Publishing, 1998), 94-95.

128

moral rule yet are exactly the people who are unswayed by moral arguments condemning
oppression. Thus, on this first level, the hard d-rule which categorically prohibits one
from oppressing others is quite limited, as is my treatment of this topic. The focus of this
project, and that which is worthy of any time or consideration, is not the actions of the
unrepentant oppressor, but rather the oppressed who, by this same hard d-rule, are
instructed and guided towards resistance and liberation.

B. Resisting Oppression in One's Own Life

The d-rule concerning oppression manifests as a need for resistance when
individuals find themselves the victim of oppression and oppressive structures.
Oppressed individuals, who have their avenues to flourishing limited by oppression, face
no other viable options than resistance when confronted with their enslavement. For the
oppressed not to resist and struggle against the oppression they face, or to acquiesce to
oppressive forces, is to accept that the highest human good of flourishing and happiness
are goals that ought not be made available to oneself. In this way, the oppressed agent
who simply accepts and submits to their oppression also accepts a withered and
emaciated view of their personhood.
It is in this arena, where one is the direct victim of oppression, that the demands
of resistance are experienced the strongest. Virtue ethics instructs agents to engage in
active struggle against oppression when their flourishing is hindered or prohibited under
the weight of oppressive structures and forces. It is the direct experience of oppression
that makes the need for resistance necessary, and the normative force of the moral
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imperative for resistance is most clearly experienced by those who are oppressed. While
the moral obligation to engage in resistance is most tangible in the experience of the
oppressed we must be careful not to describe this palpability in the language of "wanting"
or "desire." It is all too easy to describe the necessity of resistance as what oppressed
agents should necessary "want to do" and here we need to be warned against such
attempts. Tessman has, excellently, chronicled the heavy costs that accompany a
commitment to resisting oppression, and these burdens show why the oppressed should
not see the need for resistance as something they would want to do, all things being
equal, but rather the appropriate and often regrettable necessity given their experience of
oppression.
Committing one's self to resistance carries with it heavy burdens which cannot be
brushed aside quickly or accepted without understanding the harmful effects of resisting
oppression. One obvious burden that resistance bears is a threat to one's health and, in
many cases, one's very life. A commitment to combating oppression will be met with
vehement opposition and the lengths to which the oppressing class will go to ensure the
continued existence of the status quo cannot be understated. Many (like Judi Bari139 and
Frank Little140) have become the victims of the overt violence used in service of
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Judi Bari was an American radical who devoted much of her life to labor organizing, feminist
consciousness raising, and environmental activism. Bari is most well-known for her work organizing
direct-action campaigns against timber companies logging the redwood forests of Northern California. In
1990, Bari and her Earth First! compatriot Darryl Cherney were victims of a car bomb in Oakland, CA.
While luckily escaping with their lives, the car bomb planted in their vehicle left Bari in critical condition
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140
Frank Little was a anti-war activist and union organizer who was, during an organizing campaign at a
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oppression's defense. For the oppressed, the need to struggle against oppression can
carry with it a physical cost which one should not accept lightly.
In addition to the threats to one's health and existence that the resistance fighter
will likey face, the decision to address, head-on, the oppressive structures and forces that
limits one's flourishing may create prolonged circumstances of emotional and
psychological harm. In her treatment of resistance, Tessman pays special attention to the
emotional burden that resistance carries with it. The development of, in Tessman's
words, the "politically resistant self" requires the development of certain otherwise
harmful and unwanted emotional states. Tessman recounts,
I remember discovering how difficult it can be to harden oneself against
sympathetic responses to an oppressor, a discovery that was tied to my reading for
the first time Alexander Berkman's account of his attempt to assassinate Henry
Frick during the Homestead strike against Carnegie Steel in 1892.141 Upon
reading the details of the attempted assassination, I chastised myself for
involuntarily cringing in pain - as a sympathetic response on behalf of Frick, who
was injured but not killed and whose fear, as described by Berkman, made me
want to comfort rather than attack him - a response that, at the time, I believed
diminished my capacity to act as a true resister, for Frick was clearly one of the
"bad guys."142

For many, including Tessman at this time, the revolutionary attitude developed by
those committed to resisting oppression may call for the abandonment of certain
emotional disposition that many might be rightly reluctant to jettison. The resistance
fighter must cultivate a level of emotional detachment towards their oppressors and this
seems to undercut the otherwise moral goods of sympathy, empathy, and kindness.
used against Little and other union organizers of the time, these numbers, as a signal of the quite real
threat of continued lynchings, are, to this day, proudly emblazoned on the uniforms of all Montana State
Troopers.
141
Henry Frick was an American industrialist and the chairman of Carnegie Steel. Frick, well-known for
this anti-union actions and his belief that unionists ought to be outright killed, orchestrated the murder of
nine striking steel workers during the Homestead Strike of 1892.
142
Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 116.
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Resistance, and the fortitude and commitment that active resistance requires, seems to
stand at odds with the emotional and psychological development which virtue ethics
insists are central to the moral project of life. For Tessman, the resistance fighter might
come to resent the person that they become once they embrace a commitment to combat
oppression.
Worries about this emotional and psychological burden are perfectly natural and
the moral worries here are especially troublesome to the virtue ethicist. The costs that
Tessman chronicles which the resisting agent must bear are quite real, but I do believe
these burdens need to be contextualized. First, it is essential to see that the moral harms
of becoming a "politically resistant self" cannot be weighed against a fictionalized self
where emotional and psychological are otherwise nonexistent. It is not the case that the
burdens of resistance can be considered against the possibility of a state where one can
avoid emotional and psychological burdens. For the oppressed agent who embraces the
need engage in resistance, and understands that this commitment may carry with it
significant moral baggage, does so under the already existent burdens of oppression. The
oppressed agent is obligated to resistance by the harmful effects of oppression and
therefore is not being asked to accept the harmful effects of resistance over a possible
state in which these harms fails to exist. Secondly, it might seem that the emotional and
psychological burdens of resistance would lead to a cascading effect where the
cultivation of the politically resistant self leads an agent to experience a lack of
sympathy, empathy, or kindness to those they should love. While a very legitimate
worry, and a potential harm that the resisting agent must understand, I see no reason that
this slippery slope argument necessarily ends in complete moral ruin. The resisting
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agent, like all agents, must properly cultivate their emotional responses and in no way
does becoming the politically resistant self demand that agents dive headlong into
emotional commitments without concern for their effects on others. In fact, becoming
the politically resistant self demands that the resistor be constantly mindful of these
potential harms and work to keep these harms at bay.
In the end, Tessman's strong worries about the burdens of resistance remain,
although these worries must be understood against the backdrop of oppression's harms.
This then returns us back to the warning of expressing the normative force of the d-rule
regarding resistance as a form of "wanting." To describe this impulse as a "desire" or a
"want" runs the risk of white-washing the tremendous harms and costs that becoming a
political resister carries with it. Failing to see the heavy moral burdens that resistance
entails means that the gleeful activist, or the person who enters the life of political
resistance with reckless abandon and a willful spirit, must be either acting in ignorance,
or merely play-acting the revolutionary spirit. For Tessman, these weighty moral burdens
ought to yield a politically resisting agent that sees that "there is no glory in resistance to
injustice, just a sad and regretful recognition of its necessity."143

C. Resisting the Oppression of Others

On what ground can we be said to have an obligation to engage in active
resistance when it is not ourselves who are oppressed but others? While the need to resist
oppression in our own lives can be grounded in the need to struggle against those barriers
which deny our ability to flourish, the need to engage in active resistance struggles on
143
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behalf of others who are oppressed is not so clear. While doing so seems quite noble,
engaging in such actions might seem to verge on the supererogatory as the harms being
perpetrated in the lives of others do not, in principle, limit our ability to flourish. After
all, the achievement of virtue is a demanding task and requiring one to struggle on behalf
of others and their attempts to flourish only increases the demandingness of the moral
life.
This query takes us headlong into the question of virtue ethics' perceived selfcenteredness. Thomas Nagel charges that Aristotelian virtue ethics "is wrong" because it
fails to account for the way that "moral requirements have their source in the claims of
other persons" and these "moral claims cannot be strictly limited by their capacity to be
accommodated within a good individual life."144 In a similar vein, David Solomon
summarizes the self-centeredness objection when he writes:
The thought behind such claims seems to be that for classical virtue theorists, it is
rational for an agent to acquire the virtues only insofar as it is a good for that
agent that he or she acquire them. But if the rationality of virtue acquisition is thus
grounded in the needs of the agent, so the argument goes, the needs, wants, and
desires of others have, from the point of view of morality, an insufficiently
prominent status.145

Such arguments will not sound unfamiliar to defenders of virtue ethics. While the
claim that Aristotelian virtue ethics is egoistic is patently false (and overtly dismissed by
Aristotle), Aristotelian virtue ethics does rely upon on the properly understood concept of
'self-love.' It is this reliance on self-love, as the love of the virtue that one possesses, that
might lead some to believe that resisting on behalf of others must take a backseat to an
individual's pursuit of the virtuous life. According to this view, while agents must resist
144

Thomas Nagle, A View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press, 1989), 197.
David Solomon, “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13, no. 1 (1988),
432.
145

134

oppression in their lives as it limits their flourishing, the oppression of others becomes
only a secondary moral possibility and only rises to the level of moral concern when the
oppression of others effects oneself. It is this view I reject, and it will be argued that our
obligation to engage in resistance struggles against oppression ought to occur whenever
oppression is present; be that in our own lives or in the lives of others.
Let us turn first to Aristotle's rejection of radical self-centeredness, as it is through
this argument that one can see how the ethical demands of resistance obligate agents
when others are oppressed. Aristotle's conception of self-love, and therein his rejection
of egoism, is developed in his account of friendship in Book IX. Here, Aristotle
distinguishes between two types of self-lovers. The first is the self-lover as understood
colloquially. This self-loving agent is one who "assign[s] to themselves the greater share
of wealth, honor, and bodily pleasures" and does so because money, social esteem, and
pleasure are what they "desire most" and what they consider to be "the best of all things"
(1168b15-19). While called commonly called a self-lover, Aristotle openly criticizes this
ultimately self-serving person as viciously graspy. For Aristotle, these people are those
"who are grasping with regard to these things [in order to] gratify their appetites and in
general their feelings and the irrational element of the soul" (1168b19-22). For Aristotle,
these self-seeking agents are lovers of self in a way that is reproachful and blameworthy.
While Aristotle criticizes this common-place understanding of self-love, he certainly
maintains that proper self-love is central to an understanding of virtue. The second type
of self-lover described by Aristotle is "most truly a lover of self, of another type"
(1169a4-5). This self-lover acts for the sake of her friends and her country, even going so
far as sacrificing her life if necessary (1169a19). Further, this self-lover willingly
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jettisons wealth, goods, and even social standing in order to gain nobility and do what is
fine (1169a21). Here, the self-lover is not wedded to merely accumulating these goods as
perceived ends in themselves but rather understands that these goods can be won and lost
in service of true happiness and moral goodness. Here, the self-lover seeks that which is
truly good and it is this agent, motivated by virtue, that we must see as a true self-lover as
they work, sometimes even to their temporary detriment, in service of virtue. Aristotle
concludes this picture of 'proper self-love' by saying "In this sense, then, as has been said,
a man should be a lover of self; but in the sense in which most men are so, he ought not"
(1169a1-2).
While Aristotle's outright rejection of egoism denies that the self-love found in
the virtuous life must be seem as some form of "other-disregarding" (as advanced by
certain noxious strands of neo-Randian "virtue" ethics), it also seems that it might
advance a picture of virtue which ultimately privileges one's own pursuits over the
pursuits of others. Christopher Toner summarizes this view as the belief that "concern
for others can seen secondary to or conditional upon achieving one's own central goals
[for virtue and flourishing]."146 Here it might be tempting to advance an argument
regarding oppression along the following lines: when others are oppressed the damage
done to their character comes to effect non-oppressed individuals such that the oppression
indirectly affects the availability to flourish even when one is not the direct victim of
oppression. An argument such as this makes the oppression of others the indirect
problem of the non-oppressed. Their oppression comes to affect me, and therefore their
oppression is of direct moral concern to me and my purist of flourishing. While
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capturing Aristotle's claims that others, like goods, are instrumentally necessary for the
achievement of the good life (1155a5-30), an argument such as this cannot ultimately
cannot ground our obligation to resist oppression when the oppression is found in the
lives of others as it too fails to properly account for the Aristotelian conception of selflove.
To see the full scope of Aristotle's account of self-love one must see that this
specific argument defending self-love comes as a lynch-pin of sorts in a longer protracted
argument presented in his account of friendship. To trace the roots of Aristotle's
argument for self-love, we must turn back to the outset of Book VIII. Here, Aristotle
identifies "the objects of love." It is from the objects of love that Aristotle's schema for
friendship emerges, and it is from his views on friendship that self-love emerges and does
so as a paradoxical form of friendship. It is only by taking stock of this entire
argumentative chain, that we can see how and why the virtuous self-lover cannot
compartmentalize their response to oppression into delineated categories of 'self' and
'other.'
Aristotle identifies three rough categories of loved objects; the useful, the
pleasant, and the good (1155b18). Agents may love something do to its ability to
achieve goals (and are therefore loved due to their relative utility), or due to the way an
object causes pleasure for the agent, or because something is, itself, good. When we love
others, and find these object of love in persons, we delineate these relationships as
corresponding types of friendships. Thus, when agents love the usefulness of another
they engage in a friendship of utility, when agents take pleasure from another they
engage in friendships of pleasure, and when agents find goodness in another they partake
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in the complete friendship. In this way, friendships identify the domain where the object
of love relates to persons.
After denying that friendship is merely manifest goodwill (Book IX, Chapter 5) or
simple concord/unanimity (Book IX, Chapter 6), Aristotle raises a seeming paradox that
emerges from his account of the complete friendship (Book IX, Chapter 8). Here, it
appears that his conception of the friendship between two virtuous persons (i.e. the
complete friendship) oddly necessitates that virtuous agents to forsake their friendships
for the sake of their own self-love. This odd argumentative consequence can be called
"the paradox of the complete friendship." The paradox is as follows.
1. A complete friendship requires motivational displacement. (In a complete
friendship, the individuals in the friendship love each other for reasons beyond
usefulness or pleasure.)
2. Between all the friendships that one has, the one that should be most loved is the
best friendship with the best friend. ("One ought to love best one's best friend"
(1168b1).)
3. What marks a friend as a best friend is "one who wishes well to the object of his
wish for his sake, even if no one is to know of it" (1168b2). (A best friend is, in
Irwin's words, the "friend who is most a friend.")
4. Oddly enough, "all of these marks [of a best friendship] will be found most in a
[person's] relation to [themselves]" (1168b8).
5. Therefore, "[one] is [their] own best friend and therefore ought to love [them]self
the most" (1168b9).
It is the conclusion (5) which generates the paradox and the contradiction. It is
only through truly loving the goodness of another that virtuous friendship can be
described, yet this same mechanism leaves the virtuous agent ultimately loving herself
above all else. The paradox rests upon premise (1) (requiring motivational displacement
in complete friendships) being in contradiction with the conclusion drawn in premise (5).
One cannot, after all, be motivationally displaced for themselves.
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It is in response to this apparent paradox that Aristotle's discussion of self-love
emerges. Aristotle's answer to this seemingly difficult problem accepts the principle of
self-love yet reinterprets self-love in a way which is compatible with motivational
displacement. The properly self-loving agent does not love themselves as virtuous, but
rather loves the virtue they possess. The only type of self-love that yields a contradiction
in such an argument is that of the egoist, and thus, as noted above, Aristotle dismisses
and chides the egoist as being wedded to a conception of self-love which "is a bad one"
(1168b23). The self-love of the virtuous agent, when understood in the above mentioned
way, allows agents to maintain motivational displacement in that they are motivated not
by self gain but for goodness itself. The virtuous agent is motivated by goodness itself,
whether it be found in herself or in the person of another. This conclusion harks back to
the beginning of Book VIII where Aristotle identifies the objects of love. That which is
loved by the virtuous agent is goodness itself.
Aside from clarifying the role of self-love in Aristotle's ethics, this allows us to
grasp the nature of the obligation to resist oppression when oppression is found in the
lives of others. If oppression is a barrier to flourishing, virtue, and goodness, and the
virtuous person loves the good itself (and draws motivation from this love), then the good
person must detest prohibitions of goodness qua goodness itself. The virtuous agent's
love of goodness does not distinguish between the goodness of one's self and the
goodness of others, and further draws no sharp divide between restrictions on goodness
whether in their own life or in the lives of others. When one properly experiences selflove, as the virtuous agent does, they do not love their virtue, but rather virtue. The
virtuous agent does not covet their flourishing, but loves flourishing. Thus, oppression's
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harms, as barriers to flourishing, are targeted by the virtuous agent as an obstacle to the
good in itself. For one to accept the oppression of others, or sharply delineate this as
distinct from their love of the good, is to fail in the love of goodness itself. In the face of
oppression, the virtuous agent's love of goodness, as achieved in flourishing, cannot be
restrained or compartmentalized without leaving said agent loving only some goodness;
namely the goodness fortunately available to them. Thus, the virtuous agent must
respond to all oppression with acts resistance and must develop a continued commitment
to combating oppression and its harmful effects regardless of who is directly affected by
these harms.

Section 5 - Conclusion

This chapter works to establish the obligatory nature of resistance to oppression as
understood by virtue ethics. To this end, the chapter began with Hursthouse’s conception
of the v-rules, as it is in the v-rules that one can find the groundwork for virtue’s schema
for action guidance. While the v-rules work to outline the general course of action agents
must follow in order to acquire the virtues, they actively leave much of the actual
concrete action determination up to the practical wisdom of the agent. It was argued here
that the v-rules entail a vast set of entailed claims, which diverge from the virtue concepts
of the v-rules, and these claims can be further schematized into a system of d-rules. The
d-rules further guide agents in the process of action determination and can be subdivided
into the categories of hard and soft. The soft d-rules, mirroring Kant’s imperfect duties,
guide agents with flexibility and latitude, while the hard d-rules guide agents in
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exceptionless cases which relate to those things which necessarily prohibit flourishing.
Drawing from Aristotle’s understanding of categorically prohibited actions, the hard drules present as strong obligations.
With an understanding of the v-rules and d-rules in place, an understanding of our
response to oppression begins to emerge. As shown in chapter two, oppression acts as a
barrier to flourishing and the existence of the d-rules helps ground the obligations one is
under to engage in resistance struggles. In the most obvious case, these d-rules obligate
agents to resistance action when they are the direct victims of oppression. But drawing
from Aristotle’s understanding of self-love and friendship, one sees that agents are
equally under the demand of resistance when they are not the direct victim of oppression.
In general it was argued here that the existence of oppression (and the reality of
oppression’s influence), in conjunction with the d-rules that emerge from virtue ethics’
schema for action guidance, demands that agents become what Tessman calls “the
politically resistant self” and actively engage in resistance struggles.
The resistance which this chapter establishes as morally necessary still, to this
point, lacks refined definition and has only been established in broad and general terms.
The next chapter seeks to deepen this understanding, and works to give content and
direction to the practicality of resistance actions, struggles, and movements.
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CHAPTER FOUR

GIVING CONTENT TO RESISTANCE

To this point we have shown that oppression harms agents in that it acts to limit,
or even eliminate, possible avenues to flourishing. Virtue ethics requires agents to resist
these harms and work towards combating oppression by engaging in liberatory struggles
against oppressive forces. While it has been established that agents are called to engage
in resistance to oppression, the content of resistance and the determination of the
specifics of resistance such that our obligations can be discharged has been, to this point,
left largely unspecified. It is the stated aim of this chapter to provide a framework for the
practical determination of resistance.
It will be argued here that we cannot reduce the moral demands of resistance to
merely the formulation and cultivation of an attitude (or disposition) of resistance. While
the cultivation of the revolutionary attitude is necessary for engaging in resistance
movements, the obligations placed on agents in light of oppression mandates that agents
move beyond dispositional states and into engaging in resistance actions.
To understand what, specifically, agents are called to do as part of our
revolutionary obligations an organizing model will be deployed to help aide in
determining the specifics of action guidance. The model of action determination used
here, drawn from the practical world of activism and organizing, provides the necessary
tools for determining what we must do, and this discussion leads directly to questions
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about the value of efficacy in resistance actions, the role of violence in political and
social movements, and the seemingly high demands placed on agents.

Section 1 - The Revolutionary Attitude

The resistance actions and movements which virtue ethics requires cannot be
limited to the development of contrarian attitudes or dispositional states. Critics of virtue
ethics might assume that the only guidance that virtue theory can mount in response to
systematic oppression is a series of vague requirements which ask agents to develop
certain intellectual or emotional capacities which would allow them to understand and
then judge (properly) their experience of oppression with moral outrage. Here, one might
assume that virtue ethics would emphasize the cultivation of a disposition over required
actions. Yet, this is not the case. While it is essential that individuals develop a
revolutionary attitude and habituate themselves to not only understand but also abhor the
oppression manifest in the world, this attitudinal development cannot, in-and-of-itself, be
said to discharge our moral responsibilities. The reason for this is that the cultivation of
such an attitude does nothing, by itself, towards elevating the harmful effects of
oppression or making available avenues to flourishing which were previously unavailable
to the oppressed.
This is not to say that the development of such an attitude or disposition is not
important. In fact, the development of a revolutionary consciousness seems indispensible
as a precondition for revolutionary struggle. For individuals to begin, either individually
or collectively, to mount a movement of resistance to oppression agents must first
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cultivate the necessary emotional and intellectual capacities of a revolutionary attitude.
This revolutionary attitude includes both the development of reflective willingness and an
important shift in epistemic positioning.
On the first front, agents must develop a sense of reflective willingness. The
oppressed must cultivate the ability to reflect on their experiences of oppression and
come to understand the oppressive forces that operate in their lives. The immediate
response to instances of oppression might be either momentary, and often emotional,
outbursts of lashing out, or the assumption that such incidents are merely a matter of
unlucky circumstances or disconnected events. The unreflective agent, or the agent who
has not cultivated a sense of reflection and thoughtful awareness, would lack the
necessary tools for adequately understanding that which acts to oppress them. Take for
example the countless individuals who have been the victims of Sheriff Joe Arpaio's
unjust racial profiling in Arizona.147 Victims of Arpaio's systematic racial abuses, who
lack critical reflection, could perceive these actions either (a) just the isolated actions of a
rouge police officer (rather than the manifestation of racists policies and a pattern of
racial injustice), or, (b) an offence which must be met head-on, in the moment, with a
direct outburst of emotion. The reflective agent, or the agent who has cultivated an
ability and willingness to reflect on instances of oppression’s manifestation, can come to
understand their experience(s) as both part of an overlapping pattern of racism and also a
systematic offence that cannot be combated in singular outbursts. The revolutionary
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disposition is able to understand such instances and is also disposed to accurately judge
these infractions as unjust, unfair, and wrong while at the same time gauge what
response(s) is warranted. The cultivation of such an attitudinal disposition, in both its
emotional and intellectual capacities, must be developed by the oppressed and the classic
framework of virtue ethics explains how such a cultivation of character is possible.
In addition to reflective willingness, the revolutionary attitude which must be
developed in the oppressed also requires the cultivation a certain type of epistemic
positioning. Oppressed agents must learn to come to see the oppression they experience
as interconnected to the oppression experienced in the lives of others. The oppressed are
uniquely able to understand the oppression leveled against them as a matter of direct
perception, yet coming to understand the way oppression manifests in the lives and
experiences of others is a different matter all together. Here, agents must come to
position themselves as willing to learn from the experiences of others and must be willing
to take accounts of these experiences as epistemically privileged. Here, the
revolutionary spirit called for by virtue ethics must accept the insights of feminism on
epistemically privileged positions.148 The revolutionary man cannot directly experience
the ways oppression manifests, as sexism and patriarchy, in the lives of oppressed
women. And women cannot directly experience how sexist gender norms manifest in the
lives of transgendered women. In each case, the oppressed must cultivate a receptive
willingness to hear the voices of other oppressed people and take these experiences as
privileged experiences of oppression. Here I am reminded of the countess accounts of
activists and revolutionaries who have failed to cultivate such an epistemic disposition.
During the rise, and subsequent decline, of the so-called New Left, many American
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radicals, influenced by Marx, Lenin, and Mao, failed to incorporate the experiences of
women in the movement, often choosing to dismiss their experiences of sexism and
sexual oppression (coming both from outside and within, the movement) as either
unimportant or merely secondary to the primary struggle against the oppressive nature of
capitalism. Women's experiences of oppression were subdued under the interest of the
oppressed worker and the oppression of women was "explained away" as merely a
subordinate form of capitalist exploitation. Here, movement leaders and organizers (most
often men) failed to epistemically position themselves in such a way as to make their
female comrades legitimate and equal partners in the struggle to both understand and also
combat oppression. In a way similar to the development of reflective willingness, the
framework of continual habituation and constant cultivation found in virtue ethics
instructs agents as to the practical path(s) to such an attitudinal cultivation.
While the cultivation of such a revolutionary attitude or disposition, with which
one can both experience and judge oppression correctly, is of the utmost importance, it
alone cannot be said to discharge our responsibilities in the face of oppression. Agents
who are able to develop such an attitudinal disposition (or at least undertake the project
of the development of such a revolutionary disposition), yet fail to employ this
disposition of character in resistance movements or actions cannot be said to be engaging
in the required project of resistance. The harms that oppression levels against the
oppressed, as chronicled in chapter two, are not merely intellectual or dispositional harms
and thus the cultivation of a revolutionary spirit alone cannot be said to combat the harms
that make resistance necessary. This revolutionary disposition must be put into action,
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and must actively engage in a revolutionary movement which, though it's collective
effort, dismantles the existing apparatuses of oppression.
Claims such as these, that the cultivation of the proper attitudes is insufficient to
discharge our moral responsibilities when facing oppression, stand in stark contrast to the
beliefs of empowerment theorists. To the empowerment theorist, disaffected agents
commit themselves to transforming themselves (or others) from a psychological state of
disempowerment to "a cognitive sate characterized by a sense of perceived control,
competence, and goal internalization."149 The goal of empowerment theories is the
"transformation of attitudes and beliefs."150 While most academic empowerment
theorists work in sectors relating to business/employee management (where they seek
"empowered" employees for optimal business performance), ideas akin to empowerment
theory are also found in some so-called activist circles. Here, well-intentioned activists
see empowerment (as marked by positive psychological states or attitudes) as the goal of
social and political action. For these activists, consciousness-raising actions are
undertaken for the purpose of cultivating empowered attitudes and this experience of
psychological transformation stands as the final goal of social justice action. To
individuals such as these the claims being made here, that attitudinal transformation (or
the development of certain positive dispositional states) cannot be said to satisfy our
obligations in a world of oppression, will sound backwards and wrongheaded. For such
individuals, the goal of consciousness-raising actions is to, literally, raise consciousness
(or empower the previously disempowered).
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The claim that attitudinal shifts and the development of a revolutionary attitude
alone cannot satisfy the demands placed on agents should be welcomed by both Marxists
and existentialists as both Marx and Sartre forwarded important conceptions of shifting
consciousnesses in the face of oppression. Marx spoke of this important attitudinal shift
as the development of class consciousness and Sartre extolled the importance of
authenticity and the struggle against bad faith. While Marx and Sartre differed widely in
their conceptions of attitudinal transformation, both held that shifting psychological and
emotional states served as necessary means for the larger struggle to combat and,
ultimately, destroy oppressive structures. And this is the conception of the revolutionary
spirit being advanced here; attitudinal transformation acts not as an end-in-itself but
rather the necessary catalyst for the moral work of resistance.
If it is oppression's inherent harms that make flourishing impossible for the
oppressed (and therefore creates the moral mandate for resistance), then it is at these
harms, along with the practical mechanisms which level these harms, that resistance must
be directed. While some of the harms inflicted by oppression are emotional and
psychological in nature, these harms cannot be reduced to merely "internal" states which
can be solved merely by transforming an agent's dispositions. Thus, virtue ethics, in its
demands that we meet oppression head-on, cannot be reduced to an obligation to cultivate
a disposition and must focus upon action determination. The resistance necessitated by
virtue ethics must function to directly and purposefully attack and dismantle the
apparatuses of oppression which make avenues to flourishing impossible for the
oppressed. It is only though acting to dismantle oppression's mechanisms that oppressed
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people are able to pursue the human good of flourishing and the moral life described by
virtue ethics.
While the v-rules, and the subsequent d-rules, of virtue ethics provides an avenue
for action determination, the determination of revolutionary action in service of
revolutionary ends seems quite difficult to ascertain. While the v-rules can imbue us
with moral rules rooted in, and focused on, the development (and maintenance) of the
virtues, and while the d-rules can be derived and deployed to help us understand the
actions needed to fulfill the v-rules, the path to moral resistance remains somewhat
unclear and abstract. Fortunately, paths to revolutionary action have been explored and
schemas exist which can aid us in this effort. Interestingly, these schemas for specific
action determination have been developed and deployed from sources outside academic
circles, outside the confines of academic writing and journals, and outside the
frameworks of virtue ethics. These sources for strategic revolutionary action, founded
and developed by activists, unionists, and revolutionaries, need to be brought into
philosophical and academic discussions of moral resistance. Bringing these methods into
conversation with the academic discourse of oppression can help transform often highly
theoretical and abstract calls for "moral resistance" into measured and practical resistance
movements.

Section 2 - A Practical Understanding of Resistance Actions

But what specific actions fulfill the demands of resistance as mandated by virtue
ethics? If the picture of resistance advanced by virtue ethics requires agents to act in
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ways beyond attitudinal and dispositional development, and requires agents to actively
engage in resistance struggles, we are left having specify what exactly agents are required
to do. To begin to understand what agents are obligated to do in becoming resisters we
must see that our resistance to oppression must be as varied and diverse as the oppression
which it fights. Because oppression manifests in widely different, and overlapping, ways
it seems impossible to enumerate a fixed and static list of moral responses. The dynamic
nature of oppression means that we cannot simply enumerate such a list of resistance
actions but rather we need specific and elaborated tools which can be used by the
resistance fighter in specific circumstances to generate the required actions which can
combat dynamic oppression. As activists and revolutionaries, who resist the existence
and effects of oppression in all its varied forms, we must not rely on a prefabricated
inventory of resistance actions but rather understand resistance as dynamic, and be
prepared to provide appropriate and individuated responses to pressing evils. What is
called for here is a mechanism for understanding and generating practical and
implementable actions to be used by the moral resistance fighter. Fortunately, such
mechanisms already exist.
The practical mechanism for understanding and generating revolutionary action
beings with important terminological and taxological distinctions. Of central importance
are the terms "issue," "goal," "strategy," and "tactic." These terms carry a wide array of
meanings and are often used in a myriad of ways, yet, to the resister, they are technical
terms and need to be understood as such. The interconnected nature of these technical
terms, when understood schematically, provides the minimal tools needed for
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determining the reality of resistance actions. Here, these terms will be outlined and
defined.
All revolutionary movements begin with an issue. An issue is, simply, that
problem or obstacle which needs to be changed, altered, or addressed. Issues are
presented to activists and revolutionaries as being vague and broad. In many ways, the
issue is the large-scale obstacle which revolutionary attention is to be paid. When an
issue is clarified through investigation, conversation, and explanation it becomes a 'goal.'
This clarification of an issue into a goal is constrained and elucidated by the use of a set
of five criteria, captured by the acronym SMART.151 Here, SMART stands for:
'Specific' - Something is 'specific' when it is understood without ambiguity and
with clear delineation.
'Measurable' - Something is 'measurable' when it contains enumerated conditions
for calculating success criteria in specific amounts of quantity and/or quality.
'Activating' - Something is 'activating' when the undertaken
activity/campaign/action will energize current participants as well as motivate
other individuals to becoming actively involved.
'Realistic' - Something is 'realistic' when the outcome sought can feasibly be
achieved by the people currently involved with the action/campaign/activity.
'Tangible' - Something is 'tangible' when the change sought will make a marked
and real difference in the lives of those affected.

When the SMART criteria are applied to an issue, a goal emerges. A goal, which
is derived directly from an issue, is the clearly defined change that activists and
revolutionaries will accomplish. What distinguishes a goal from an issue is that an issue
can be vague and unclear while goals are strictly delineated, measured, and have
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achievable outcomes (ensured by the satisfaction of the SMART criteria). For example,
while "ending environmental destruction" is a noble end and a wishful dream it fails in all
conceivable ways to be a goal as it is unrealistic, there are no defined measurable criteria
for determining the success of such a campaign, and is utterly unspecific. On the other
hand, "stopping the Pacific Lumber Company from clear-cutting any of the old-growth
trees in Humboldt County" represents a SMART goal. Here, the goal has gained
specificity, will have a tangible results, and the involved activists can measure the
success of the campaign (as, in this overly simplified example, the loss of "not any" oldgrowth tree can be measured).
A SMART goal connects directly to 'strategy.' Strategy defines the form of
campaign or struggle that will be waged to achieve the goal. To achieve SMART goals
agents may wage legal campaigns (where the legal system is used as a weapon), publicity
campaigns (where public perception is used as a weapon), or commercial campaigns
(where the buying, or not buying, of products is used as a weapon), to name just a few. A
campaign's strategy, which too is subject to SMART evaluation, will justify the form of
struggle that will be embarked upon. The determination of strategy must be specifically
determined in light of the most effective and realistic way to achieve the goal.
Strategy connects, in the end, to 'tactics.' Tactics are the specific actions agents
will perform as part of a strategy (or strategic plan) in order to achieve the goal. Tactics
can range from tree-spiking to the production and distribution of literature. It is the
strategy which determines and informs which tactics agents must perform. If, for
example, activists are engaged in a legal campaign then civil-disobedience (and
subsequent legal entanglement) might be a tactic employed whereas a protest, as a tactic,
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would be dismissed as the strategic plan is not one which hinges upon publicity or public
perceptions. Just as in the determination of goals and strategy, tactics are subject to the
SMART criteria.152
To help illustrate the interplay between these concepts I believe that it is useful to
consider an example. Thus, let us consider the following fictitious scenario:
LGBTQ students and faculty at a liberal arts college see that their community is
marginalized within the university community as a whole and there exists an alarming
lack of resources at their university to be used for combating this marginalization and
supporting members of the LGBTQ community. First and foremost, these activists are
struck with the issue: their marginalized status and the harm that comes from this
marginalization. Though interactions with each other they come to the realization that
something needs to be done and thus formulate a goal. Their goal cannot be "to stop
homophobia" or to "make the university more queer friendly" as these vague, idealistic,
and unmeasurable goals lack SMART criteria. So the students and faculty determine a
specific goal; the establishment of an LGBT resource center on their campus by the end
of the upcoming academic year. With this SMART goal in mind, they then can formulate
a strategy and determine how best to achieve this goal. These activists determine that the
university has available funds for the establishment of such a resource center and need to
be convinced of its importance and viability. Thus, these activists opt choose
strategically to wage a corporate campaign. Here, activists reach out to other universities
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where LGBT resource centers exist and, with their help, draft a proposed budget for the
center to be delivered to the university. Activists create a "target map" to determine
which individual, or individuals, in the university administration are able to approve such
a resource center. It serves these organizers no good to petition someone who cannot
deliver the goods, and these activists learn who, specifically, can approve their request.
Activists attend board meetings, or meetings where decisions such as this would originate
or be approved, where they present their proposal. Activists also gather narratives of
students and faculty describing how the center would positively impact their lives on
campus and deliver these proposals to the proper university.
In this example, we can see that any specific tactic which is used is derived from
strategically analyzing the goal in light of the issue at hand. These activists, using this
organizing model, are able to set achievable goals, employ useful and strategic tactics,
and continually act to strategically achieve their goal.
There are three important strengths to understanding this model of resistance
determination. The first is that it this structure, of the interplay between issues, goals,
strategy, and tactics in a cohesive and dynamic system, allows us to see how resistance,
as the morally mandated response to oppression, can begin to be realistically formulated.
The importance of the ability to formulate real and practical resistance actions cannot be
overstated. Drawing insights from the practical world of organizing can help direct
academic projects, such as this, to give substance to the otherwise general and unfulfilled
calls for political action.
The second strength of such a system is that it emphasizes and necessitates
effective results. By demanding specificity and elaborating, clearly, the measurability
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and tangibility of our goals, strategies, and tactics, this model of resistance organizing (if
applied correctly) yields actions which directly combat oppression and the harms that
oppression causes. In this way, the campaigns and actions that revolutionaries and
radicals embark upon, when employing this organizing schema, avoid the problem that
empowerment theories fall prey to. Since it is oppression's harms that create the need for
active resistance, it is these specific harms that must be directly contested. While
empowerment theory may give agents an indirect avenue for coping with said harms, the
organizing model of deployable action seeks to directly rectify these injustices and
therefore can be said to provide the framework for the d-rules concerning oppression.
Finally, and most importantly, this organizing structure is free from an overt
moral framework. This, at first glance, might sound like an odd strength seeing as the
organizing model being advanced here is being used to frame and explain how agents are
to act in order to discharge the moral obligations which arise in the face of oppression.
The moral neutrality of this method means that it is both free from any inherent or
axiomatic moral judgments which would render it incompatible with the framework of
virtue ethics and also free to work in conjunction with the demand to engage in active
resistance to oppression as mandated by virtue ethics. In the first sense, this method does
not contain any moral claims, such as (for example) a demand that the goals of resistance
action be only constructed from theological and eschatological revelations, which would
render its compatibility with virtue ethics impossible. In the second sense, this model can
be deployed to determine, practically, the measures needed for agents to engage in
practical and implementable forms of resistance while the moral demands of virtue
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ethics, as expressed as v/d-rules, can likewise be equally deployed to constrain the
considered actions of resistance to that which the morally virtuous agent would accept.
The question thus becomes how the interplay between a practical organizing
model such as this and the moral requirements of virtue ethics works to guide our
resistance. The moral neutrality of this organizing model asks for all options to be
considered, regardless of moral standing, and places central emphasis on the efficacy of
actions to combat oppression without considerations of their moral permissibility. It is
here that the framework of virtue ethics can act to constrain actions available to activists
and revolutionaries.
One of the central moral concerns which is often raised during discussions of
resistance action is the question of the permissibility of violence. Tessman, when
discussing the costs beared by the resisting agent approaches the question of violence in
liberatory struggles but, in the end, fails to engage directly in the question of the role of
violence in revolutionary struggles. She says, "is not my intent here to enter into - and
certainly not to settle - the question of whether liberatory goals are best achieved through
a commitment to nonviolence... or through a readiness for violence."153 While Tessman
works to avoid this question, it seems essential to address this important issue head-on as
it is one of the most central questions encountered when discussing morally available
resistance actions and movements. So it is to this question that the next section turns.

153

Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 113.

156

Section 3 - The Role of Violence in Resistance Struggles

When considering the permissibility of violence in revolutionary action it is hard
to escape the overt moral language of those who espouse doctrines of nonviolence. The
position of nonviolence dominates the landscape of 'moral activism' and the pacifist
position often carries with it the belief that any set of revolutionary actions which remain
bound by any sensible moral principles must, by nature, commit itself to nonviolence. In
this way, the prevailing myth of morally acceptable revolutionary action is that it must be
nonviolent.
This section begins with a survey of pacifist positions, starting with the canonical
views of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mohandas Gandhi and then moves to more nuanced
and constrained forms of pacifism. This survey of pacifist positions demonstrates the
contours of the pacifist landscape and shows that pacifist positions occupy a spectrum of
possibilities, motivations, and justifications. In the end it will be argued that while
pacifism is not a univocal or monolithic position, a commitment to nonviolence, no
matter the motivation or justification, remains a deeply flawed position which one ought
not accept as a necessary perimeter of resistance actions.
The most widely known, and often referenced, pacifist positions are those of King
and Gandhi. Both King and Gandhi publically defended the exclusivity of nonviolence in
revolutionary movements, and the impact of their positions can hardly be understated.
While the pacifism espoused by King and Gandhi are importantly different, both men
expressly tied prohibitions on violence to the moral position and it is their views which
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best serve as both an anchor-point and launching pad for understanding doctrines of
nonviolence.
In many ways it is Gandhi that represents the voice of absolutist pacifism.154
Gandhi's understanding of nonviolence is rooted in two equally important principles or
concepts; satyagrahi and ahimsa. Satuagrahi, a word that Gandhi coined, is a derivation
from the Gujarati word sadagraha (meaning firmness to a good cause). Satuagrahi is the
"[hope] to convert the heart and soul of the opponent by virtue of adhering to the truth,
enduring self-suffering, remaining sincere and chivalrous and by avoiding hurting,
humbling, or embittering the opponent."155 Ahimsa, a Sanskrit word, means nonviolence
('himsa' is Sanskrit for violence and ahimsa adds a prefix to indicate the rejection of
'himsa'). The connection between satyagrahi and ahimsa takes root, for Gandhi, in his
epistemological worldview. Gandhi held that there exists an immutable and eternal truth
of existence but also held that people remain, in whole, unable to know this truth. This
skepticism about human knowledge standing before eternal and absolute truth forced him
to deny that violence was ever an option. Gandhi believed that satyagrahi could never
use violence "because man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth and therefore [is]
not competent to punish."156 The two moral pillars of satyagrahi and ahimsa established,
for Gandhi, the moral framework of not only resistance to oppression but also the moral
framework for the virtuous life. Gandhi's commitment to nonviolence was necessitated
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by his understanding of what he say as the only "right, or pure, means to a right, or pure,
end."157
In a similar way, Martin Luther King Jr. advanced a conception of nonviolence
which held a moral, not strategic, view of pacifism. King, in describing his so-called
'pilgrimage to nonviolence,' chronicles how he came to understand the unique moral high
ground which pacifism, and pacifism alone, offers. King describes how the nonviolent
resister must come to commit herself to the denial of both "external physical violence"
(which prohibits the use of violent actions against an opponent) as well as the use of
"internal violence of spirit" (as manifest as hatred).158 For King, the moral prohibition on
all forms of violence, both physically and emotionally, takes root in the Christian notion
of universal love. It is love, for King, that is the basis of all commanded moral action
thus all forms of violence, even in service of noble and libratory ends, must be forsaken.
Throughout King's description of the nonviolent position one sees countless overt
references to "moral resistance" and "moral resister." Where one might expect to find
King distinguishing between the moral goodness of the struggle for justice and the moral
evil of oppression, they actually find King often distinguishing between the "moral
resister" of nonviolence and the "immoral resister" who rejects the pacifist doctrine.
King expressly ties morality to pacifism and describes those who accept even a limited
role for violence (even for libratory ends) as morally failing.159 For King, the connection
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between nonviolence and moral necessity was so strong that he concluded not only that
the pacifist position was available only to those who have "morality enough" to end the
cycle of hate and injustice,160 but also that "[nonviolence] was the only morally and
practically sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom."161
Positions such as those expressed by Gandhi and King, with their overt attempts
to constrain all resistance actions to the moralism of pacifism, defines the axiomatic core
of absolutist pacifism. Here, absolutist pacifism (often called "universal pacifism") holds
that violence, in all forms and in all circumstances, is morally reprehensible and
unjustified. As is often the case with absolutist positions, heavy criticism has been
launched at this view. Jan Narivson, arguing from a politically rights-based tradition,
holds that absolute pacifism is "far from being plausible" and claims that it suffers from
being "morally inconsistent."162 For Narvison, the failure of absolutist pacifist stems
from a commitment to the proposition that violence is wrong. This commitment, while
allowing pacifists to condemn any violence that is waged against them, also commits
them to abide the existence of violence in that it constrains individuals in their attempts to
stop impending acts of violence. For Narvison, the pacifist must condemn violence as
categorically wrong but also hold that violence which cannot be stopped by anything
short of a violent response is morally justified, as any potential violent reaction is morally
worse than the violence committed by the aggressor. This 'commitment' that Narvison
sees the absolutist pacifist having to make leaves their position "confused" as "their
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position involves a contradiction: violence is wrong, and it is wrong to resist it."163
Others, such as Daniel Farmer have argued that absolutist pacifism (or as he dubs it
"deontological pacifism") is "morally indefensible" as it leads to the "unpalatable
conclusion" that individuals should forgo violent responses in situations of dire selfdefense.164 Where Narivson objects to pacifism as a contradiction in rights, Farmer does
so on the grounds of incomparable value. For Farmer, the absolutist pacifist holds that
the refusal to defend one's life, at a minimum, is of comparably higher value than the life
that is threatened. This means that for the absolutist, the immorality that is a violent
threat to one's life is somehow morally superior to the life that is threatened. This
devaluing of the life threatened, for Farmer, is an obvious case of moral confusion.
The pacifist response to the arguments launched by Farmer and Narvison is to
back away from absolutist strains of pacifism to positions of qualified or contingent
nonviolence. Here, the pacifist denies the absolutist line found in the positions of King
and Gandhi and opts to advance a position which holds that nonviolent resistance is to be
sought except in the most dire of circumstances. To my mind this seems the only
appropriate response to the insensibility of the absolutist position. In fact, Farmer
himself argues that criticisms of absolutist pacifism, such as those he offers, act as strawman arguments given that qualified pacifism "represents the commitments of actual
pacifists."165 Here, Farmer is absolutely correct.
Possibly the most easily adaptable position to this qualification on violence would
be strands of utilitarian pacifism. Here, the use of violence is weighed by means of a
utilitarian calculus and the utilitarian pacifist assigns especially heavy negative utility to
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the use of violence making it an available option only when its prescribed low utility is
overcome by the achievement of significantly higher utility.166 A position such as this
does seem to avoid the problems of absolutism and may appear plausible, at least on the
surface, (and is probably the position of many non-academic pacifists), the details of its
possibility need not be discussed here as such a position seems out-of-step from the larger
virtue-based approach detailed in this work.
Of interest here are positions of so-called "virtue pacifism" which seek to morally
ground pacifism in an ethical framework which avoids the problems which plague
absolutist stands of nonviolence. Franco Trivigno argues for a form of contingent or
qualified virtue pacifism.167 Here, Trivigno considers the damning and harmful effects of
violence on the characters of individuals who, in war or in their attempts to resist
oppression, commit themselves to violent means. Trivigno notes the harmful
psychological effects that a learned willingness to killing (or harm) has on agents and
how this severely damages their character. His argument begins with the way a
willingness to kill (or harm) others erodes an agent's empathic abilities. From here he
moves to show how a willingness to use violence makes the acquisition of multiple
virtues, beyond empathy, seemingly impossible. The dehumanization needed to carryout
acts of violence requires agents to habitually cultivate a lack of empathy and erodes the
seemingly natural instinct to identify would-be victims as similar to one's self. Here, the
would-be violent agent must lose, or work to lose, the empathy which would otherwise
interfere with their ability to act violently. This loss of empathy, which otherwise would
"play a role in causing virtuous action and also virtuous character," results in agents who
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lacks the necessary traits to achieve virtue and therefore eudemonia.168 The result of this
negative habituation, for Trivigno, is the yielding of an agent who can only be described
as morally damaged. "One may becomes (sic) callous and insensitive, when confronted
with the suffering of others; one may become cruel and malicious in what one says about
them and hope for them; one may become spiteful and vindictive when confronted with
their wrongdoing"169 Here, Trivigno claims a cascading of harmful effects that are
leveled against this agent; while possibly beginning with a loss of empathy, the result is
an inability to cultivate the goods of "compassion, sympathy, benevolence, and
kindness.” This moral harm, found at the level of character, leads Trivigno to claim that
"states should refrain from putting its citizens [in the form of soldiers] in situations that
are likely to hinder eudaimonia" and (moving beyond the question of war) that one
should endorse contingent pacifism for political resisters.170
The contingent nature of Trivigno's virtue pacifism emerges as he expressly
accounts for some of the ways that violence may, in fact, be necessary in certain
circumstances. He specifically notes instances of life-saving self-defense and I suspect
this would extend to other forms of severe harm, such as rape, which might not result
necessarily in one's death but may bring about severe harm to one's body or sense of
being. While Trivigno allows for the possibility of a violent response in these cases he
severely qualifies the use of this violence. He says:
If violence must be used, because he is being directly attacked and cannot avoid
its use in order to resist, then the virtuous person will use only the minimum
amount of violence necessary to defuse the situation. If, after all nonviolent and
nonlethal violent strategies have been fully exhausted, it turns out that the
minimum amount of violence necessary is deadly - because the only way to resist
168
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the violence involves killing - then the virtuous person will feel pain and regret
afterwards.171

The violence permitted by Trivigno is constrained by three factors (1) it is only to
be used as a way to resisting impending harm towards oneself (thus making it purely
reactive), (2) all other forms of resistance must be exhausted before violence is
considered, and, (3) any warranted violent response is minimal in nature and the amount
of violence used is only enough to avoid the impending harm in this situation (making its
acceptable duration quite short). When these criteria are met, and violence is used, the
acting agent should experience the appropriate moral regret for their action, even if such
actions are warranted, justified, and necessary.
Trivigno's account of a virtue-based qualified pacifism clearly avoids inescapable
problems faced by absolutism and carves out a pacifist position which might seem
amenable to the account of resistance being forwarded here. Yet, while positions of
qualified pacifism, such as Trivigno's, can (easily) avoid the charges of logical
inconsistency and moral indefensibility, they remain deeply morally problematic and I
want to outright reject them as acceptable models of virtuous resistance. The grounds on
which I want to reject these accounts follows the arguments made by Peter Gelderloos172
and Ward Churchill173 who have argued, I believe successfully, that all pacifist positions,
including those with the necessary qualifications to make them minimally morally
palatable, remain inherently patriarchal and racist and therefore ought to be rejected.

171

Travigno, “A Virtue Ethical Case,” 96 (emphasis in original).
Peter Gelderloos, How Nonviolence Protects the State (South End Press, 2007).
173
Ward Churchill, Pacifism as Pathology: Reflections on the Role of Armed Struggle in North America
(AK Press, 2007).
172

164

Gelderloos' charge of the patriarchal nature of even qualified pacifism takes root
in the ways which patriarchy assigns and normalizes gender roles. Patriarchy advances a
view of gender which is fundamentally dualistic and essentialist whereas gender norms
establish what is appropriate for men and women. While much has been written about
the excessively problematic nature of gender dualism, Gelderloos focuses upon the ways
patriarchy assigns the appropriateness of violence between the genders. For Gelderloos,
"Patriarchy gives both the ability and the right to use violence almost exclusively to
men."174 Under patriarchy, men are expected to be violent and the violence expressed
and enjoyed by men is explained as a byproduct of their masculinity. This manifests as a
patriarchal license for men to use 'appropriate levels' of violence against women and
children, often grounds explanations of why men engage in wars and warrior behavior,
permits men to be quick to fist fights over insults and to defend honor, and even explains
why men relish violent sports like rugby and football. The opposite is true for women.
Patriarchy essentializes women to roles of mother and caregiver, and presents femininity
as a compassionate foil to the violence that is expressed in masculinity. For Gelderloos,
when women resist the oppression that is patriarchy, and do so by committing to any
strand of pacifism, they replicate the gender norms of the very same patriarchy they seek
to resist. "Because patriarchy clearly prescribes a one-sided male violence, women
would be disrupting this power dynamic, not reinforcing it, by relearning their propensity
for violence."175 The insistence, which even qualified pacifism has, on tactical decisions
which makes violence a last-ditch-effort means that women who subscribe to such a
position must only explore those resistance options which replicate the unjust association
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of gendered violence perpetuated by patriarchy. In effect, the resisting pacifist is only
morally allowed to consider violent options once all the other womanly options are
explored and exhausted. When one applies Trivigno's constraints on the use of violence,
the revolutionary women is left to (1) only break away from patriarchal femininity to stop
violent acts from taking her life or violating her body, but in no other circumstances of
oppression is she to abandon her femininity, (2) she must explore all peaceful, and therein
stereotypically feminine, responses before breaking the patriarchal connection between
masculinity and violence, and, (3) must restrain herself to only temporarily abandoning
her femininity and must do so for the shortest time possible. The insistence on
nonviolence, with limited qualifications, means that women who resist patriarchy are
restricted to continually play-out the damning essentialist feminine myth which
patriarchy perpetuates.
In a similar vein, Gelderloos argues that pacifism, even of a qualified nature, is
racist.176 The basis for such a claim is that the ideology of pacifism comes from a racially
privileged context and unfairly harms and burdens people of color. Racialized systems of
social privilege endorse certain acceptable forms of resistance for people of color. When
people of color struggle against oppression they are permitted, to a certain extent, to do
so as long as they stay nonviolent. When they diverge from nonviolence, the response
(even by self proclaimed white anti-racist activists and resisters) is often quite vitriolic.
"Black people marching is photogenic. Black people with guns evokes the violent crime
reports on the evening news. American Indians holding a press conference is laudable.
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American Indians ready, willing, and able to take their land back is a trifle disturbing."177
The social acceptability of militant non-whites is almost universally nonexistent, and the
fear that is provoked by the arming of people of color is nearly universally condemned
both by the powers-that-be as well as by those who otherwise claim to stand in solidarity
with their anti-oppressive ends. People of color are doubly demonized for turning away
from the sanctified avenues of nonviolence. People of color are asked to accept
institutionalized violence and are vilified for responding to this violence with anything
other than Christian love and a turn-the-other-cheek attitude. And here lies the tragic
reality; the nonviolence that pacifism commands carries with it disproportionate
consequence for people of color. Here, Gelderloos summarizes this tragic reality:
[Pacifism] ignores that violence is already here; that violence is an unavoidable
structurally integral part of the current social hierarchy; and that it is people of
color who are most affected by that violence. Pacifism assumes that white people
who grew up in the suburbs with all their basic needs met can counsel oppressed
people, many of whom are people of color, to suffer patiently under an
inconceivably greater violence, until such time as the Great White Father is
swayed by the movement's demands or the pacifists achieve that legendary
"critical mass."178

The burden of institutionalized violence is beared disproportionately by people of
color, and pacifism asks people of color to be victims of this violence in the name of
"bearing witness" while numbers are massed and consciences can be affected. In effect,
pacifism disproportionately asks people of color to act as cannon fodder for the violence
doled out by oppression. This is why pacifism is an all too easy position for privileged
(white) people to endorse as they, by and large, are not asked to directly suffer the violent
retribution that resistance carries with it. When militant Native Americans or Blacks
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reject this dogma of nonviolence they are seen as unwieldy, unreasonable, and
uncontrollable mobs with savage intent. To borrow the analogy made by Malcolm X,
pacifism asks people of color to conform to socially acceptable tropes of blackness; they
become the acceptable “house negro” and discuss resistance as "our resistance" and to see
their struggle as “our struggle.”179 When people of color fail to abide the message of
pacifism they are cast as "alienating" other (white) people who are reluctant to support
their armed movements while claiming to yearn to share in the ends they seek. Pacifism
acts as if the violence that is doled out against the oppressed is equal, and in its equally
this violence is to be absorbed and reacted to with the same direct noncooperation. The
reality is that the current state of racial privilege "punishes the resistance of people of
color more harshly than the resistance of white people."180
One can see the evidence of the patriarchal and racist nature of nonviolence in the
ways in which resistance narratives are constructed. The story, if not outright myth, of
the civil rights struggle in the United States is that it was gender inclusive and, for the
most part, safely nonviolent.181 The actions of the Black Panthers and the Nation of
Islam are often excluded from the civil rights story while the actions of the NAACP and
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference are held as paradigms of virtue. Similarly,
Rosa Parks has been cast into the acceptable tropes of both the "tired seamstress who
tiptoed into history" and of "angry grandmotherlyness."182 This fictionalization of her
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actions and life allowed for her public veneration to the point where, upon her death in
2005, she became the first women in history to have her body laid in honor in the
Rotunda of the US capital building. I suspect that no such honors will be bestowed upon
Angela Davis or Kathleen Cleaver upon their deaths.
Beyond the ways that nonviolence furthers, rather than resists, the oppressive
structures of racism and patriarchy, pacifism suffers from a further, equally troubling,
problem of ineffectiveness. The problem of ineffectiveness represents the practical
failure of pacifism which, in conjunction to the deeply troubling moral and political
dynamics of pacifism's perpetuation of patriarchal and racists ideals, helps show why
pacifism ought not be a criteria for moral resistance.
The claim that pacifism is ineffective for bringing about revolutionary change
stands in direct opposition to the historical "victories" that pacifists cite as evidence for
their commitment to nonviolence. To explore pacifism's ineffectiveness it is essential to
first debunk these historical fictions. Once these historical fictions are taken off the table
as evidence for pacifism's ability to accomplish ends, we can see why, by the very nature
of any pacifist position, effectiveness must be rejected as an essential component of
political action. In short, when one actually investigates the claims made by pacifists
about the effectiveness of nonviolence one is left with little evidence that pacifism can act
as an effective tool for resisting oppression.
Pacifists are often quick to cite India's independence, "the" Civil Rights
Movement in the US, and the anti-nuclear movement as examples of the successful
deployment of nonviolence. Sadly, none of these examples help demonstrate a
meaningful measure of effectiveness. Take for example the story of India's independence
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from the British. The prevailing myth of India's independence struggle is that the Indian
people, unified under the leadership of Gandhi, adopted a doctrine of pacifism and after
years of struggle and suffering, forced the British to relinquish control of India to the
Indians.
While uplifting and inspiring, this story is, at best, a radical oversimplification,
and at worst a lie. While the Indian independence movement did embody many
nonviolent tactics, it cannot be claimed (1) only nonviolence was used in this struggle, or,
(2) it was nonviolence that caused the British to relinquish colonial control. The struggle
for Indian independence was not monolithic and certainly not guided exclusively by
Gandhi. Advocates for nonviolence, who evoke the name of Gandhi with religious
fervor, often are ignorant of other revolutionary figures such as Chandrasekhar Azad
(who lead an army of Indians in armed campaigns against the British), Bhagat Singh
(who gained mass support for his bombing campaigns aimed at "overthrowing both
foreign and Indian capitalism"), Subhas Chandra Bose (who, as a militant candidate
called for and organized open warfare against colonial rule, was elected twice to the
presidency of the Indian National Congress in 1938 and 1939), and even Nehru (whose
pragmatism led him to deny the universality of nonviolence). The Indian (and Pakistani)
independence movements cannot, without dangerous oversimplification, be called a
movement of nonviolence. Nonviolence was used by some, but rejected by others.
Further, the claim that it was, specifically, the nonviolence of Indian revolutionaries
which brought an end to British rule is false. There were a number of factors beyond
nonviolence which forced England to relinquish control of India. These forces, aside
from including the violent aspects of the Indian independence movement, include violent
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forces outside India. One such force which weakened British control over India was the
actions of Palestinian revolutionaries in the mid-to-late 1940’s. The British Mandate for
Palestine, also called the Palestine Mandate, created British rule over Palestine after
World War I and in the 1930’s a large scale war by was waged by Palestinian guerilla
fighters against the occupying British army. This war consumed considerable resources
from the British, and resulted in large numbers of British causalities and, according to
many historians, presented a clear threat to the British that the Indians, like the
Palestinians, might give up civil disobedience and take up arms in masse if ignored for
long enough.183 This factor, rooted in the violent actions of Palestinian anti-colonists,
influenced British decisions concerning India and it and it alone is enough to show that it
cannot be claimed that the nonviolent tactics used by some Indians was, in itself, what
caused the end of British rule in India.
Similar analyses can be performed on the myths of the Civil Rights Movement184
and the US's anti-nuclear movement.185 While it is true that many in these movements
were committed to pacifist principles, it is not the case that pacifism can be said to be
singularly and causally responsible for the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the
minimal movement towards ending nuclear proliferation and bringing about nuclear
183
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disarmament. In each of these historical cases there is no evidence that pacifism can be
cited as the causal force which brought about these "victories."
While these historical fictions, when exposed, help dismantle the perceived
effectiveness of pacifism, the failure of pacifism's effectiveness is not purely to be
inferred from past historical failures. The fundamental failure of pacifism, as an effective
route to resistance and revolution, is found in the ways that pacifism cannot be
incorporated into a sensible organizing model. The pacifist must begin organizing from
the principle that all actions must be nonviolent and then work backwards to tactics,
strategy, and goals. In effect, the pacifist can only plan in reverse. Tactics are not
considered in reference to their strategic ability to achieve goals, but in their ability to
adhere to the principle of nonviolence. In this way, the pacifist must privilege their
commitment to remaining nonviolent over the effectiveness that this nonviolence may or
may not possess. This backwards reasoning explains why pacifist organizing often, and
continually, performs the same set of actions regardless of the goals or the reality of their
campaigns. Protests, boycotts, letter writing campaigns, political lobbying, petition
signing, and consciousness raising are the "activism in a box" for pacifists, and these
different tactics are dragged-out and deployed in almost all pacifist campaigns as these
tactics can be done without the use of violence. This leads to political campaigns which
begin and end with ineffectiveness. Surely there are times where these tactics are
important and strategically warranted, but the belief that we must begin our organizing by
placing parameters on our tactics and then work backwards to see what strategies are
available to us based on these limited tactics places the preverbal cart before the horse.
Effectiveness, as a value, is taken off the table as an organizing necessity and is replaced
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by the ability of one's actions to expresses nonviolence. While this conclusion may seem
bold to some, to the pacifist this is not a contentious conclusion as the pacifist openly and
avowedly holds their nonviolence as the central value needed in organizing. For the
pacifist, remaining committed to nonviolence is superior to efficacy.
Given that pacifism is not only ineffective but also patriarchal and racist there is
more than sufficient evidence for rejecting pacifism, even in its qualified and contingent
forms, as an acceptable moral parameter on resistance actions. While this conclusion
may sound, to some, quite bold, it is essential to see that this outright rejection of
pacifism does not entail the adoption of a "pro-violence position." In fact, to my mind,
there is no one who adopts or advocates for a "pro-violence" position. Such a position
would entail relying exclusively on violent tactics in any and all situations, and not only
is no one folly enough to defend such a position but the belief that they must is beyond
absurd.186 What one must accept when they reject pacifism is simply a position which
might be called "diversity of tactics." Here, agents are asked to consider and weigh
possible tactical actions in light of their connection to strategy and goals. Whereas
pacifism demands agents to accept tactical parameters before considering specific
actions, the diversity of tactics asks agents to consider tactics as they flow from strategies
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and as they work to accomplish goals.187 As Gelderloos points out, it is an unfortunately
reality that people seem to approach tactics and strategy backwards, "enacting tactics out
of a habitual response or marshalling tactics into a strategy without more than a vague
appreciation of the goal.”188 The diversity of tactics demands that this tactical habituation
be upended, and asks agents to consider all of the political and ethical dimensions of
tactics (and strategy) when setting courses of action. While the resisting agent may come
to decide that nonviolent options are preferable to violent ones in a given campaign, and
therefore align themselves with the pacifist, they do so only after active deliberation and
consideration and not by simply conforming their actions to a pre-established tactical
order they feel compelled to enact.
It is also equally important to understand is that these active discussions about the
availability of a plurality of tactics which the diversity of tactics demands does not deny
the moral and psychological reality of the harms that violent resistance may carry with it.
The psychological and moral harms chronicled by Trivigno, which lead him to adopt his
virtue-based qualified pacifism, are quite real and the diversity of tactics does not deny
this reality. In fact, these harms need to be understood by resisting agents and these
dangers must help frame discussions of resistance actions. What the diversity of tactics
demands is these harms are weighted by resisters in light of the reality of oppression.
The resisting agent must be free to consider all options, weighing moral demands and the
often high moral costs which resistance entails, when determining the details of
resistance. The determination of tactics, no matter their form, must be part of a continual
187
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discussion within revolutionary movements. Tactics must be continually determined
through the use of practical wisdom and not guided at the outset by a commitment to a
nonviolent axiom.
The appropriate resisting agent who properly considers the high moral cost that is
beared by one who engages in violent actions will likely act in accord with other activists
who swear to a doctrine of nonviolence but between the two there are important
differences. First, the resisting agent who accepts the diversity of tactics is empowered to
consider options, even if they ultimately reject them, which the pacifist cannot even bring
to the table for thoughtful consideration. Secondly, the agent who accepts the diversity of
tactics will be determining their actions under the light of their strategic necessity,
effectiveness, and moral acceptability rather than beginning with a set of tactical options
which must be worked backwards into a strategic plan.
In the end, violence and violent tactics must remain an option for the resisting
agent and cannot be removed from consideration. While the choice to use violence is by
no means a decision that agents should arrive at easily nor quickly, it must remain a
viable option for activists and revolutionaries who seek to struggle against oppression and
who seek to alleviate the harms which oppression levels against the oppressed. The
heavy burdens beared by resisting agent, as chronicled by Trivigno and Tessman, are all
quite real, but these harms cannot, in principle, outweigh the necessity of effective
resistance to oppression.
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Section 4 - The Emerging View of Resistance and the Demandingness Objection

The general picture of resistance that begins to emerge here has many
complicated facets. Agents are obligated to engage in resistance to oppression and the
dischargement of this obligation can only be determined by agents embedded in specific
contexts. The actions of resistance must strategically target multiple targets, must be
relentless in their pursuit of liberation, and are not limited to merely combating the
oppression an individual faces in their own life. On top of this, the practical
determination of appropriate resistance actions and campaigns requires agents to engage
in a diverse range of tactics, and the determination of these tactics (and the strategies
which make these tactics necessary) can only be uncovered through a timely process of
deliberation, discussion, and reflection. Taken together, these demands begin to mount
and it might be argued that the conception of resistance being advanced here ought to be
subject to the criticism of demandingness.
The demandingness objection, in its simplest form, is "describable as the problem
of the ease or difficulty of fulfilling a moral theory's demands - its 'moral
obligations'..."189 When a moral theory advances a schema of moral demands that
extends beyond a 'reasonable' degree of difficulty, and the fulfillment of these moral
demands become onerous to the obligated agent, the moral theory is said to be suspect or
problematic. Alan Thomas claims that the belief that morality ought not be onerous is
"an uncontentious core of common sense morality."190 The breadth and depth of our
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obligations to resist, as being advanced here, more than seem to qualify as onerous and
demandingness objections appear quite apt.
While the demandingness objection is most often associated with consequentialist
theories, virtue theorists such as Swanton and Thomas have attempted to outline, and
guard against, accounts of virtue ethics which stray into excessive demandingness. On
these accounts, and particularly Swanton's, the conception of resistance being advanced
here seems to run afoul of these warnings and I suspect that the arguments made here will
be met with charges of onerous demandingness. In anticipation of such responses I want
to address this important issue. To do so, I will outline Swanton's understanding of the
demandingness objection, and the principle(s) she asks us to abide to keep virtue
theoretical accounts free of this so-called problem. Following this, I will argue that
Swanton's approach ultimately fails and that one ought to accept the onerous nature of
our obligations to resist oppression.
Swanton's work on the demandingness objection, as it relates to virtue ethics,
works to establish limits on the scope of demands that any virtue theoretic account can
make. She begins by acknowledging that the "The Demands of the World are limitless;
there are limitless needs to fulfill, there is no end to the value we could promote..."191
These seemingly limitless demands are exerted by both strangers in need as well as by
loved ones with which we have relationships. For Swanton, there is no lack of need in
the world given the high amount of existent suffering, and the relationships we hold to
our loved ones continually ask us to devote more than all of our energy to their
191
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maintenance and flourishing. When taken individually, it might appear that agents ought
to be obligated to radical sacrifice in the face of competing demands. Mirroring Singer's
famous dictum that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening,
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought morally
to do it,"192 Swanton claims that when one considers individual actions which makes
demands of us to sacrifice it would appear obviously obligatory that one make such
sacrifices. She considers a variety of semi-fictional cases, drawn from her own life,
where she is asked to choose between using available resources (of both time and money)
to aid in famine relief or use these resources to see a movie, restore a classic Vauxhall, or
continue to use her gardening as an outlet for her creativity. Beyond cases of famine
relief, similar dilemmas are encountered when one weights the expenditure of time and
money for these ends as compared with the possibility of devoting these resources
towards furthering more meaningful aspects of one's relationships. When each of these
courses of action are considered individually, it seems rather obvious that the moral need
expressed is both (a) of significantly higher priority demanding one's time and money,
and, (b) exactly the sort of needs that the virtuous agent (who has cultivated the otherregarding virtues of sympathy, empathy, and benevolence) would find compelling. In
each case, as in the classic Singer examples, it would seem that the pressing moral
demands of famine relief or relationship maintenance ought to trump one's desires to
creatively garden, see movies, or restore old cars. While Utilitarians might claim that the
loss of these quite minimal goods is far outweighed by substantive goods that can be
secured by reallocating these resources, one might expect Swanton to demand the same
sacrifice as these actions are exactly of the type demanded by virtue. Yet Swanton rejects
192
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such a view and maintains that actions such as these cannot, nor should not, be
considered individually, where one weighs off each expenditure against other possible
outcomes. While sacrificing in any one of these situations may not leave an agent in ruin,
Swanton maintains that the cumulative force of acquiescing, even happily, to these
demands is damning to one's character and results in a withering of self. Returning to her
examples, she proposes that if she were to give up seeing the movie, and restoring the
car, and abandoning the creative outlet that is gardening she (hypothetically) would find
herself "gradually becomes more miserable" and, in the end, would find that, in
Nietzsche's terms, "her self wilts away."193 This disruption of one's self, and the 'wilting
of one's self' that comes from continually meeting the otherwise moral demands of
sacrifice, is a price too high to pay. Swanton uses this evidence to show that radical
sacrifice is, in fact, not obligatory, even when each individual instance of need appears
more morally significant to the desires/plans of the agent. In this way, she defuses the
demandingness objection by denying that such sacrifices are obligatory. From here, she
abstracts to a general understanding of moral demands and holds,
Moral demands (whether arising from authorities such as bosses, from the needy
in general, from our nearest and dearest, or from the general demand to promote
value) should not tax our strength to the point where the self wilts away, we
neglect our children and loved ones, we ignore ethics altogether ... and resentment
becomes rife. ..... A plausible ethics must not require contortions of our
psychological apparatus.194

Returning to the question of obligatory resistance, I suspect that Swanton would
object to the view being advanced here seeing as how the obligation to resist does
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demand continual effort, personal sacrifice, and the abandonment of otherwise morally
significant projects on the part of the resister.
The problem with Swanton's account is that it relies on a false dichotomy of
assumed privilege. Swanton asks us to consider the damning effects of the 'wilting of the
self' as if this wilting was only brought about through continual sacrifice. In Swanton's
model, the acting agent is placed into a moral bind because they are asked to choose
between sacrificing for other's needs or achieving (or working towards) a state of self
flourishing where this flourishing of the self is otherwise possible. The would-be movie
going gardener who drives a beautiful old Vauxhall is presented as otherwise fully
capable of self-fulfillment but conflicted by the seeming need to respond to moral needs
of others. The damning reality of oppression is that agents do not begin with the prospect
of self-fulfillment which they may be asked to unfairly abandon. The existence of
oppression wilts and withers characters and contorts psychological apparatuses long
before agents are placed into circumstances where they are asked to sacrifice their
otherwise good characters. Swanton seems to assume that the unwilted person is
somehow plucked from their previously unsullied world of blissful self-fulfillment and
suddenly and unfairly asked to jettison this otherwise flourishing life. Only in a semiideal world could such a choice exist. Even if we were to grant that such a prospect is
possible, and believe that an agent can morally develop in an oppression-free vacuum, it
certainly only be a problem for a very select and privileged few. In reality, the harmful
and costly demands of resistance exist alongside the harmful and costly effects of
oppression. When the reality of oppression is understood, and taken seriously, the
overarching demands of resistance are no more wilting than the lived reality of the
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oppressed. When these circumstances are understood, the obligation to engage in
resistance is no longer trade-off between flourishing and harm, but rather the swapping of
the harms of oppression for the harms of resistance, and between these two positions only
resistance holds the promise of liberation.
Agents engaging in, and committing themselves to, resistance will have to
sacrifice, and sacrifice dearly. The demands of resistance ask us to prioritize our
projects, and it seems quite reasonable that the agent who develops the revolutionary
attitude and commits themselves to the project of resistance might find that this
revolutionary life cannot accommodate children, or continued schooling, or fine art, or
vacations to the beach. To the privileged, the reality that these goods might not be able to
be sought, let alone acquired, during the course of the revolutionary life may sound
shocking. Yet to the oppressed, the existence of such 'goods' has never been real and
asking them to abandon these goods is tantamount to asking them to feel regret for
accepting a life that will probably not experience interstellar space travel.

Section 5 - Conclusion

In the end, the determination of resistance actions cannot be specified without
context, and resistance cannot be reduced to a codified list of necessary actions. It is
impossible to say, with specifics, what resistance must look like. Resistance is a category
of actions which address the issue(s) of oppression. Resistance is not a specific tactic,
nor is it a strategy, but rather resistance captures the strategic and tactical actions one
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undertakes when the issue they address is, specifically, oppression.195 To fulfill the
demands of virtue ethics agents must act in a plurality of ways, in a multitude of
situations, and must organize themselves in such a way that their actions (be they
collective or individual) effectively fight to break down the harmful apparatuses of
oppression and work to make avenues to flourishing a reality for the oppressed.
Committing oneself to resistance, and working to fulfill the demands of virtue ethics, is a
costly endeavor and places continual and onerous demands on agents. As it is the soaring
harms of oppression which create these demands, it is at oppression and oppressive
structures which our actions must be targeted. The sad reality of oppression is that there
are individuals who, even when engaged in active resistance to oppression and
committing to the fulfillment of the moral demands placed on them by the existence of
oppression, will not achieve the flourishing virtue promises. Yet it is only through the
concerted effort of individuals working in tandem that there is any promise that these
harms can be alleviated or eliminated and flourishing made an available goal for all
people.

195

One may wonder if it is possible to have a model of issues, goals, strategy, and tactics which does not,
given this understanding of resistance, address oppression. It is not the case that the only implementation
of this model, and also the SMART criteria, come when fighting oppression. This model can be used in
cases of falsely identified oppression and may be employed, for example, by Neo-Nazi organizers. This
model can also be used in business as a way of tackling new customer bases or organizing new franchises.
In these cases the presented issue is not oppression (or a manifestation of oppression) and therefore yields
no resistance.
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CONCLUSION

By way of summery, this project took a paradigmatic understanding of oppression
and opened it up to a virtue-based analysis. This analysis allowed for a substantiation of
the all-too-obvious prima facie claim that oppression is harmful to those oppressed. The
holistic framework of virtue ethics, as the lens through which this harm was investigated,
showed that oppression warps the acquisition of the virtues in a multitude of ways,
systematically manipulates the external goods necessary for the development of the
virtues, and unduly presses agents into the habituation of base and shameful actions. In
each of these ways, oppression acts as a barrier for the achievement of flourishing. By
exposing oppression’s harmful influence on the ability for the oppressed to flourish, one
finds not only the need for agents to engage in resistance struggles against these
corrupting forces, but the obligatory nature of this need. The source of this obligation is
found in the ways that agents are obligated by the so-called d-rules implied by virtue
ethics’ schema for action guidance. In the end, the d-rules which emerge in conjunction
with oppression compel agents to engage in revolutionary actions to combat the existence
of oppression. It was argued here that this moral engagement cannot be said to discharge
our responsibilities through the mere cultivation of dispositional attitudes, but requires
that agents act in such a way that they maximize efficacy and actually combat the
oppressive structures and systems which limit avenues to flourishing.
This project has sought to make important contributions to both the existing
discussions of oppression found in social and political philosophy, as well as to the
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expanding tradition of virtue ethics. To this end, this dissertation makes three important
contributions in these areas.
This project contributes, in an important way, to the expanding literature on
oppression. Theorists like Frye, Cudd, and Harvey (to name just a few) have sought to
explore the philosophical and political dimensions of oppression, and this project
contributes to this expanding field. The contributions made here helps show the
substantial psychological, emotional, and moral impact of oppression as revealed by
virtue ethics and thus this project expands existing discussions by substantiating these
impacts.
The second way this project contributes to existing philosophical literature is that
it develops neo-Aristotelian understandings of action guidance. While Hursthouse stands
as the foremost figure in this field, and her explanation of the v-rules has helped
schematize and explain how virtue ethics provides a framework for action guidance, the
establishment of the d-rules here helps push this idea further. The d-rules allow for a
more refined explanation of action guidance as found in virtue ethics and, in what is
expectedly the most controversial aspect of this work, this action guidance works in such
a way that one can establish the generation of obligations in virtue ethics.
The third way this work makes important contributions to existing philosophical
literature on oppression is that it works to answer the looming question of ‘what is to be
done.’ Often philosophical works on oppression hint at, or vaguely suggest, the ways
agents should be acting in our struggles against oppression, but more often than not these
overtures stop short of providing a way to practically understand what shape these actions
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should take. As an example of this we can look to the way that Tessman walks up to the
question of effective resistance and then leaves it as an open question. She claims:

It is not my intent here to enter into… the question of whether liberatory goals are
best achieved through a commitment to nonviolence … or through a readiness for
violence. Nor will I try to determine the relative efficacy of ending oppression
through negotiation and communication with dominators—requiring virtues like
compassionate understanding…. Not settling these questions, I leave open
the possibility that the more‐militant or more‐radical approaches are the most
effective.196

Similarly, at the end of Cudd’s book length treatment of oppression she addresses
four potential strategies of resistance.197 These “strategies” include rhetorical and
symbolic strategies, economic strategies, armed strategies, and legal strategies. In each
arena she looks to past struggles and suggests a similar replication of past tactics, but she
does so without any schema for evaluating these potential actions as either effective,
realistic, or feasible. Where this work adds to existing literature is that it works to draw
practical resistance organizing into existing discussions of oppression and allows for a
robust substantiation of the concrete ways that the political resister must act.
Looking forward from here, this project sets forth multiple paths for future
exploration. The establishment of the d-rules, as outlined here, allows for continued
exploration of ways in which Aristotelian virtue ethics can make important inroads into
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discussions of practical and applied philosophy. The d-rules established here are only
explored in one area, the experience of oppression as an impediment to flourishing, but
the d-rules need not be limited to this one discussion. Their general form lends to their
application in a variety of arenas, and continued work on these derivative rules of action
guidance provide fertile ground for continued exploration. In this way, the d-rules set out
here seem to provide rich possibilities for continued exploration and scholarship in
practical and applied philosophy.
Beyond further exploration of the d-rules as an avenue for providing virtue
theoretic inroads into contemporary discussions of practical and applied philosophy, the
d-rules seem posed to answer important theoretical questions about the nature of the
supererogatory and the existence (or non-existence) of such a category in virtue ethics.
Chapter four, in part, worked to defend the account of obligation established here against
the potential charge of demandingness. While the work done here defended the specific
d-rules which emerge in conjunction with oppression against this potential objection, this
work also treads closely on the category of the supererogatory. People like Jason Kawall
have argued that virtue ethics lacks the tools necessary to make sensible headway on the
existence (or non-existence) of the category of the supererogatory, and Kawall claims
that the lack of these tools means that virtue ethics falls into circularity.198 On the
surface, it seems that the d-rules might be just the necessary tools which neo-Aristotelian
virtue ethics needs to address this question, and this possibility represents an important
avenue for further exploration and future scholarship.
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Beyond future academic work, this project begs for practical implementation.
The second half of this project aims to establish a way to mobilize people to combat
oppression and does so by outlining an organizing model which stresses the need for
continual praxis. In this way, the continued struggles against oppression require constant
and perpetual reflection and re-evaluation. By engaging in this unceasing and selfcritical evaluation, revolutionary movements of the oppressed are ensured that our
actions, campaigns, and efforts achieve the highest degree of efficiency. The practical
implementation of the suggestions made in this project work as both a forward plan for
real-life engagement and a reflective praxis of review, and the moral and social
philosophy used here has an important role to play in both these tasks. Here, the
philosopher and the activist become one and same person. The revolutionary agent must
take the abstract theoretical lessons learned from praxis and find ways to continually
shape their actions and campaigns, and the tools outlined here not only aid in the process
but make the reality of this process palpable. To this end it is worth considering a few
facts:
•

In 2014, The Walk Free Foundation completed a global survey and concluded
that, globally, there are currently 38.5 million slaves.199 This global estimate
includes the conservative estimate that there are 60,000 currently in the US.
Commenting on this report, Rick Noack, writing for the Washington Post, notes
that these shocking numbers are “twice the amount estimated… in 2012.”200

•

The Sentencing Project, a non-partisan research and advocacy origination, claims
that “The United States maintains its distinction as the nation with the highest rate
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of incarceration in the world… [with a] total correctional population of 6.9
million.” And according to the 2010 US Census, African Americans were 5 times
more likely than whites to be incarcerated, and while representing 13% of the US
population, African Americans represent over 40% of the incarcerated
population.201
•

Dr. Brian Mustanski, writing for Psychology Today, noted that in 2013 the
number of hate crimes perpetrated against members of the LGBT community has
doubled in New York City alone.202 And according to a 2011 FBI report, while
hate-crime numbers have decreased nationally, anti-gay hate crimes are nationally
increasing (and this report excludes anti-transgender hate crimes).203

•

The Wall Street Journal reported in 2014 that the Average income for the
wealthiest 10% of U.S. families rose 10% between 2010 and 2013 while at the
same time families in the bottom 40% saw their average inflation-adjusted income
decline over that same period.204 The AFL-CIO reported in 2013 that CEO pay
was an “eye popping” 331 times the salary of the average worker and 774 times
the take home salary of a minimum wage worker.205

One need not abstract very far from these facts to see that oppression, and systematic
injustice, is alive and well. It is the experience of oppression, which generate statistics
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like these, which provides the impetus for the need of revolutionary thinking about
resistance to oppression to which this project focused. While much of this work is
academic in nature, this project, and in particular chapter four, has sought to bring an
academic analysis of oppression into conversation with the reality of resistance struggles.
By engaging in practical resistance organizing, and by deploying a model such as the one
outlined here, oppressed peoples are equipped with the basic tools needed to actively
combat oppression. In this way, this project has sought to bridge the divide between
academic work on the reality of oppression and the resistance struggles oppression make
necessary. It is in the actual implementation of the suggestions made here that this
project hopes to move from an academic setting to the reality of liberation.
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